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Introduction: New Perspectives 
on Africa’s Youth Employment 
Challenge
Seife Ayele, Samir Khan and James Sumberg*
Abstract This article frames and introduces the ten other contributions 
to this collection. First, the dominant narrative around Africa’s youth 
employment challenge is set out, as are four key points of debate and 
discussion that are subsequently addressed by the various contributions. 
We then draw from the ‘research into policy’ literature and note that it 
says little about how young researchers move into a policy engagement 
mode, or how they can be helped to move in this direction. This sets the 
stage for an introduction to the Matasa Fellows Network, which was 
established to do just this, with a particular focus on the youth employment 
challenge in Africa. The articles in this IDS Bulletin are authored by the ten 
members of the first cohort of Matasa Fellows and are briefly introduced in 
the last section.
Keywords: underemployment, engaged excellence, side-hustle, 
precarious employment.
1 Introduction
Neither youth nor employment are new to development discourse 
and policy in sub-Saharan Africa. But while both have been on the 
development agenda at least since independence, over the last decade 
policy and programme interest in both youth and employment has 
increased dramatically. Specifically, the youth employment challenge 
provides an increasingly important focus for policy, intervention and 
research throughout the continent (as it does globally).
This renewed interest in youth and work reflects a heady combination of  
ideas, policy entrepreneurship, fear and crisis response, and was kicked off 
by the 2007 World Development Report, Development and the Next Generation 
(World Bank 2006). The report’s primary framing is of  young people as 
an ‘investment opportunity’, and the central argument is that governments 
and development partners should invest in youth because their situation 
presents an ‘unprecedented opportunity to accelerate growth and reduce 
poverty’ (op. cit.: 2), and that ‘if  they remain unemployed for long periods… 
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they could be a drain on the economy’ (ibid.). The notion of  human capital 
is central to the report, and specifically how policy can be used so that 
this capital, as embodied in young people, is ‘kept safe, developed, and 
deployed’ (ibid.). The main part of  the analysis is structured around five 
life transitions: continuing to learn, starting to work, developing a healthy 
lifestyle, starting a family, and exercising citizenship. The suggestion 
is that policy reform can most effectively help young people navigate 
these transitions by focusing on three strategic directions for reform: 
opportunities, capabilities and second chances. Despite the report’s 
largely instrumental approach to young people, it does acknowledge that 
an important element of  ‘getting it [policy] right’ is ‘listening to youth’, 
allowing them to exercise their ‘client power’.
Two closely related ideas – youth bulge (Evoh 2012; Sommers 2011) 
and demographic dividend (Ahmed et al. 2016; Choi 2016; Eastwood 
and Lipton 2011, 2012) – figure prominently in Development and the 
Next Generation, and have since become key aspects of  a now dominant 
narrative that both justifies and orients policy around youth and 
employment. A youth bulge refers to the situation that arises when 
countries reduce infant mortality but still have a high fertility rate, and 
as a result, a large share of  the population comprises children and 
young adults. As these young people come into the workforce they 
give rise to a potential, one-time, demographic dividend – a boost in 
economic productivity when there are ‘growing numbers of  people in 
the workforce relative to the number of  dependents’.1 Whether or not 
this dividend is realised depends on the structure and dynamism of  the 
economy – an economy that cannot provide productive employment to 
young people will forego any demographic dividend.
Another important aspect of  the dominant narrative that was 
consolidated through the 2007 World Development Report is a concern 
with ‘risky behaviours’ among especially under- and unemployed youth, 
associated with unprotected sex, alcohol, tobacco and drugs. Related to 
the sense that young people can be drawn into situations and behaviours 
that put themselves and society at risk is a fear that in the absence of  
employment opportunities, the youth bulge becomes a threat to political 
and social stability (Urdal 2004, 2006). Playing on the image of  idle 
young men as ‘breakers’ (Honwana and de Boeck 2005), the civil war 
in Sierra Leone (1991–2002), the violence following the December 
2007 election in Kenya, the Arab Spring (2010–11) and other examples 
are used to demonstrate the clear and present danger posed by young 
people who lack gainful employment.
The remainder of  this article is structured as follows. The next section 
introduces four key points of  debate and discussion relating to youth 
and employment in Africa. Each of  the articles in this IDS Bulletin 
address one or more of  these points. Following this, we draw from the 
literature on how development research affects policy and note that it 
says little about how young researchers move into a policy engagement 
mode, or how they can be helped to move in this direction. This sets 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 1–12 | 3
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
the stage for an introduction to the Matasa Fellows Network, which 
was established to do just this, with a particular focus on the youth 
employment challenge in Africa. The articles in this IDS Bulletin are 
authored by the ten members of  the first cohort of  Matasa Fellows and 
are briefly introduced in the last section.
2 Four points of debate
In this section, we introduce four points of  debate and discussion 
in the emerging ‘research–policy–intervention’ nexus around youth 
and employment in Africa. Not surprisingly, they are also important 
concerns of  the articles in this IDS Bulletin. The four points are: ‘Who 
are the youth?’, ‘What is the problem?’, ‘Are entrepreneurship and 
self-employment the solution?’ and ‘What about youth aspirations?’.
The ‘Who are the youth?’ debate arises because different age‑based 
definitions of  youth are used within and across countries and 
development organisations, with implications for official statistics and 
cross-country comparisons. From a policy coherence perspective, the 
issue is not so much with the lower age cut‑off, but rather the upper 
age cut‑off and the resulting range. There can be as many as ten years’ 
difference between the oldest youth by some United Nations definitions 
compared to some national definitions. Further, a typical definition of  
youth lumps together individuals who span a range of  20 years, which 
begs the question: do a 15-year-old and a 35-year-old have enough 
in common to enable coherent policy? More fundamentally, the hard 
boundaries that are inherent to age‑based definitions, and the resulting 
compartmentalisation of  policy, provide little space for the notion of  
transitions that is now so central to modern understandings of  young 
people’s lives (Locke and te Lintelo 2012). Related to this is the other 
– and perhaps more important – aspect of  this debate, which is the 
tension between the age‑based definitions from the worlds of  law and 
policy, and more fluid cultural and lived‑reality understandings of  youth 
that may take account of  markers like dependence and independence, 
marriage and childbirth. Again, do a 17-year-old dependent student 
living at home and a 17-year-old working mother have enough in 
common to enable coherent policy?
It is clear that there will always be a need for unambiguous definitions 
of  the age at which young people can, for example, leave school, 
vote, marry, sign contracts, join the army or hold public office. It is 
not obvious, however, if  or why policy relating to young people and 
employment must continue to be bound by arbitrary and overly broad 
definitions. Even if  in a particular country anyone between the ages of  
15 and 35 continues to be defined as youth, it does not follow that policy 
and interventions could or should not focus, for example, on either the 
lower end of  the range, or those individuals who, regardless of  their 
age, find themselves at a particular transition.
The ‘What is the problem?’ debate has two important dimensions. 
The first revolves around unemployment versus underemployment. 
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The fact that the official statistics estimate unemployment means 
that it is commonly used to frame the problem, with the absolute 
levels and differences between youth and adult, and rural and urban 
unemployment being most often cited. However, some observers argue 
that these figures are of  little value, particularly in rural Africa, because 
unemployment is generally low, while underemployment, which is less 
often estimated or reported, is high (Gough, Langevang and Owusu 
2013; Hino and Ranis 2014: see also ILOSTAT, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) database of  labour statistics). This matters 
because policy responses to unemployment and underemployment 
should be quite different, and a faulty framing of  the problem will 
likely result in lost opportunities and wasted resources. The second 
dimension of  this debate is reflected in the choice of  related but subtly 
different terms, including employment, self‑employment, job, work, 
entrepreneurship and career, and the additional complexity that comes 
from combinations like ‘gainful employment’ and ‘decent work’. What 
are the explicit or implicit messages that accompany alternative framings 
like the ‘the youth employment challenge’, the ‘youth jobs challenge’ or 
the ‘youth work challenge’? From the perspective of  (some) policymakers 
and/or (some) young people, is wage employment in the formal sector 
the gold standard, while everything else is simply work, or ‘waiting’? And 
where should, for example, domestic work and unpaid care work fit into 
our thinking about the youth employment challenge (Chopra 2015)? 
As illustrated by Victoria Flavia Namuggala (this IDS Bulletin), in some 
situations the boundaries between employment, socially unacceptable 
activity and criminal activity are becoming increasingly blurred.
The ‘Are entrepreneurship and self-employment the solution?’ debate, 
such as it is, remains extremely one-sided, with most policymakers 
and development professionals committed to entrepreneurship as the 
best (and only) response to the youth employment challenge. This 
commitment must be set against two observations. First, there has 
been a move from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’ conceptions of  entrepreneurship, 
so that it is now considered synonymous with self-employment – 
any activity that is undertaken to generate income is considered 
entrepreneurship (Langevang et al. 2015; Singer, Amores and Moske 
2015). This inclusiveness risks draining the terms entrepreneurship 
and entrepreneurial behaviour of  any meaning. Second, by accepting 
that entrepreneurship and self-employment are synonymous, it forces 
one to take seriously the conclusions of  a recent ILO review of  
self-employment programmes for young people, which concluded:
It is not clear, on the basis of  the evidence and data reviewed, that 
the [self-employment] schemes that have been tried actually created 
new self-employed jobs, nor is it clear whether these jobs are of  
sufficient merit to be worth creating (Burchell et al. 2015: 40).
Yeboah et al. (2016) suggested that the commitment to entrepreneurship 
and self-employment as the main responses to the youth employment 
challenge in Africa indicates an ‘imagination gap’ between the 
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employment futures that policymakers imagine for young people, 
and those that young people imagine for themselves. A more explicit 
focus on the demand side of  the youth employment challenge will be 
necessary if  this gap is to be addressed (Flynn et al. 2017).
Reference to the imagination gap brings us to the closely related ‘What 
about youth aspirations?’ debate, which touches on a number of  related 
concepts including aspirations, expectations, dreams and imagined 
futures (Hardgrove, Rootham and McDowell 2015; Leavy and Smith 
2010). In a sense, the question is how seriously young people’s stated 
aspirations should be taken: for example, while some are adamant that 
it is not realistic to think that everyone can be a salaried professional, 
others applaud such imagined futures for their ambition, despite the 
fact that they may not be grounded in local or personal realities. On a 
practical level, their aspirations and imagined futures – however they 
are judged by adults – are the most important basis on which young 
people can engage with policy and programmes concerning their 
working futures. If  the idea of  bringing young people into discussions 
about how best to address the youth employment challenge is to move 
beyond rhetoric, taking the futures they imagine for themselves seriously 
will be an absolute necessity.
3 Research plus
Reflecting the broader influence of  the evidence‑based policy 
movement, the renewed interest in youth and employment in Africa 
has been accompanied by calls for evidence of  what works. While 
the existing research base from which evidence can be drawn is quite 
limited, there are signs that the level of  potentially relevant research and 
evaluation activity is increasing.
What are the chances that this research will actually be useful in 
informing policy around youth and employment, and how can these 
chances be improved? In recent years, much has been written about 
the ‘research into policy’ problem (Court and Maxwell 2005; Eames 
and McGeevor 2007; Stone 2009, 2013; van der Arend 2014; Young 
2005). Approaches to this reflect different understandings of  knowledge 
and evidence, and of  the policy process. The research into the policy 
problem looks very different to those who see the policy process as linear 
and largely technical, compared to those who argue that both evidence 
and policy processes are always contested and deeply political. The 
research and policy in development (RAPID) framework (Court and 
Maxwell 2005; Court and Young 2006; Young 2005) for the analysis 
of  impacts of  research on policy draws from both the technical and 
political approaches. It highlights the need to understand context 
(i.e. forces that influence research uptake crucially include the extent 
of  civil and political freedoms in a given country, political contestation, 
institutional pressures and vested interests; and attitudes and incentives 
among officials, etc.); the evidence (which needs to be credible and of  
high quality, timely and relevant); the links between policy and research 
communities (i.e. the importance of  links with communities, networks 
6 | Ayele et al. Introduction: New Perspectives on Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge
Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’
and intermediaries, the media and campaigning groups); and external 
influence (notably the impact of  donors’ actions on the research–policy–
practice nexus and international politics and processes).
The notion of  ‘engaged excellence’ (IDS 2015; Oswald, Gaventa 
and Leach 2017) is also relevant. In IDS Bulletin 47.6, Oswald et al. 
(2017) suggest that engaged excellence reflects a recognition that in 
development, the quality of  research is dependent upon it linking to 
and involving those people who are at the heart of  particular change 
processes. They also identify four interdependent pillars of  engaged 
excellence, namely: delivering high-quality research; co-constructing 
knowledge; mobilising impact-oriented evidence; and building enduring 
partnerships. Crucially, an engaged excellence approach is based on an 
appreciation of  the importance of  knowledge politics and an ability to 
engage with and navigate the politics of  policy processes in different fora.
There is another strand of  literature that focuses more on the individual, 
and specifically the links between personal political commitment and 
scholarship. Along these lines, O’Connell described what he referred to 
as politically engaged scholars who ‘entered research settings as change 
agents and openly admitted values into their scholarship’ (2011: iii).
But significantly, these literatures say relatively little about how young 
researchers get into a policy engagement mode, or how they can be 
prompted or helped to move in this direction. For those in a university 
environment, criteria for promotion come into play, as these often 
prioritise publication over policy impact. There is also a particular 
challenge if  new PhD researchers return to their universities to find they 
are heavily burdened with teaching and other duties. Understandably, 
learning the ropes of  effective policy engagement often takes a back 
seat in these crucial early years, and regrettably, this may set a pattern 
that continues long into the future. The Matasa Fellows Network was 
designed to help address this challenge.
4 Matasa Fellows Network
The Matasa Fellows Network was launched in 2015 as a joint initiative 
by The MasterCard Foundation and IDS. It aims to develop a network 
of  young African researchers with the commitment and skills to make a 
positive contribution to policy around youth employment in Africa. Ten 
Fellows, who either recently completed or would soon complete PhDs 
were selected from 222 highly qualified applicants. The Fellows’ academic 
training covers economics and applied econometrics, anthropology, 
geography, development studies, international education, politics, women 
and gender studies, and migration. This breadth of  disciplines reflects the 
complexity and multiple dimensions of  the youth employment challenge.
Fundamental to the Matasa initiative is the proposition that no 
matter how innovative or rigorous the research, policy influence will 
seldom be achieved by bolting on a few policy recommendations or a 
short discussion of  policy implications to a research report or paper. 
(Endnotes)
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Rather, influence requires careful reflection, strategy, planning and 
tactics, and above all, a nuanced understanding of  the context and 
the politics that shape any given policy process. Unfortunately, this 
orientation, and the skills needed to put it into action, are seldom part 
of  PhD training programmes. This is the gap that the Matasa Fellows 
Network seeks to address.
In September 2016, nine of  the ten Matasa Fellows participated in 
a week‑long workshop at IDS. Different aspects and understandings 
of  the African youth employment challenge were explored, as were 
academic and practitioner perspectives on the policy process. A 
‘walkshop’ over the Sussex Downs provided space to reflect on the value 
of  concepts like ‘imagined self ’ and ‘imagined future’ in addressing 
the youth and employment challenge, and also helped consolidate 
the group’s esprit de corps. The Fellows walked and worked together to 
develop their ideas for the articles in this IDS Bulletin – many of  which 
were drawn from their PhD research. A second workshop was held 
in December 2016 at the University of  Ghana at Legon, at which 
the articles were finalised and a series of  policy briefs prepared. Two 
additional events provided valuable insights into workings of  national 
public policy processes in Ghana.
5 Introduction to the articles
The articles in this IDS Bulletin address four core areas: the evidence 
on youth employment policy and interventions; the politics of  youth 
policy; the changing nature of  young people’s work; and promotion of  
entrepreneurship.
Setting the scene, Kilimani (this IDS Bulletin) provides an overview of  
the youth employment challenge across the developing world, with a 
particular focus on policies and interventions. This review identifies 
two critical factors that are commonly seen to limit employment 
opportunities for young people: human capital, including education, 
training and skills; and a business environment facilitating access to 
key resources such as credit, infrastructure and markets. But as many 
interventions are based on little more than faith and theory, as opposed 
to evidence, they generally fail to deliver jobs. Greater support for 
labour-intensive sectors and public works may be warranted. There is 
in any case strong arguments for more integrated and coherent policy 
across education, labour markets, financial services, and infrastructure.
Turning to the politics of  youth policy, Gebremariam (this IDS Bulletin) 
provides a critical analysis of  the development and contradictions of  
youth policy in Ethiopia. He charts a shift from government portraying 
unemployed youth as ‘threats’ and ‘vagrants’ to their incorporation 
into the emerging developmental state, reflecting a reframing of  youth 
as ‘entrepreneurs’ and as the ‘seeds of  democracy and development’. 
This shift reflected the role that young people played in giving the 
government a bloody nose in the fiercely contested 2005 national 
elections. An important conclusion is that context matters in shaping 
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youth policy and interventions, and that a focus on changing framings 
and narratives provides an extremely useful window through which to 
analyse these political and policy dynamics.
How young people find, access, create, combine and perceive work – 
how they navigate an increasingly precarious employment landscape 
– are the concerns of  five articles. Using the notion of  ‘side‑hustle’, 
Mwaura (this IDS Bulletin) documents efforts by six educated young 
people in Kenya to generate income through agriculture. Their efforts 
challenge a number of  important assumptions – that being employed 
means having one job; that individuals work in either the formal or the 
informal sector; that educated youth are not interested in agriculture; 
and that a choice to get involved in agriculture reflects long‑term 
intentions. The diverse livelihoods, mixing and matching across formal 
and informal employment and agricultural entrepreneurship that 
characterise side-hustling can be read as young people successfully 
struggling against adversity. But Mwaura argues that more than 
anything else they reflect the failure of  the state to uphold its end of  
the intergenerational bargain. Along similar lines, Namuggala (this 
IDS Bulletin) contrasts formal understandings of  work and employment 
with the range of  income-generating activities undertaken by young 
people displaced by the war in Northern Uganda. While the law and 
mainstream society criminalise or stigmatise sex work, gambling and 
dancing, for these young people they are among the few available forms 
of  employment. To classify these young people as either unemployed 
or deviant is to completely misread their situations and motivations. 
This point is brought home in the fact that income generated through 
these activities is used to fulfil family and social responsibilities. Broader 
perspectives on the nature of  work urgently need to be brought into 
public policy debate.
The links between young people, migration and work have generated 
significant research and policy interest, and Yeboah (this IDS Bulletin) 
engages with these debates with a particular focus on migrants’ social 
networks. The article draws on interviews with 30 young migrants from 
rural northern Ghana who were working in and around Agbogbloshie 
market in Accra. Migrants draw on their social networks to obtain the 
funds to travel to Accra, and to secure work and navigate risky and 
precarious employment situations. But these same social networks are 
also associated with discriminatory and exploitative practices. Yeboah 
argues that the key policy challenge is not how to stop migration or 
strengthen migrants’ networks, but rather how to enable young people 
from poor families and poor areas to remain in school, so that they 
can enter the labour market from a more advantageous position. 
The challenges facing young people in marginal rural areas are also 
addressed by Mutua et al. (this IDS Bulletin) with specific reference to 
livestock production and marketing in Baringo County, Kenya. Results 
of  a survey are used to explore how social norms and micropolitics 
enable or constrain participation. This analysis indicates a disconnect 
between Kenya’s youth policy which advocates for equitable distribution 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 1–12 | 9
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
of  employment opportunities, and the reality at community level, 
where access to and control over livestock resources remains far from 
equitable. This poses particular challenges for livestock development 
programmes: can implementation strategies be developed that challenge 
existing barriers in ways that increase employment opportunities for 
male and female youth, without attracting backlash from other groups?
Continuing with the focus on rural areas, Lambon‑Quayefio (this 
IDS Bulletin) takes a critical look at the common narrative that the 
rural non‑farm economy has the potential to generate a significant 
number of  jobs for young people. Reviewing evidence from Ghana, she 
concludes that rural non-farm enterprises are highly heterogeneous, 
and many function essentially as coping mechanisms. At the present 
time, these enterprises have little potential for growth or employment 
creation. Lambon‑Quayefio suggests that a much more disaggregated 
understanding of  the rural non-farm economy is needed, and in 
particular in relation to operators’ motivations. In addition, policymakers 
must follow through on long-standing commitments to invest in rural 
infrastructure – without this, the rural non-farm sector will be of  little 
interest to young people seeking productive employment.
The last three articles in this collection look at efforts to promote 
entrepreneurship as a response to the youth employment challenge 
in Africa. Sikenyi (this IDS Bulletin) questions the effectiveness of  the 
Kenyan Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF). This flagship 
credit programme was meant to transform large numbers of  under- 
and unemployed youth from ‘job seekers’ to ‘job creators’. However, 
the eligibility criteria are such that few young people can qualify; but 
perhaps more importantly, the fund has been mired in accusations of  
political meddling, mis-management and corruption. Government 
credit programmes like YEDF are problematic by their very nature, but 
the possibility that they benefit under‑ and unemployed youth could 
be improved with more reasonable eligibility criteria and mentoring, 
greater accountability and transparency, and more effectively 
coordinated by state and non-state actors.
Shittu (this IDS Bulletin) focuses on the role of  mentoring in promoting 
youth entrepreneurship. His main conclusion is that in order to address 
the scale-up of  mentoring programmes, there is a need for much more 
research on in what situations and for whom group mentoring models 
can be made to work. Finally, Mgumia (this IDS Bulletin) draws on her 
PhD research in Tanzania to document the experience of  52 participants 
in a youth-oriented entrepreneurship programme. The programme 
tried to induce entrepreneurship through training and access to credit. 
However, this effort at ‘programme‑induced entrepreneurship’ is shown 
to have been of  limited relevance to participants who either aspire to 
salaried employment, or whose demanding family situations make it 
impossible to accumulate and effectively manage the capital required to 
establish a small business. This analysis strengthens the call for a more 
nuanced, contextualised and constrained approach to the promotion of  
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entrepreneurship and self-employment as primary responses to the youth 
employment challenge in Africa.
In summary, the contributions to this IDS Bulletin: first, underline 
the enormity of  the youth employment challenge in Africa; second, 
demonstrate how politics and political context shape youth-related 
policy; third, illustrate the need for critical reflection on the multiple and 
divergent meanings of  work and employment; and fourth, highlight an 
urgent need to rethink interventions that promote entrepreneurship and 
self‑employment. The scope for quality research and effective policy 
engagement is tremendous.
Note
* We acknowledge the very helpful comments and suggestions of  
the individuals who peer reviewed the articles in this IDS Bulletin, 
including: Koffi Assouan, Steve Cumming, Victoria Johnson, 
Karen Moore, Christie Okali and Shova Thapa Karki. We also 
acknowledge the valuable assistance of  Hannah Corbett and 
Carole Smithyes.
1 United Nations Population Fund, www.unfpa.org/demographic-
dividend.
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Youth Employment in Developing 
Economies: Evidence on Policies 
and Interventions
Nicholas Kilimani
Abstract Based on a synthesis of the existing academic and policy 
literature, this article undertakes a situational analysis of youth employment 
in developing countries. The article analyses existing interventions across 
sectors and provides insights into how they can be harnessed to generate 
employment opportunities, citing examples of specific projects. This has 
been undertaken with a view to bringing to light interventions that have 
been proven to work, as well as demonstrating the sources of failure. 
Finally, the article distils key emerging issues related to human capital and 
the business environment. These have been shown to be binding constraints 
to higher productivity, and can be used as inputs to shape policy discourse 
around youth employment. 
Keywords: Africa, developing economies, underemployment, youth, 
employment policies, job creation skills. 
1 Introduction
Full and productive employment and decent work were targets in 
Millennium Development Goal 1 to eradicate extreme hunger and 
poverty: employment is considered the main route out of  poverty. 
Employment also features prominently among the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) which were rolled out in 2015. The 
issue of  employment for youth and women is of  particular interest as 
these groups tend to be in the weakest positions in the labour market 
(Koehler 2013). In the analysis of  youth employment outcomes, it is 
important to focus on job prospects over the longer term. This is based 
on the understanding that young people with diminished prospects 
of  finding decent work at their entry into the labour market will likely 
face undesirable labour market outcomes over longer periods (see 
ILO 2012a). Studies on youth labour market dynamics show that 
unemployment during youth and early adulthood results in lower 
earnings, higher probability of  unemployment, and lower health and 
job satisfaction in the future (see Kletzer and Fairlie 2003; Burgess et al. 
2003; Bell and Blanchflower 2011). 
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Youth comprise roughly a quarter of  the world’s population, and in many 
countries, especially in Africa and South Asia, young people make up 
nearly a third of  the population (S4YE 2015). Because of  this, not only 
do nations in the developing world share high age-dependency ratios 
– the ratio of  dependents (people younger than 15, or older than 64) 
to the working age population (those aged 15–64) – they also have large 
populations under the age of  15. Projections suggest that a billion more 
young people will enter the job market over the next decade. Cleland and 
Machiyama (2016) present key demographic projections between 2015 
and 2050 for sub-Saharan Africa. A critical result to note is continued 
population growth, albeit at uneven rates across age groups and urban–
rural strata. Total population is expected to more than double. Given 
such trends, it is critical that sound policies and interventions are put into 
place to tap into this potential population dividend:1 the cost of  failure 
will be lost human potential and possible sociopolitical instability. In East 
Asia and the Pacific, the economic transformation witnessed between 
1965 and 1990 was partly attributed to a rapidly expanding working-
age population (see Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom, Canning and 
Malaney 2000). More importantly, the region had just over one working-
age adult for each dependant in 1965, rising to almost two by 1990 
(Filmer and Fox 2014). During that time, gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita in the region rose from US$1,300 to US$3,300. East Asia’s 
demographic is understood to have resulted in economic transformation 
through, first, the rise in output per capita; and second, the increase in 
working age population relative to total population, the result of  which 
was a rapid decline in fertility.
For many programmes, identification of  linkages between the dynamics in 
the labour market, entrepreneurship interventions and actual employment 
has largely been based first on faith, second on theory, and only lastly 
on evidence (see Blattman and Ralston 2015). Consequently, in many 
contexts such programmes have failed to deliver jobs, poverty reduction or 
stability. Most notable are standard interventions such as skills training and 
microfinance. Osmani (2002) provides insights into why, despite numerous 
interventions aimed at creating employment, many developing economies 
are not able to absorb new entrants into the labour market, especially the 
young. Among these is labour market failures and specifically the inaccuracy 
of  information about the types of  work that are available and the returns to 
labour that can realistically be expected from each. Even with microfinance 
programmes that provide start-up capital, access is often difficult for 
young people. This may be partly because of  the high cost of  reducing the 
uncertainty associated with lending to ‘beginners in business’, but may also 
reflect informational asymmetries. With respect to skills training, there is a 
gap in knowledge as to which skills are most profitable to acquire, and how 
and by whom they can be acquired. This article synthesises this literature 
and provides insights for policy direction. Specifically, it reviews the evidence 
on some of  the most common policies: labour market interventions, 
entrepreneurship, and other social protection programmes. The focus of  
the article is on labour market and entrepreneurship interventions that 
primarily target youth in developing countries. 
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2 Situational review of trends in youth employment
Data on various youth employment indicators show that low 
unemployment and inactivity rates are not necessarily signs of  
better youth labour market outcomes, as they mask high rates of  
underemployment, vulnerable employment, informal work, and 
working poverty (Pieters 2012). South Asia and especially sub-Saharan 
Africa face the largest youth employment challenge in terms of  size 
and share of  the youth population. These are equally the regions where 
vulnerable employment shares (self-employment and unpaid work) are 
highest. Middle-income countries in the Southern Mediterranean and 
sub-Saharan Africa have the world’s highest youth unemployment rates. 
Youth unemployment rates tend to rise with education and are higher 
in urban areas. Women fare much worse than men, both in terms of  
unemployment and vulnerable employment. 
Figure 1 Global unemployment and unemployment rates (%), 2007–15
Notes Youth (15–24), adult (25+) and total (15+), 2007–15.  
Source ILO (2015).
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2.1 Global youth unemployment starts to recover
After a period of  rapid increase between 2007 and 2010, the global 
youth unemployment rate settled at 13 per cent for the period 2012–14 
and is expected to have remained stable in 2015 (Figure 1). While this 
rate is now on par with rates observed in the early 2000s, the number of  
unemployed youth has shown a significant decline over the same period: 
78.7 million youth were unemployed in 2005, 76.6 million unemployed 
at the peak of  the crisis in 2009, descending to an estimated 73.4 million 
unemployed in 2015. In the ten-year span between 2005 and 2015, the 
youth labour force declined by as much as 46 million while the number 
of  unemployed youth dropped by 5.3 million. Figure 2 reflects the 
cyclical nature of  youth unemployment and reminds us of  the often 
repeated tenet that youth are among the most severely impacted by 
economic crises: they are the ‘first out’ as economies contract and the 
‘last in’ during periods of  recovery (ILO 2015).
Evidence from previous crises suggests that it takes an average of  four 
to five years from the resumption of  economic growth before overall 
employment returns to its pre-crisis levels (ILO 2009). Recovery of  youth 
employment can take even longer. In fact, at this point in time, nearly 
ten years after the onset of  the global economic crisis, the global youth 
unemployment rate remains well above the pre-crisis rate of  11.7 per cent. 
While the number of  unemployed youth has declined in recent years, the 
global youth unemployment rate is proving more difficult to reduce.
Projections for 2015 through 2019 show no change at 13.1 per cent 
until 2019. Regional disparities are, however, likely to increase, as some 
improvement in youth unemployment rates in developed economies in 
the medium term will be offset by the increase in unemployment rates 
in other regions.
Figure 3 Analytical framework for Pathways to Youth Employment 
Source S4YE (2015). Reproduced with kind permission of S4YE.
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3 The link between employment programmes and actual employment
This article’s framework for analysis is adopted from Solutions for 
Youth Employment’s (S4YE) theory of  change, which is presented 
in Figure 3. The S4YE Pathways to Youth Employment framework 
represents the current conceptual thinking on how to provide young 
people with pathways to economic opportunities and employment – 
and how stakeholders can work to achieve youth employment at scale. 
The framework depicts a youth’s journey towards productive work, 
highlighting how underlying conditions combine with government and 
non-government efforts and interventions to shape her/his trajectory 
towards a dignified adult life. In doing so, it provides a road map 
for how interventions aimed at creating youth employment should 
be crafted. In fact, the framework is not meant to be static – it may 
change over time with shifting dynamics and new knowledge. Overall, 
the challenges constraining productivity and earnings for youth have 
to be articulated in order to provide an orientation for policies. Most 
importantly, the focus should be on activities with the ability to generate 
adequate employment for the growing number of  youth.
The Pathways to Youth Employment framework needs to be 
interrogated in relation to three critical sectors. The first sector is 
agriculture. In many parts of  the developing world and especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture employs over 70 per cent of  the labour 
force. In principle, it can therefore be a source of  employment for 
many youth. However, prospects for growth as well as issues of  value 
chain development are critical for the sector to generate the much 
desired capacity to absorb the increasing numbers of  unemployed 
youth. The second sector is household enterprises. These are most often 
unincorporated, non-farm businesses owned by households, which 
include self-employed people running smallholder businesses using 
unpaid family labour. Third is the modern wage sector, which includes 
small, medium and large firms employing five or more workers. In 
many developing economies, approximately half  of  wage employment 
is in the public sector. However, given the inelasticity of  employment 
in the public sector, the focus should be on the private sector where the 
prospects for growth, and hence job creation, are greatest. 
The framework highlights two dimensions that are critical to 
engendering a pathway to productive work. The first of  these is human 
capital, i.e. the supply side of  the labour market, which includes 
individual abilities, education and training, skills, family connections, 
networks and other characteristics unique to an individual. Human 
capital is fundamental in enabling a person to find opportunities to be 
productive, increase earnings and achieve income security (Filmer and 
Fox 2014). Evidence used to identify externalities in education is derived 
mostly from agriculture. Externalities take the form of  farmers learning 
from their neighbours, especially the more educated who are likely to 
adopt new technologies (Conley and Udry 2010; Rosenzweig 2010). 
The second dimension is the business environment. This is outside an 
individual or firm’s control, but affects productivity. It includes access to 
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productive resources such as land, credit, infrastructure, technology and 
markets. In Africa in particular, insecure and ambiguous land rights, as 
well as constraints on rental markets are considered major impediments, 
especially for young people. Tenure security can be improved through 
systematic land registration. This can improve farmers’ confidence to 
the degree that they undertake costly and long-term investments on the 
land. Furthermore, they can even use the land registration certificate 
as collateral. Evidence from Rwanda shows that the more secure the 
land tenure, the greater the investments in soil improvement, up by 
9 per cent and 18 per cent among male and female farmers respectively 
(Ayalew, Deininger and Goldstein 2011). Registered and titled land 
provide a basis for the development of  land markets which are shown 
to engender commercial farming and also increase productivity (see 
Morris, Binswanger-Mkhize and Byerlee 2009). Registration can also 
facilitate transfer to small-scale farmers (e.g. in Sudan, see Filmer and 
Fox 2014). Other aspects of  a business environment include government 
policies, regulations and programmes which can directly or indirectly 
affect the choice of  economic activity, and even how it is conducted.
This framework integrates a range of  issues including skills acquisition, 
the employment options available to youths depending on the skills 
acquired, and the supportive interventions that ensure that youth can 
be absorbed into the workplace, right through to actual employment. In 
the framework, government as a stakeholder can develop the necessary 
policies, institutions, infrastructure and legal frameworks to engender 
youth employment, while non-governmental actors can influence youth 
employment through private investment which in turn has an influence 
on the demand for labour. Essentially, each stakeholder has their own 
contribution towards realising youth employment. These issues and the 
linkages between them are presented in Figure 3 and are discussed in 
the subsequent sections of  the article.
4 Dynamics of determinants of youth labour market outcomes
To understand the major challenges bedevilling youth employment 
in developing countries, it is useful to first discuss the determinants 
of  labour market outcomes as these form a basis for designing 
interventions. Labour market outcomes are reflected by a number of  
critical factors which are elucidated below.
4.1 Labour demand
Labour demand is largely driven by economic growth and structural 
change. Essentially, job creation depends on the growth and labour-
intensity of  production in the different sectors of  the economy. In 
middle-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the services sector 
accounts for a high and growing share of  employment, while the 
share of  agriculture and sometimes even manufacturing has been 
on the decline (IMF 2012). The majority of  developing country 
workers in the services sector are self-employed, for example in retail 
and transportation services. This trend of  structural change, with 
an increasing share of  the workforce in low-productivity activities, 
(Endnotes)
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 13–32 | 19
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
can result from a lack of  labour demand in high-productivity formal 
enterprises. Increasing the productivity of  smallholder farmers in the 
agricultural sector would be one opportunity for generating youth 
employment. The growing demand for food locally and globally is a 
potential opportunity, and with its land and water resources Africa is 
well positioned to respond. If  youth could be provided with access to 
agricultural resources in tandem with interventions to make agriculture 
more productive, some suggest that it would go a long way towards 
transforming livelihoods (Filmer and Fox 2014).
In Latin America, for example, productivity growth since the 1990s 
has been accompanied by a declining share of  manufacturing in total 
employment, with workers moving into lower-productivity employment 
in services (McMillan and Rodrik 2012). In the Middle East and 
North Africa, jobs have been created in low-value-added sectors, such 
as construction and the public sector, while few have been created 
in manufacturing. Furthermore, job growth has not kept pace with 
growth of  the working age population. The public sector accounts for 
a large share of  the total wage bill in countries in the region, due to a 
high public employment share and relatively high public sector wages 
(World Economic Forum 2012). Public sector employment, including 
public administration and publicly owned enterprises, has especially 
dominated the market for educated labour. In Egypt for example, this 
was a result of  public employment guarantees for secondary and post-
secondary graduates. These guarantees proved untenable and were 
suspended in the early 1990s (Assaad 1997). 
With increasing global integration of  economies, the structure of  
(employment) growth is also affected by external factors. The impact 
of  the 2008 financial crisis on GDP and consumption in the developed 
world indirectly affected developing countries through reductions in 
demand for their exports of  goods and services. The global economic 
and financial crisis has particularly affected youth, and the decline in 
work opportunities has created immense friction in the school-to-work 
transition. As a matter of  fact, young job seekers have worse prospects 
for decent formal sector employment than their parents. 
The World Bank (2012b) highlights how employment challenges are 
interconnected through the proliferation of  production fragmentation. 
For instance, jobs in both manufacturing and services are increasingly 
mobile. As such, the growing labour costs in Asia (in particular, China) 
could open up opportunities for other developing countries to jump-start 
industrialisation. What is critical to note is that when labour demand 
slows down, self-employment may be the only alternative opportunity. 
Thus, intervention to support self-employment may be needed. 
4.2 Labour supply
The supply-side drivers of  youth employment outcomes are the 
quantity, quality and relevance of  education and skills. Skills are built 
through formal general education, formal vocational education and 
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training (VET) and apprenticeships, and through non-formal education 
and training. Access to primary education is a first requirement 
for basic literacy and numeracy skills, which are a precondition for 
ensuring access to decent work. Survey evidence shows existence of  
major failures in delivery of  education. For instance, cases have been 
recorded of  teacher absenteeism of  16–20 per cent on a given day in 
Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania. In these countries, learners are known 
to experience only two to three hours of  learning a day (Filmer and Fox 
2014). Improvements in basic education would lay a better foundation 
for improvements in productivity, by maximising young people’s 
possibilities of  successfully transitioning to remunerative employment. 
Besides general education, youth can acquire work-relevant skills 
through VET, which can be integrated into compulsory schooling as an 
alternative to an academically oriented track, or can be part of  several 
post-compulsory schooling options. Eichhorst et al. (2012) show that in 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, VET is of  limited 
importance. This is due to weak links between skills provided by the 
VET system and those that are demanded by the private sector. Other 
challenges include insufficient funding, poor monitoring and evaluation, 
stigmatisation, and lower returns to VET compared to secondary 
education.2 In sub-Saharan Africa, the expected benefits from VET 
relative to general secondary schooling are not evident, and many view 
VET as an inferior alternative. Because the majority of  firms and jobs 
are informal, traditional apprenticeships after primary education can be 
sufficient to gain employment (Pieters 2012). 
The benefits of  VET in terms of  earning and social promotion vary 
across countries and influence its attractiveness. Returns to VET are 
higher than general secondary education in, for example, Cambodia, 
Indonesia (for older cohorts), Thailand and Turkey (World Bank 2010a). 
In other countries, such as Egypt, Indonesia (younger cohorts), Iran, 
Rwanda and Tanzania, returns to VET are lower than to secondary 
general education. Cross-country differences may be due to variations 
in implementation, labour market institutions and employers’ 
willingness to invest in skills on-the-job (Eichhorst et al. 2012). Evidence 
from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries shows that the returns to vocational education 
decline with age. This is largely attributed to the idea that VET limits 
students’ ability to adapt to technological change as their potential to 
regularly acquire new knowledge naturally diminishes with exposure, 
and age (Hanushek, Woessmann and Zhang 2011). In this case, good 
quality VET needs inbuilt capacity to prepare students for adapting to 
ever-changing technologies. 
4.3 Migration
Across the developing world, labour supply in different places is also 
affected by rural–urban, rural–rural and international migration. Due 
to rural–urban migration patterns, urban labour supply tends to grow 
faster than the working age population, further increasing the pressure 
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on urban labour markets. Globally, about 25 per cent of  urban growth 
is driven by rural–urban migration, although migration accounts for a 
larger share in countries that are still largely rural. This is particularly 
the case in East and Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, but also the 
MENA region (Grant 2012). At the same time, economic crises induce 
high rates of  return-migration when migrants lack social safety nets in 
the cities, shifting some of  the labour supply back to rural areas. 
Most rural–urban migrants are young people, who also make up a 
significant share of  international migrants.3 Youth migration can serve 
to build human capital if  the migrants attend school or gain work 
experience and income in the host region or country. There is evidence 
that international migration can help reduce poverty and contribute 
to economic growth in the migrants’ countries of  origin. According 
to the World Bank, an average increase of  10 per cent of  emigrants 
in the total population of  a developing country is associated with a 
1.6 percentage point reduction in poverty. Furthermore, economic 
analyses show that an increase in temporary migration in developed 
countries, including low-qualified migrants, could produce gains 
amounting to US$150bn each year, equally shared between developed 
and developing countries (Dayton-Johnson et al. 2009). However if  
migration leads to a significant loss of  skilled labour to more developed 
economies (i.e. brain drain), international migration might have 
negative impacts on sending countries.
In this regard, policies toward international migration and employment 
in developing countries must be more coherent, given the many 
interactions between the two phenomena. Coherent policies require a 
much better understanding of  the links and impacts between mobility, 
jobs and development. Given the current socioeconomic challenges, 
these policies should be pursued by means of  stronger partnerships 
between origin and destination countries, with special attention to 
brain drain and circular migration issues. Of  particular importance are 
remittances and their contribution to job creation in recipient countries: 
can policy help create stronger incentives to save and invest in migrants’ 
home countries? 
4.4 Labour market functioning 
Youth employment outcomes are shaped by the institutions governing 
the matching of  job seekers to vacancies, notably those institutions 
that are charged with the provision of  labour market information, 
intermediation and regulation. Availability and quality of  information 
plays a key role in the labour market, for job seekers to identify relevant 
opportunities and for employers to find adequate workers. Evidence 
from school-to-work transition surveys in Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, 
Kosovo, Mongolia, Nepal and Syria (Matsumoto and Elder 2010) show 
that the most important channel for job searching by youth is social 
networks, and specifically family and friends. Reliance on informal 
networks and connections may be efficient when employers find it 
costly to assess competencies of  potential employees, or when there are 
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no formal institutions mediating short notice hiring. However, it does 
mean that young job seekers are unlikely to find work outside their own 
networks, which limits social and intergenerational mobility.
Lack of  information about job opportunities can contribute to skill 
shortages and mismatches, because parents and children are not well 
informed to assess the returns to education. Experimental evidence for 
India and the Dominican Republic has shown that giving information 
about job opportunities or returns to education increases the time 
children spend in school (Jensen 2010, 2012). The role of  information 
also includes transparency in hiring practices. Labour market 
functioning further depends on regulation, such as a minimum wage, 
which exists in all developing countries for which institutional data are 
available. Unemployment benefit legislation is present in most countries 
in Commonwealth of  Independent States (CIS), Europe, North Africa, 
and the Latin American and Caribbean middle-income countries 
(Aleksynska and Schindler 2011). 
5 Challenges by region
5.1 Latin America
Over half  of  the working youth in Latin America are in informal 
employment (against 30 per cent of  adults), and this proportion is rising. 
Informality is highest among youth with primary education, but has 
recently increased rapidly among more highly educated youth, signalling 
a lack of  formal private sector labour demand and/or a mismatch of  
skills obtained in secondary and tertiary education (Busso et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, figures for young people not in education, employment, 
or training (NEET) are particularly high in Latin America compared 
to other regions. Besides a slow-down in growth and formal private 
sector labour demand, youth employment in Latin America faces major 
supply side challenges, in particular the quality and relevance of  skills 
attained in secondary education. Large skill mismatches and poor quality 
of  education and training mean that joblessness coexists with unmet 
demand for skilled labour. Where experience in informal employment 
serves as a training ground for formal wage employment, some have 
pointed to deficiencies in the education system (CEDLAS 2013). 
A particular challenge related to informality in Latin America is the 
design of  social insurance and social assistance systems. Formal sector 
workers pay mandatory contributions to social insurance schemes, 
which increase the cost of  formal labour, while informal workers are 
covered by social assistance programmes, which effectively subsidise 
informal labour. Redesigning these financing mechanisms could have 
important impacts on the labour market (Ferreira and Robalino 2010). 
5.2 Middle East and North Africa 
This region has the world’s lowest private sector investment contribution 
to growth, and most investment is directed to low-skilled, labour-
intensive sectors (Gatti et al. 2013, based on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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Development (UNCTAD) and World Bank World Development 
Indicators). Private sector dynamism is harmed by inconsistent and 
unpredictable policy implementation and poor access to credit. 
Distorted prices of  primary factor inputs, such as energy due to the 
presence of  fuel subsidies, increase the relative cost of  labour (ibid.).
On the supply side, the major challenge is the mismatch between skills 
and expectations of  young job seekers on the one hand, and skills 
demanded by the labour market on the other. Queuing for public 
sector jobs is often a rational strategy for highly educated youth, as 
public jobs are more secure and provide higher pay, with higher returns 
to education than in the private sector. Students choose academic 
programmes that are increasingly irrelevant to the private sector. The 
World Bank Enterprise Survey shows that about a third of  firms in the 
region identify a lack of  appropriate skills in the labour force as a major 
obstacle for their business (Filmer and Fox 2014). 
A great challenge in terms of  labour market functioning in the Middle 
East and North Africa is the lack of  merit-based hiring processes. 
Meritocracy in hiring practices would secure greater equality of  
opportunity across socioeconomic backgrounds and, importantly, would 
improve signals from the market to education and training institutions. 
Table 1 Employment composition: sub-Saharan Africa vs high growth counterparts
Wage job
Income level and 




Sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 10.0 12.3 18.3 69.4 100
Bangladesh 10.8 14.9 25.7 27.7 46.6 100
Cambodia 11.1 12.2 23.3 21.0 55.7 100
Low-middle income
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.0 11.9 13.9 31.1 55.1 100
Bolivia 12.6 30.4 43.0 28.1 28.9 100
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic 54.0 8.1 13.5 19.0 67.5 100
Mongolia 5.9 33.4 39.3 16.0 44.7 100
Nicaragua 13.3 30.6 43.9 22.9 33.2 100
Philippines 12.6 36.1 48.7 19.5 31.8 100
Vietnam 14.3 17.5 31.8 19.1 49.1 100
Source Filmer and Fox (2014).
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Finally, the region stands out because of  the large gender gap in youth 
labour market outcomes. Women do much worse on all quality and 
quantity indicators than men, and make up the majority of  young 
NEETs. In many of  the region’s countries, social norms restrict women’s 
mobility and access to work, with very few employment opportunities 
for young women. This results in high unemployment rates for the 
minority of  young women who complete higher education (ETF 2012).
5.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s highest youth population growth 
rate and the highest share of  youth in the working age population. Still, 
the region’s youth employment problem should be seen in qualitative 
rather than quantitative terms. This is especially true in low-income 
countries and for the most vulnerable groups: young women, youth 
in rural areas, youth from poor families, and those with no or little 
education. Despite high unemployment among well-educated youth, 
firms in many of  these economies report difficulty in finding qualified 
personnel, an indicator perhaps that the skills being inculcated by the 
education system are not aligned with efforts to promote new economic 
activities (World Bank 2012a, 2013). 
Employment creation by the private sector has been weak due to a low 
growth elasticity of  employment, especially in resource-rich countries. 
The share of  the labour force in private industry in sub-Saharan Africa 
is markedly different from the rapidly growing economies of  Asia and 
Latin America (Table 1). Solid growth over the past decade has not led 
to a significant improvement in labour market outcomes and poverty 
reduction. A review of  youth employment programmes in Cameroon 
established that although they addressed a wide range of  specific 
challenges, they lacked coherence and were clearly not integrated within 
the country’s broader policies to alleviate binding constraints to growth 
and employment (World Bank 2012b).
The informal economy employs up to 90 per cent of  the working age 
population in low-income countries (AfDB 2012), and is a structural feature 
of  economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Because of  its pervasiveness, the 
informal sector has to be part of  any policy addressing youth employment. 
Low labour productivity and earnings in self-employment and the informal 
economy are a limitation to sustained poverty reduction. In countries where 
the majority of  youth are in rural areas, increasing agricultural productivity 
and non-farm rural activities is crucial. Low productivity is related to lack 
of  learning opportunities for youth in the informal economy. However, in 
basic formal education, gender gaps in enrolment and the poor quality of  
education also remain an urgent challenge.
5.4 Asia
Most countries in South Asia are characterised by high vulnerable 
employment shares, informality and working poverty. Despite high 
growth rates compared to other regions, a large share of  workers 
remain in agriculture, in the urban informal sector or in informal 
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jobs in formal enterprises. Employment growth in the formal sector 
is too low to absorb large numbers of  young labour market entrants. 
Manufacturing still accounts for a small share of  total output and 
employment, compared to other developing regions. This mostly affects 
low- and medium-skilled workers, who are still predominantly confined 
to working in agriculture and informal services (ILO 2013). Besides 
structural change towards more low-skilled intensive manufacturing 
production, increasing productivity in agricultural and informal 
activities is key to improving youth employment outcomes. 
On the supply side, although primary school enrolment has increased, 
the transition rate from primary to secondary schooling is declining. 
Due to the poor quality of  basic formal education and persistent gender 
gaps in educational attainment, the most vulnerable youth groups do 
not get much of  a chance to obtain decent work. Another striking 
feature of  youth employment in the region is persistently low female 
labour force participation. Southeast Asia has the world’s highest youth-
to-adult unemployment rate ratio; adult unemployment is very low 
(2.5 per cent in 2011 according to International Labour Organization 
(ILO) statistics) while youth unemployment is close to the world average 
(13 per cent in 2011). The main challenge for Southeast Asian countries 
is the poor quality of  employment for the majority of  workers; more 
than 60 per cent of  the region’s employed are estimated to be in 
vulnerable employment (Pieters 2012). 
6 Policy direction and lessons for intervention design
Based on the foregoing analysis, the critical issues to engender youth 
employment revolve around empowering youth by enabling them to 
build human capital and providing them with opportunities for quality 
jobs. In this section we review a number of  measures to guide the 
development, consolidation, and reshaping of  existing policies.
6.1 Youth employment strategies 
In order to address the youth employment challenge there is a need 
for integrated approaches involving different levels of  government and 
multiple stakeholders, including relevant ministries, education and 
training providers and social partners. Because of  the complex nature of  
developing country labour markets, and the diversity of  income-generating 
activities that people undertake, the youth employment challenge requires 
policy action beyond basic education and labour markets, in areas such as 
credit markets, infrastructure, business regulation, and rural development. 
In addition to basic education, high productivity skills that can accelerate 
youth employment include those relating to processing, marketing, 
machinery operation and repair, commercial transportation (passenger 
and haulage), logistics and quality control. Responsibility therefore lies with 
governments to ensure coherence and coordination (ILO 2012b). 
6.2 Growth
Promoting job-rich, inclusive growth is key to youth employment 
promotion in the long term. Although achieving job-rich growth is a 
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major challenge in general, strategies to expand labour demand are 
needed to complement interventions targeting more short-term and 
youth-specific goals, such as wage subsidies and skills training (IEG 
2013). Thus, macro and growth policies need to stimulate private 
investment, especially in labour-intensive sectors or sectors with large 
employment multipliers (ILO 2012b). Examples of  such policies for the 
MENA region are reducing relative labour costs and promoting more 
labour-intensive agricultural crops, rather than the traditional subsidies 
on fuel, energy and wheat (Gatti et al. 2013). Lin and Chang (2009) call 
for policies that enable firms and sectors to make use of  a country’s 
relatively abundant production factors. This means focusing on labour- 
and resource-intensive production activities, rather than prioritising 
capital-intensive industries. Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) call 
for so-called ‘soft’ industrial policy, aiming to facilitate collaboration 
between government, industry, and cluster-level private organisations, to 
reduce coordination failures in order to increase productivity.
6.3 Promotion of entrepreneurship 
Promotion of  youth entrepreneurship and self-employment requires 
increased access to credit by strengthening financial infrastructure, bank 
competition and non-bank financing. Youth micro-entrepreneurship 
also requires reform and more consistent enforcement of  business 
regulation, in order to reduce red tape and increase transparency 
(ILO 2012b). The most effective entrepreneurship training combines 
‘core’ business administration skills, such as accounting, with ‘softer’ 
entrepreneurial skills, such as problem solving. It is important to 
systematically screen youth for latent or active entrepreneurial 
characteristics, such as innovative thinking, leadership attributes, 
passion and results orientation. Programmes should clearly separate 
training and financing functions by forming partnerships with financial 
institutions to provide and manage credit for youth (MIF 2012). To 
improve entrepreneurs’ ability to benefit from trade liberalisation and 
foreign investment, they also need skills for developing their networks 
and linking with higher levels of  the value chain.
Various institutional arrangements and incentive schemes can be 
used to widen access to credit. In Uganda, the Development Finance 
Company of  Uganda Bank Limited’s (DFCU) credit facility is largely 
provided under a leasing arrangement. Evidence shows that having 
credit and financial services that are accessible to women is crucial for 
increasing their ability to save and start a business (Dupas and Robinson 
2013). In Kenya and Uganda, M-Pesa and Mobile Money respectively 
have been central to providing financial access to a wide section of  the 
unbanked population.
Some suggest that engendering entrepreneurship starts with a mindset 
change towards a culture which rewards competition and innovation. 
This entails addressing the beliefs, values and attitudes underlying 
behaviour and choices. Effective mindset change begins with identifying 
prevailing mindsets. As such, honest discussions can provide hypotheses to 
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be tested through surveys. While most economic development efforts shy 
away from explicitly addressing mindset change, this is an issue that some 
suggest is key to any real progress (The Brenthurst Foundation 2011).
6.4 Public works programmes
The most direct way to increase labour demand in the short term is 
through public works programmes (PWPs). PWPs create temporary 
jobs for the poorest and most vulnerable, with the primary goals 
of  income smoothing, poverty reduction and asset building. Many 
PWPs are organised around infrastructure development, but there is 
significant scope for PWPs to provide social services. This is a highly 
labour-intensive sector and could be better targeted to increase young 
women’s participation (ILO 2012b). Beyond providing a safety net, 
PWPs can also be used to improve participants’ employability in paid 
jobs or self-employment in order to graduate from the programme. 
Examples are the Sierra Leone Cash for Work project, the Temporary 
Income Assistance Program in El Salvador, the Expanded Public Works 
Programme in South Africa, and the Kazi Kwa Vijana programme in 
Kenya (Andrews and Kryeziu 2012; Subbarao et al. 2013). To increase 
employability, youth or other participants with high re-employment 
opportunities should receive skills training and education that may result 
in some type of  accredited certification. 
6.5 Skills
Addressing skills shortages and mismatches requires action on several 
fronts, including formal and non-formal general education, VET 
and apprenticeship training. Improving literacy skills through better 
primary education requires urgent attention in many low-income 
countries. Education policies should also aim to improve access to 
secondary education for disadvantaged youth. Disadvantaged youth 
are especially constrained by the cost of  schooling and, in the case of  
young women, by social and cultural barriers. New technologies in 
education and access to open educational resources could enhance 
flexible course delivery and customised training for specific groups of  
youth. Policies that increase the permeability of  education systems 
are also needed, to allow youth to move more easily between different 
levels and types of  education. Mobility would also include allowing 
students to move between VET and other higher education tracks, 
which could increase the attractiveness of  VET. Since the benefits of  
formal VET depend largely on the relevance of  skills to actual demand 
in the private sector, a widely heard policy recommendation is to 
build public–private partnerships in the design and provision of  VET. 
Almost by definition, however, formal VET policies cannot address 
challenges for the majority of  youth in low-income countries working in 
the informal sector. It is crucial that skills development policies include 
youth in agricultural and non-agricultural informal employment, where 
poverty reduction is most urgent (Walther 2012). This could be achieved 
by improving and expanding traditional apprenticeship schemes, for 
example through local training committees and training schemes for 
agricultural (or agriculture-related) occupations. 
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6.6 Labour market information
When jobs exist, youth can be helped by providing information and 
employment exchange services through educational institutions, or by 
offering these in youth centres. Better access to information further 
requires the availability of  transportation. For poorer youth and those 
living further from urban centres, offering transport subsidies may be 
necessary to allow them to benefit from employment exchange services. 
In predominantly informal labour markets, however, formal information 
channels may be of  little relevance. We know little about the functioning 
of  informal labour markets, but it is clear that informal networks are key in 
the job searching process. The use of  new technologies, particularly mobile 
phone-based, could help in expanding job search networks for youth, 
linking formal and informal networks, and increasing the effectiveness of  
these networks. Where growth is weak and there is a lack of  productive 
jobs, overseas employment programmes may be part of  a solution. 
6.7 Regulation 
In countries with high unemployment among educated youth, particularly 
in the MENA region, there is a need to restructure public administration 
hiring and promotion processes, and to reduce public–private dualism in 
the labour market. This requires labour regulation and social insurance 
reforms and more social dialogue, including with youth organisations 
and representatives (Gatti et al. 2013). Wage subsidies and reduced social 
contributions for young workers can be used to increase demand for 
young workers, if  targeted and provided for a limited period of  time and 
with strong monitoring to avoid abuses (ILO 2012b). A minimum wage 
could be important for young workers to sustain a decent earnings level, 
while a lower youth minimum wage could be used to stimulate youth 
labour demand. In terms of  employment protection, special first job 
contracts or reducing restrictions on temporary contracts have also been 
used in some situations to stimulate demand for youth labour.
6.8 Knowledge gaps
In low-income countries, youth will continue to be absorbed in agriculture, 
non-farm informal jobs and/or self-employment. Much of  the existing 
analytical evidence tends to focus on formal employment in urban areas, 
where political interest and data can be found. Little is therefore known 
about the functioning of  the informal and agricultural labour markets, 
and even less about the youth specifics of  these labour markets. As such, 
investing in youth labour market data and analysis is an important first 
step in aiding policy and programme design. Improving data infrastructure 
in developing countries is furthermore likely to increase attention to the 
labour market situation of  vulnerable youth. Even where policies can be 
and have been evaluated, impacts of  interventions on non-targeted groups, 
spillover effects and other general equilibrium effects have been extremely 
hard to assess. Finally, a number of  youth employment determinants 
and relatively new policy areas and programmes remain particularly 
understudied. Examples are the role of  urbanisation and the location 
of  jobs, new technologies in production and in job searching, micro-
franchising for stimulating entrepreneurship, and green growth strategies.
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Notes 
1 A population or demographic dividend occurs when the proportion 
of  working people in the total population is high as this indicates that 
more people have the potential to be productive and contribute to 
growth of  the economy.
2 Returns here refer to the overall benefits that accrue to those that 
choose to undertake a given form of  education and training.
3 Youth make up about one third of  international migrant flows, 
especially flows towards developing countries (McKenzie 2008 – based 
on census data for 12 countries, including six developing countries).
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The Politics of Youth Employment 
and Policy Processes in Ethiopia
Eyob Balcha Gebremariam
Abstract Policy processes are inherently shaped by political contexts. 
One way of identifying the impact of politics on policy processes is by 
examining how policy narratives and framings evolve through time. This 
article examines youth employment-focused policies in Ethiopia between 
2004 and 2015. It argues that policy narratives and framings driving youth 
employment policy are directly derived from the developmental orientation 
of the incumbent Ethiopian regime. The 2005 post-election political crisis 
also played a major role in streamlining youth-focused policy processes.
Keywords: unemployment, Africa, young people, Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
1 Introduction
This article uses youth-focused policies in Ethiopia to demonstrate how 
politics and societal narratives shape policy processes. It does this by 
adopting two interlinked lines of  analysis. The first explores the role of  
political context in shaping policy processes. In doing so, the primary 
focus is on how policy narratives and framings change depending on 
context and political dynamics. The second related line of  analysis 
explores the relationship between broader social narratives and policy 
narratives. Here, the focus is on the two-way interaction between 
socially constructed positions of  youth and youth-focused policies. The 
argument is that categorisations of  youth such as ‘vanguard or vandals’ 
(Abbink and van Kessel 2005) or ‘makers and breakers’ (Honwana and 
De Boeck 2005) of  society shape and are shaped by policy processes.
The analysis focuses on the period 2004–15, when Ethiopia registered 
significant socioeconomic developmental success. According to the 
World Bank, the average economic growth rate between 2004 and 2014 
was 10.9 per cent (World Bank 2016). Furthermore, the poverty trend 
has also been declining significantly from 55 per cent in 2000 to 31 per 
cent in 2013 (UNDP 2014; World Bank 2016). At the same time, the 
country’s political landscape also changed considerably. With three 
national elections conducted during this period, the ruling party, the 
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Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), emerged 
as the dominant political actor in the country. One example of  this 
dominance is the current parliament (2015–20) where the party controls 
100 per cent of  the seats. The article explores how these political and 
economic dynamics have been affecting youth-focused policy processes.
There are two questions that motivate the analysis. First, how does 
politics shape policies relating to youth employment? In answering this 
question, I will demonstrate that policy processes are not technocratic, 
linear and rational, but are rather driven by political dynamics and 
interests. Second, how do socially constructed positions of  youth affect 
policies that address youth employment? Answering this question 
contributes to the understanding of  how societal beliefs can be 
translated into policy frameworks and how politically crafted policies 
interact with social narratives. To address these questions, a legal 
document, two youth-specific policies and the youth-focused sections of  
three consecutive national development plans are examined.
Two core arguments are developed. First, dominant policy narratives 
and framings relating to youth are directly derived from the political 
orientations of  the government, which in Ethiopia is building a 
developmental state through rapid economic growth. In line with 
the developmental orientation, policy narratives and framings have 
changed from portraying youth as ‘vagrants’ and ‘threats’ to society, 
or ‘marginalised and victims of  social evils’, to seeing them as 
‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘seeds of  democracy and development’. Second, 
with specific focus on youth employment, the policy process was driven 
by the need to respond to a political crisis.
The remainder of  the article is divided into four sections. Section 2 
introduces the two main ways of  understanding the social position of  
youth, viz. as an age group or a transitional stage. Section 3 sets the 
context towards understanding the social position of  Ethiopian youth. 
Hence, the section provides an overview of  the political and policy 
context and implications for the social position of  youth. Section 4 
analyses the four policy documents in order to address two central 
questions. Finally, Section 5 discusses the findings and concludes.
2 The social position of youth
2.1 Age-based notions of youth
Age is one of  the most crucial elements that shapes understandings of  
youth. One of  the central features of  age-based categorisation of  youth 
is the assumption that there are ‘clearly identifiable processes which 
are universal’ (Wyn and White 1997: 53). Hence, when young people 
depart from the assumed set processes and behaviours, they are easily 
categorised as ‘deviants’ and ‘abnormal’ (ibid.). Age-based categorisations 
are often used to frame policy interventions in areas such as education, 
health and criminal justice. One important limitation of  age-based 
understandings of  youth is that they promote a categorical approach. 
Examples include the notions of  ‘adolescents’ and ‘juveniles’ that link 
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the biological age of  young people to their psychological and emotional 
status, and to their social identity and behaviour. This is critiqued for 
being ‘biologically determinist’ and reducing the experiences of  young 
people at the individual level (Wyn and White 1997: 54–7).
However, one cannot ignore the crucial role that age plays in shaping 
the experiences, opportunities and challenges of  youth. One way of  
broadening the understanding of  youth is to examine how biological 
age shapes interactions between youth and the state as well as with 
other social institutions. For example, some argue that states use ‘age 
statuses’ to categorise youth as a ‘discrete and distinctive social category’ 
(Mizen 2002: 6), and that this categorisation provides a foundation for 
dominant policy narratives that subsequently shape the experiences 
of  young people (Wyn and White 1997). Age also interacts with state 
institutions through, for example, the legal voting age, age-based 
eligibility to claim social and economic rights (such as minimum/living 
wage) and access criteria for state loans.
Age-based characterisation of  youth plays a central role in policy 
narratives built around the notions of  ‘demographic dividend’ and 
‘youth bulge’. ‘Reaping the demographic dividend’ essentially requires 
policy and institutional frameworks to make the segment of  society 
within a certain age range healthier, educated and more productive 
(Bloom and Williamson 1998). Without age-specific characterisation, 
one can argue that all aspects of  policy relating to youth will remain 
weak (Mizen 2002: 8). However, the experience of  being ‘a youth’ is not 
only about belonging to a certain age group for a specified period – it is 
also about growing up and transitioning to the status of  adulthood.
2.2 Transitional status of youth
Youth is not a permanent status, and some scholars argue that the 
meaning of  youth is inextricably linked with the concept of  adulthood 
(Wyn and White 1997: 11). Signs and processes associated with the 
transition to adulthood include school-to-work transition, economic 
independence, leaving the parental home and establishing a family. 
Processes of  transition are complex, non-linear and context-dependent, 
which only complicates the job of  much youth policy that aims to 
facilitate transitions into adulthood.
It is important to note that growing up is a social process that is 
contingent on the interplay of  enabling and constraining conditions 
within a given context and society. State policies and institutions in 
particular have a direct impact on youth transitions. For example, the 
introduction of  neoliberal policies impacted on the lives of  many African 
young people (Caffentzis 2002). Withdrawal of  state guarantees to rights 
and services in the areas of  health, education and employment severely 
affected young peoples’ transitions into adulthood. In some cases, the 
failure and degeneration of  the state led to civil war and protracted 
conflict, with young people being both victims and perpetrators (Abbink 
and van Kessel 2005; Honwana and De Boeck 2005). More generally, 
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in contexts where the state fails to deliver the benefits of  development, 
smooth transitions to adulthood are compromised.
Precarious socioeconomic conditions, civil unrest and institutional 
exclusion can also prolong the process of  transition. Honwana developed 
the concept of  waithood to explain this, with waithood being ‘a prolonged 
period of  suspension between childhood and adulthood’ (2012: 1). 
The argument is that because of  structural challenges which hinder 
social mobility there are multiple cases where youthhood has become a 
more permanent status rather than a transitional stage. Furthermore, 
in situations where transitions are prolonged, young people often 
engage in survival strategies while navigating the contours of  waithood. 
Expressions such as ‘eke out a living’ or ‘getting by’ (Honwana 2012) 
and ‘hustling’ (Di Nunzio 2012) provide a flavour of  this navigation. 
The key point is that this period of  ‘extended liminality’ increases the 
vulnerability of  young people (Honwana 2012).
In the following section, the article reflects on age-based experiences 
and transitional statuses of  youth in recent Ethiopian socioeconomic 
and political contexts.
3 Ethiopian youth: political contexts, policies and changing social 
positions
This section sets the ground to understand the interplay between 
political contexts, policies and changing social positions of  youth. It first 
discusses the notions of  political context and politics. Then, after a brief  
historical overview, the methods of  analysis used are presented.
In a nutshell, an appreciation of  political context helps to understand 
when policy processes emerge onto the scene, how policy is crafted and 
who the leading or powerful actors are, both in policy formulation and 
implementation (Turner, Hulme and McCourt 2015). This approach 
contrasts with the ‘stages’ approach to the policy process, which focuses 
on technical processes (Jenkins 1978). Whilst examining the role of  
political context in policy processes, it is imperative to clearly set how 
the study approaches politics.
For the purposes of  this study, politics is understood as ‘the processes 
of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the [ownership], 
use, production and distribution of  resources’ (Leftwich 1996: 17). 
In operational terms, this definition leads to a concern with how 
youth-focused policy processes trigger ‘conflict, cooperation and 
negotiation’ (ibid.) between the Ethiopian state and youth. Because of  
the interest in youth employment policy, economic opportunity and 
fulfilment of  economic citizenship rights are crucial elements around 
which the processes of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation occur. 
Political processes that affect the provision of  economic opportunities 
directly influence how economic resources are accessed and claimed 
by youth. Furthermore, changing social positions of  youth are also 
inextricably linked with the evolving political context, and affect the 
dynamics of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation between state and 
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youth. Likewise, societal narratives about youth cannot remain insulated 
from the dominant features of  politics.
Here it is important to sketch out how the changing political context in 
Ethiopia has affected the social positions of  youth. After the EPRDF 
came to power in 1991, the country was forced to implement structural 
adjustment programmes by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Demissie 2008; Feyissa 2011). Despite strong 
ideological resistance from the EPRDF not to reduce the state to an 
ideal ‘night-watchman’ status as the neoliberal policies would have 
required, there was a considerable escalation of  privatisation (Stiglitz 
2002). The EPRDF tried its best to remain committed to its ideological 
aspiration of  building a socialist economy. To this end, the party pursued 
its revolutionary democracy ideology to remain the politically dominant 
player in the country while strategically engaging with western donors 
(Feyissa 2011). The strength of  the EPRDF’s ideological commitment 
was demonstrated by its determination not to relinquish state ownership 
of  land and not to liberalise key sectors of  the economy such as finance, 
telecoms, transport and energy. Nevertheless, other aspects of  the 
stabilisation and privatisation programme were implemented.
The structural adjustment programmes had significant impact on 
society in general and youth in particular. Especially in urban areas, 
government employment, which was often considered ‘desirable’ (Mains 
2011: 115) for young people joining the labour market, was severely 
affected. A reduced public sector as a result of  privatisation, reduction 
of  public expenditure and restructuration contributed to increased 
unemployment (Krishnan, Selassie and Dercon 1998; Demissie 2008). 
On top of  limited employment opportunities, the number of  high 
school graduates continued to increase. With a growing gap between 
the available employment opportunities and the number of  new young 
jobseekers, the seemingly predetermined process of  transition into 
adulthood started to derail, resulting in new societal problems.
Youth unemployment became a major problem starting from the early 
years of  EPRDF’s tenure. A socioeconomic household sample survey 
conducted in 1994 revealed that young people below the age of  35 
constituted 90 per cent of  the urban unemployed (68 per cent between 
the ages of  16–25) (cited in Kebbede 2004). Another study argued that 
in 1994, 50 per cent of  the male workforce below the age of  30 were 
unemployed in urban areas (Serneels 2004). The considerably reduced 
capacity of  the state to offer employment opportunities was seen to 
explain urban youth unemployment. Furthermore, the mismatch between 
education and job openings was also a major factor. For example, 
another survey in 1994 showed that in Addis Ababa, 50 per cent of  the 
unemployed youth were high school graduates (cited in Minas 2002).
In 2001, a decade after it came to power, the EPRDF went through 
a major ideological revision. The objective of  creating a socialist 
society was dropped in favour of  building a capitalist society 
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(Tadesse and Young 2003). As a result, the principles of  free market 
economics were adopted, and there were more opportunities for 
private accumulation of  wealth. The late prime minister called this new 
development strategy ‘democratic developmentalism’ (Zenawi 2006). 
The reform processes also endorsed the good governance agenda and 
established formal institutional and policy frameworks. As part of  
this, the first youth-focused ministry was established in 2000, and was 
mandated to formulate the first national youth policy.
The first post-reform election was in May 2005, and in a relatively 
open political environment, the ruling party suffered huge losses (Aalen 
and Tronvoll 2009). However, the EPRDF used its power over the 
military to squash both opposition parties and protest activities during 
the post-election period (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Gudina 2011). 
Following the wake of  the post-election violence, EPRDF undertook 
a campaign of  mass mobilisation, particularly targeting urban youth 
who participated in protest activities in significant numbers (Di Nunzio 
2012). To this end, the EPRDF-led government started to invest 
heavily to address urban youth employment, and to reduce youth 
marginalisation through the introduction of  youth participation fora.
Furthermore, the EPRDF controlled the post-2005 political context by 
putting in place institutions and politico-legal frameworks to guide the 
processes of  conflict, cooperation and negotiation. These, combined 
with political repression, acted to constrain the activities of  opposition 
parties, private media and civil society organisations (Aalen and Tronvoll 
2009; Gudina 2011). At the same time, the ruling party enhanced its 
political power by establishing channels of  mass mobilisation targeting 
women, youth, farmers and other segments of  society. These served 
both as spheres of  cooperation and negotiation as well as political 
control. In contrast to the early 1990s period of  dismantling public 
services, the EPRDF expanded the state structure which also created 
massive employment opportunities. Mobilisation occurred hand in hand 
with recruitment into the party structure, which also involved resource 
distribution. Young people became crucial targets of  the ruling party 
in these processes of  cooperation and negotiation, which included 
controlled economic and political inclusion. For example, the ruling 
party established its youth league in May 2009 with 180,000 founding 
members, and reaching 2.3 million in 2013 (EPRDF 2013). At the 
same time, party membership also increased exponentially from around 
700,000 in 2005 to 6.3 million in 2013. These efforts to manage conflict 
and promote cooperation and negotiation have been important aspects 
of  the ruling party’s agenda of  ‘democratic developmentalism’.
The remainder of  the article uses discourse analysis to examine 
youth-focused policy documents. Narratives and framings are analysed 
with considerable focus given to the policy processes and context. Since 
the study relies on secondary data, it also refers to studies conducted 
on Ethiopian youth to provide additional evidence alongside the close 
examination of  the policy documents.
(Endnotes)
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4 Analysis of youth employment-focused policies
This section presents analysis of  policy frameworks that address youth 
employment launched by the Ethiopian state between 2004 and 
2015. The analysis is based on a review of  one legal document, two 
youth-focused policy documents and three national development plans.
4.1 Vagrancy Control Proclamation
The Vagrancy Control Proclamation (VCP) (384/2004) came into force on 
27 January 2004. The preface of  the proclamation explains the rationale: 
‘Vagrancy is increasing and wide-spreading in our country from time to 
time, thereby creating a threat to the tranquillity and order of  the people’ 
(FDRE 2004: 2533). Hence, the purpose is ‘to permanently dispel this 
threat… to bring criminals to justice and create conditions for their social 
rehabilitation’ (ibid.). The objective of  the VCP is ‘… bringing criminals 
to justice, imposing punishment proportionate to their crimes and to 
create conditions for their transformation into law-abiding and productive 
citizenry’ (FDRE 2004: 2534). The VCP defines vagrancy as ‘… whosoever, 
being able-bodied, having no visible means of  subsistence’ but found 
committing actions restricted in the proclamation. Such restricted actions 
include ‘betting and gambling in a public place, substance abuse, disturbing 
on streets or around schools, participating in organized gang brawls’ (FDRE 
2004: 2534–6). ‘Police’ and the ‘federal prisons commission’ are identified 
as being responsible for implementing the VCP. The proclamation also sets 
up a ‘centre’ for psychosocial and behavioural counselling as an institutional 
mechanism for providing ‘rehabilitation services to any persons convicted 
of  vagrancy’ (FDRE 2004: 2534).
In terms of  political context, it is worth considering two important 
factors that contributed to the emergence of  the VCP. First, as argued 
earlier, the contraction of  the public sector due to structural adjustment 
programmes significantly reduced potential job opportunities. The 
nascent private sector was not at the time mature enough to create 
employment opportunities for the increasing young population. As 
a result, young people, many of  whom were high school graduates, 
remained unemployed for relatively long periods of  time. But remaining 
unemployed defies societal expectations about youth. Since youth is 
considered as a short period of  transition, moving out of  this temporary 
status is essential, and not being able to complete this transition is 
deviancy. For example, Mains (2012) described how members of  the 
wider society in Jimma town, south-western Ethiopia, felt insecure and 
threatened with the presence of  ‘idle’ and ‘unemployed’ young men on 
the streets. For the young men, the ‘abundance of  unstructured time’ 
(ibid: 122) was a trap that they wanted to escape from if  they could get 
job opportunities. With quite narrow job opportunities, as well as with 
limited skills acquired through education, the young men were forced to 
pass most of  their time ‘hanging out on street corners, watching films, 
chewing khat (mild stimulant)’ (ibid: 123).
Second, the VCP was introduced in the wake of  large-scale unrest in the 
capital following Addis Ababa University student protests in April 2001. 
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The students called for the reinstatement of  the independent students’ 
union and newspaper, and replacement of  armed campus police 
with civilian police (Balsvik 2007). The protest spilled over into the 
city and resulted in large-scale looting, ransacking and vandalism in 
major market and shopping areas. At least 40 people were killed. The 
government accused unemployed young people and opposition parties 
of  being the main perpetrators of  the violence and looting (ibid.): the 
blame was laid at the feet of  ‘unruly’ and ‘unemployed’ youth.
The name of  the Amharic version of  the VCP can be literally 
translated into ‘Dangerous Vagrancy Control Proclamation’. The 
use of  such alarmist language helps to garner unconditional moral 
and normative support. The VCP argues that social ‘order’ and 
‘tranquillity’ is compromised because of  ‘dangerous vagrancy’. Hence, 
‘punishment’ and ‘rehabilitation’ need to be administered as remedies. 
With such interventions, the VCP claims it will restore societal order 
by ‘transforming’ criminals into ‘law-abiding and productive citizenry’. 
Furthermore, the VCP strengthens the crisis narrative and the need 
for urgent action by adding both a space and time dimension. The 
proclamation depicts ‘dangerous vagrancy’ as ‘wide-spreading’, which 
implies it affects or will affect large areas and numbers of  people, 
while the phrase ‘from time to time’ is ambiguous and provides no real 
indication of  the prevalence of  the problem (FDRE 2004: 2533–4).
Both the narratives and framings in the VCP correspond with societal 
narratives about ‘idle’ and ‘unemployed’ youth who pass most of  their 
time on the street. These youth were perceived as deviants because 
of  their failure to meet societal expectations of  growing up and 
becoming independent adults. The VCP builds on such narratives, 
and making reference to occasional, large-scale incidents such as the 
riot in April 2001 links unemployment with crime. Furthermore, 
the VCP also claims moral superiority by stating its purpose as ‘to 
bring criminals to justice’. In addition to the judiciary solution, the 
VCP declared its intention to change the values of  vagrants through 
‘social rehabilitation’, which was broadly defined as ‘transformation 
into law-abiding and productive citizenry’. The components of  social 
rehabilitation mentioned in the proclamation include education, 
vocational training, civic education, counselling and hard labour. 
The police, public prosecutor, courts and ‘rehabilitation centre’ were 
identified as key implementers of  the VCP (FDRE 2004: 2538–9).
The VCP’s link with youth employment can be seen in its targeting of  
unemployed youth. One of  the key elements of  the definition of  vagrancy 
in the VCP is having ‘no visible means of  subsistence’. Particularly in 
a context where young peoples’ transition to ‘socially acceptable status 
of  adulthood’ (Honwana 2014: 29–31) is severely compromised, a 
dependence on activities in the informal economy is inevitable. Studies 
have indicated that young people with limited opportunities for social 
mobility rely on casual work and activities on the fringe of  legality. These 
survival strategies are not considered ‘visible means of  subsistence’ by the 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 33–50 | 41
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
VCP, which makes young people who are actively involved in the street 
economy (Di Nunzio 2012) prime targets of  the proclamation.
Di Nunzio (2012) describes survival strategies of  young people in poor 
urban neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa as including a combination 
of  street activities, which are broadly defined as hustling. Hustling is 
‘being smart and finding a way to make money for survival’ (ibid: 443). 
Common street activities include brokering small transactions, running 
errands for a small fee, working as an informal tourist guide and 
grabbing any opportunity that would generate money. Sometimes 
hustling may involve illegal activities such as pick-pocketing, thieving 
and drug selling. It is important to note that hustling differs significantly 
from the notion of  being ‘idle’ and ‘unemployed’. Young people who 
are involved in hustling consider that their activities are ‘tiring’, and 
require skills, networking and different layers of  interactions.
The VCP’s focus on these young people became more pronounced 
during the highly contested 2005 elections. The government used the 
VCP as an instrument of  repression when it targeted unemployed 
youth because of  their support for the opposition during the tense 
pre- and post-election period. Opposition parties widely criticised the 
government for the high unemployment rate and for its criminalising 
discourse. The government labelled young people who participated 
en masse in pre-election demonstrations and post-election protests as 
‘dangerous vagrants’, ‘jobless’ and ‘unruly’ young people (Aalen and 
Tronvoll 2009; Di Nunzio 2012). Furthermore, unemployed youth and 
particularly those surviving through hustling constituted a significant 
majority of  the nearly 30,000 people detained during the post-election 
violence (Gebremariam and Herrera 2016). Hence, in the tense political 
context around the election, unemployment was not only associated 
with crime but also dissent and protest.
The VCP definition of  vagrancy also unequivocally focuses on the 
individual – an ‘able-bodied’ person not having any ‘visible means 
of  subsistence’. The proclamation never mentions a single causal or 
contributing factor – social, economic, cultural or political. Thus it 
fails to recognise the multiple factors that can force young people into 
activities defined as vagrancy, including an ineffective education system, 
lack of  work, and the expectations of  society that young people quickly 
become independent adults (Miles 2003: 189). As discussed earlier, a 
political context which removes systems of  direct and indirect support 
for youth employment pushes young people to the margins of  illegal 
activities. When opportunities for transition into adulthood become 
narrow, young people engage in activities such as hustling. By focusing 
on the survival strategies of  these economically marginalised young 
people, the VCP missed the root cause of  the problem.
To conclude, the VCP came into being when the political context and 
limited economic opportunities had led a large number of  unemployed 
youth to hustle for survival through a combination of  legal and illegal 
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activities. Both societal narratives and the VCP perceived the survival 
strategies of  the youth and the situation they were forced into as 
deviance; hence a threat that needed legal intervention (Mains 2012). 
However, the VCP was not the only approach that the EPRDF used to 
address youth issues. It also produced a youth policy that is discussed in 
the following section.
4.2 National Youth Policy
Endorsed on 12 March 2004, the National Youth Policy (NYP) is one 
of  Ethiopia’s most significant youth-specific state documents. It argues 
that an age-based definition of  youth is ‘most suitable for research and 
policy purposes’ (MYSC 2004: 3), and goes on to define youth as people 
between 15 and 29 years. The NYP envisions ‘creating [an] empowered 
young generation’ (op. cit.: 19) with values incorporating a democratic 
outlook, knowledge, professional skills, organised engagement and ethical 
integrity. The objectives of  the policy include: to ‘bring about active 
participation of  youth’ (ibid.) in socioeconomic, political and cultural 
activities; and ‘enable [youth] to fairly benefit from the results’ (ibid.).
The VCP and NYP emerged at approximately the same time and 
within the same socioeconomic and political context. However, the 
NYP was produced based on a ‘comprehensive study’ (op. cit.: 1) which 
involved consultation with stakeholders including youth. The study 
conducted as a baseline for the policy identify pervasiveness of  extreme 
poverty (44 per cent in 2004), high youth unemployment (67 per cent in 
1999), high prevalence of  HIV/AIDS and low enrolment in secondary 
and higher education as major challenges for Ethiopian youth. 
Furthermore, the country’s long history of  non-democratic politics is 
highlighted as a hindrance to meaningful youth participation.
There are two levels of  narrative within the NYP: a broad narrative 
about the status of  youth, and a narrative more specific to youth 
employment. At the broader level, high levels of  poverty, economic 
and political marginalisation are identified as main factors restricting 
young people’s ‘potential energies and capabilities’ (op. cit.: 5). The 
policy envisions changing the dire socioeconomic and political situation 
through ‘active participation’ (op. cit.: 19) of  the youth. The government 
aims to play an instrumental role to help youth organise themselves and 
actively participate in ‘development endeavours, building democratic 
system and good governance’ (op. cit.: 21).
The narrative specific to youth employment issues has multiple layers. 
The NYP suggests that the government alone cannot ‘resolve the 
problem of  unemployment’ (op. cit.: 12). Hence, the policy aims to create 
favourable conditions for the youth to ‘create new jobs for themselves’ 
(op. cit.: 26), and to enable the private sector to create job opportunities 
for them. It also advocates for policy interventions that shape both 
formal and informal employment opportunities, and suggests that these 
can help address the under- and unemployment problems among youth. 
With regard to rural youth, ensuring access to land and expansion 
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of  off-farm activities are identified as part of  the solution to youth 
unemployment.
One of  the most important framings adopted by the NYP is an 
age-based definition of  youth. While it is not the only document to 
use age-based definitions, taking an age-based definition has serious 
limitations. One of  these is the tendency for homogenisation, despite 
important differences arising from gender, culture, socioeconomic 
status and geographic location. For example, the kinds of  expectations, 
experiences, challenges and opportunities facing young men and women 
vary significantly despite age similarities. Mains (2012) for instance 
talks of  ‘barriers to adulthood’ for young men in Jimma town because 
of  limited economic opportunities to move towards marriage and 
fatherhood. In this case, young men are forced into a prolonged period 
of  transitioning into adulthood. On the contrary, young women might 
be forced by cultural practices of  early marriage, even as young as ten, 
which inevitably shortens their period of  transition. It is also important 
to note the salient role that socioeconomic status and geographic location 
play in shaping young peoples’ lives, despite belonging to the same age 
cohort. For example, young people from wealthy families may have better 
access to opportunities than other young people in the same age cohort. 
Likewise, social norms, values and practices based on age hierarchies 
among different cultural groups across the country also vary considerably. 
Hence, the age-based definition needs to be used with caution.
The other main characterisation of  youth in the NYP is in terms of  their 
receptiveness to ‘new ideas’, [their] ‘potential capacity for creativity and 
productivity’, and ‘potential energies and capabilities’. This framing is 
supported by depictions of  youth as ‘nation builders’ and positive ‘agents 
of  change’. While focusing on the potential capabilities of  young people, 
the NYP also identifies present-day challenges that may compromise 
the future – for example, young people as potential victims of  an 
unfavourable environment broadly categorised as ‘economic and social 
problems’. Here youth are portrayed as marginalised and vulnerable 
members of  society who are ‘exposed to social evils’ (MYSC 2004: 5).
In response to the crisis around the 2005 election, the government relied 
on the VCP instead of  the NYP. As argued earlier, unemployed young 
people in the informal economy were targeted because of  their direct 
involvement in the post-election violence. Furthermore, the highly 
technocratic approach of  the NYP, with its stakeholder engagement 
and strategic plan, was not deemed to be useful in the short term. The 
EPRDF-led government faced a serious crisis of  political legitimacy 
because of  the post-election violence. It chose to address this among 
the youth through massive political mobilisation: the political priority 
was addressing the legitimacy deficit, irrespective of  the existing youth 
policy framework.
In general, it can be argued that the NYP illustrated the case in which the 
political context becomes a vital factor in shaping policy processes. When 
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the NYP was formulated, the government was not under any immediate 
political pressure. However, when the political environment became tense, 
the NYP was not used to guide the political processes of  cooperation 
and negotiation with the youth that the government badly needed. The 
political urgency required another policy framework, and as a result the 
government drafted and introduced the Youth Development Package 
(YDP) that directly serves the political interest of  the government. The 
following section further elaborates on the YDP.
4.3 Youth Development Package
The Youth Development Package (YDP) was launched in September 
2006. The associated documentation claims that the YDP reflects 
consultations with youth in both urban and rural areas (FDRE 2006: 6). 
Based on the consultations, the YDP was formulated to address three 
‘burning problems’: unemployment, ‘unavailability of  well-equipped 
and youth-focused social services and recreational centres’ and 
‘exclusion and lack of  participation forums’. A number of  ‘strategic 
directions’ are set out through which these issues will be addressed. 
Perhaps the key one is the endorsement of  youth as the ‘front-leaders’ 
to solve the problems they are facing. Additional strategic directions 
include: ‘enabling the youth to understand its leading role’, ‘facilitating 
[the creation of] youth participation forums’, ‘enhancing young people’s 
educational, vocational and leadership skills for improved participation’, 
and ‘organizing the youth depending on their interests’. The package 
assigns the role of  ‘key supporter’ to the state in addressing the ‘burning 
problems’. The YDP adopts the age-based definition of  youth set by the 
NYP and approaches the problems of  urban, rural and pastoralist youth 
differently (ibid.: 1–19).
The YDP emerged as a response to the 2005 post-election violence: 
in effect, the government used the YDP to try to mend its relations 
with young people. The central narrative of  the YDP focuses on the 
imminent risk associated with youth marginalisation. This narrative 
establishes a direct connection between the status of  youth and both 
the existing and future socioeconomic and political orders. The central 
proposition – that the level of  exclusion and desperation among youth 
has detrimental effects in the present and the future – suggests the YDP 
is mainly meant to mitigate ‘serious risk’. Within this narrative, the 
YDP addresses youth as vital actors: in the present as nation builders, 
and in the future as ‘inheritors’ or ‘successors’. Youth need to prepare 
themselves to be ‘leaders of  their time’, while the government must play 
its role ‘to prepare’ the youth to become ‘inheritors’ (ibid.: 2).
Unemployment is identified as one of  the burning problems that 
requires a coordinated response, and it is argued that the causes of  
youth unemployment in urban and rural areas have both similarities 
and differences. Some common causes are identified such as limited 
skills development and exclusion of  those who are not in education, 
employment or training. It is also suggested that limited access to 
financial services restricts youth entrepreneurship. Two factors are 
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posited to contribute specifically to urban youth unemployment, with 
the first being the constraining environment that inhibits the private 
sector and specifically growth of  micro and small enterprises (MSEs). 
The second factor is that the education system needs ‘to produce 
entrepreneurial youth with improved skills and mind-set’. The YDP 
argues that unemployment among rural youth is deeply rooted in the 
land tenure system, which excludes them and makes them ‘property-
less’. The document notes that the national agricultural policy neglects 
the specific challenges of  rural youth, which contributes to their ‘high 
economic vulnerability’. In order to address these problems, the 
YDP aims to expand off-farm employment and income-generating 
opportunities (ibid.: 5–8).
Two observations can be made about the YDP. First, it can be seen as 
an example of  a policy process that responded quickly to a particular 
political crisis. Political expedience – the Prime Minister’s Office 
formulated the YDP and ordered the Ministry of  Youth, Sports and 
Culture (MYSC) to implement it – meant that the finer points of  
policy formulation, like consultation, went out of  the window. Broadly 
speaking, the YDP is fairly similar in its narratives and framings to the 
NYP. But it also has unique features: for example, despite adopting 
the age-based definition of  youth, the YDP attempts to broadly 
categorise youth in terms of  their geographical location and primary 
socioeconomic activities. In doing so, the YDP categorised youth as 
being either urban, rural or pastoral. Challenges and opportunities 
that correspond to these categories were also elaborated. Perhaps the 
long-standing EPRDF tradition of  producing detailed political strategy 
documents came into play in the production of  the YDP. Whilst 
the NYP followed the formal structure and presentation of  a policy 
document, the YDP is produced in a detailed 90-page document similar 
to other political strategy and propaganda documents.
Second, while relying fairly on similar framings and narratives to 
the NYP, the YDP clearly acknowledged structural and institutional 
constraints on youth. The government did not stop at identifying 
the constraints; it also acted swiftly to address both economic and 
political marginalisation. For example, it highlighted the expansion 
of  MSEs, and provided young people with financial and technical 
assistance to start their own businesses. Obviously, since the programme 
was primarily initiated to regain the government’s legitimacy, the 
sustainability and long-term impact must be carefully examined. 
However, the effort required to address youth unemployment with 
actual job creation programmes should be recognised. As part of  the 
effort to address the political marginalisation of  young people, the 
EPRDF also initiated Youth Forums, particularly in Addis Ababa, as a 
permanent consultation platform between youth and the government.
4.4 National development plans
Three national development plans have been adopted since 2005, and 
in different ways each addressed youth issues and particularly youth 
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employment. The Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development 
to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005–10) (MoFED 2006) emerged as part of  
the global effort to reduce poverty which had the effect of  reducing any 
sense of  ownership on the part of  the Ethiopian government. With the 
subsequent Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I from 2010–15, 
and GTP II from 2015–20), the government enjoyed more policy space 
to formulate its own approach and plans. After electoral defeat in several 
constituencies, the EPRDF engaged in mass mobilisation, effective political 
restrictions and huge public sector investment (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; 
Gudina 2011). These activities contributed to the party winning 99.6 per 
cent of  the parliament seats during the 2010 elections. The national 
development plans need to be examined in relation to the political context 
from which they emerge. Accordingly, in GTP I, the government officially 
declared its aim to build a ‘democratic developmental state’ (MoFED 
2010: 22), and this was reaffirmed in GTP II. Both plans were preceded 
by national elections that gave the ruling party control of  almost all 
parliamentary seats. Hence, the development plans were also commitments 
through which the ruling elite sought to consolidate its legitimacy.
PASDEP addressed youth employment by incorporating the narratives 
of  NYP and the ten-year multi-sector and five-year strategic plans that 
followed the NYP. By aligning PASDEP and NYP, the government 
attempted to maintain some level of  policy coherence. However, as 
noted earlier, once the YDP entered the policy scene, it replaced all other 
youth-specific policy frameworks. GTP I approached youth issues in 
tandem with sports, and youth-specific objectives were presented in broad 
terms: ‘[T]o increase the participation of  youth in democratic governance 
and economic development processes’ (ibid.: 112). The three identified 
‘GTP I targets for youth development’ were increasing youth centres at 
district level; youth mainstreaming in development programmes; and 
increasing the number of  youth volunteers. No clear indication was given 
as to how youth employment would be addressed. GTP II maintained 
the broad objective of  enhancing meaningful youth participation in 
the socioeconomic and political arenas. GTP II defines youth as ‘seeds 
of  development and democracy’ and aims to make them sources of  
‘developmental investors’ through entrepreneurship schemes (MoFED 
2015: 86) It further argues that youth employment is best addressed 
by organising young people in MSEs. The plan aims to integrate the 
job creation and entrepreneurship programmes with education and 
training and the manufacturing sector (ibid: 127). To this end, it set a 
goal of  organising 7.43 million young people in MSEs and 1.35 million 
in cooperative unions. These plans included making approximately 
£366 million available to young entrepreneurs.
In all three documents, the age-based definition of  the NYP was 
the main departure point. Youth issues are also presented as ‘cross-
cutting’ in the national development plans. At the same time, there is a 
shared portrayal of  youth as a marginalised and excluded segment of  
society that needs coordinated support. GTP II in particular uses the 
phrase ‘seeds of  democracy and development’ (ibid.: 86) to embed the 
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process of  growing up into the political and economic discourse of  the 
developmental state.
5 Discussions and conclusions
Three main learning points can be identified. The first is that context 
plays a critical role in influencing when a policy emerges, how it is 
formulated and implemented, and who gets involved. The VCP, NYP, 
YDP and the national development plans emerged in different contexts 
and these contexts are reflected in their respective narratives, framings 
and implementation. The structural adjustment period that caused 
the economic marginalisation of  youth did not trigger a direct policy 
response. Rather, the resulting prolonged period of  unemployment and 
transition was treated as a sign of  deviance and a threat to society, and 
the VCP was crafted as a remedy. The NYP, while in many ways good 
intentioned, had minimum impact, and was quickly overtaken by the 
YDP and GTPs after the 2005 election crisis. The post-election crisis 
provided the EPRDF with lessons about the relevance of  cooperation and 
negotiation, and as a result new framings were introduced that recognised 
the marginalisation of  youth and the need for them to be included.
The second point is about how policies in turn affect the way politics 
is pursued. For example, the VCP with its narrow perspective arguably 
contributed to the 2005 conflict. On the other hand, policies with a 
different point of  departure, which are not focused on criminalising 
youth – such as the creation of  Youth Forums and promotion of  MSEs 
– can promote political processes based on cooperation and negotiation.
The third point is that policies rooted in long-term developmental 
objectives and the political vision of  the state tend to be consistent 
in their narratives and framings, and can be effective in identifying 
root causes and delivering tangible outcomes. As a result of  its strong 
developmentalist orientation, the Ethiopian state can claim to have 
created millions of  jobs and self-employment opportunities for youth.
In terms of  addressing youth employment, two points need to be 
underlined. First, the challenges of  youth employment cannot be 
addressed with categorical approaches to defining youth or with 
approaches that frame young people as isolated individuals. The VCP’s 
criminalising narrative stems from detaching the individual young person 
from the socioeconomic and political context in which they live. Second, 
when broader socioeconomic and political contexts are taken into 
account, challenges of  youth employment can be addressed systematically. 
The NYP, YDP and GTP II identified structural and institutional 
challenges, which set the stage for effective long-term intervention.
Finally, the analysis demonstrates that it is important to examine youth 
employment within the context of  the broader socioeconomic and political 
dynamics of  the state. How state elites pursue their political purposes 
determines the developmental orientation of  the state. These broader 
political dynamics inevitably shape youth employment policy processes.
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The Side-Hustle: Diversified 
Livelihoods of Kenyan Educated 
Young Farmers
Grace Muthoni Mwaura*
Abstract Side-hustling – the engagement in diverse income-earning 
activities – has become a common phenomenon among Kenyan educated 
youth who are increasingly faced with formal employment uncertainties. 
In this article, I examine how aspirations and expectations of educated 
youth are formed within their opportunity space, involving their assessment 
of what is possible within their geographical, socioeconomic and political 
contexts, and given their own qualities and characteristics. Through the 
life stories of six educated young farmers interviewed in 2014, I show how 
side-hustling offered them an alternative livelihood strategy; a means for 
self-improvement; and a reconfiguration of their imagined futures. The 
article suggests moving beyond our deductive statistical analyses of who is 
employed and who is not; and instead utilising a youth livelihood framework 
which helps to understand how young people make meaning of themselves 
and opportunities around them in extreme socioeconomic conditions.
Keywords: Africa, agricultural livelihoods, entrepreneurship.
1 Introduction
The twenty-first century is marred with images of  waiting youth (Honwana 
2012) who have become marginalised through under- and unemployment 
and are increasingly disconnected from their life aspirations. Nonetheless, 
these youth are not just waiting; they continually develop new subjectivities 
that enable them to manoeuvre the changing labour markets. They 
choose to reconstruct their aspirations through a range of  new social 
relationships (Durham 2007), multiple identities (Gough and Langevang 
2015), new political formations (Honwana 2012), and entrepreneurial 
individuality (Thieme 2013). To fully comprehend youth responses to 
economic austerity, it is important to examine the nexus of  the flexibility 
of  protracted youthhood inspired by neoliberal reforms and resultant 
socioeconomic uncertainties, as well as other specific local changes.
In this article, I examine side-hustling in agriculture as one response 
by educated youth to economic austerity. I broadly view the side-hustle 
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as that which young people do ‘on the side’ during their free time, on 
weekends or in the evenings, not merely to supplement their incomes 
but also as a capital accumulation strategy in preparation for other 
livelihood opportunities. These side-activities are conducted alongside 
schooling, while job-seeking (locally referred to as ‘tarmacking’) (Prince 
2013), caring for the family, and even when employed.
The notion of  side-hustling is important for understanding youth 
livelihoods in contemporary contexts for several reasons. First, 
side-hustling allows us to show what educated youth do when facing 
uncertainties about employment. Second, it suggests that youth 
employment should not be viewed through the lens of  a single job. 
Thirdly, inasmuch as side-hustling is a supplementary source of  
income, it also fulfils other imaginations of  young people such as 
attaining social markers of  adulthood. Indeed, side-hustles illuminate 
how the aspirations of  educated youth change when they anticipate 
or face livelihood uncertainties, and how they develop diversified 
career trajectories that potentially enable them to attain the desired 
social markers of  adulthood, while also avoiding the stigma of  being 
‘unemployed youth’ (Prince 2013).
This article begins by providing an overview of  youth employment and 
agriculture in Kenya. In Section 3, it contextualises side-hustling in the 
conceptual framework of  opportunity space. Section 4 discusses the 
methods of  data collection used. Section 5 presents six life stories of  
educated young farmers focusing on their variations of  side-hustling. 
Section 6 analyses how side-hustling helps understand the everyday life 
of  young people in terms of  providing a livelihood strategy, shaping 
their identities and reconfiguring their aspirations. Finally, Section 
7 concludes with implications for policy and recommendations for 
further research.
2 Youth employment and agriculture in Kenya
Although Kenyan youth1 make up 60 per cent2 of  the working 
population (NCPD 2013), their contribution to economic development 
remains low, posing a great challenge to the sustained growth envisaged 
by government. For instance, in 2009, the National Human Development 
Report recorded a youth income index of  0.44, meaning a high 
dependency ratio and continued struggles for youth to earn a living 
(UNDP 2010). Even with an increasing number of  young people 
completing primary and secondary education, only approximately 
200,000 students per year proceed to higher learning institutions, with a 
small fraction of  these completing university and securing employment 
afterwards (Njonjo 2011). This article is concerned with the role that 
education plays in configuring and reconfiguring the aspirations of  
young people in a context where the labour market offers limited formal 
employment opportunities for young people.
The idea that agriculture can provide significant numbers of  jobs for 
young people is now accepted in most African countries. In Kenya, 
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it is part of  a well-established policy narrative that supports informal 
sector work and self-employment in rural areas. However, this narrative 
is problematic for two reasons. First, it excludes educated youth who 
it is claimed reject rural-based occupations as dirty and demeaning, 
aspiring instead to white-collar formal employment. Second, it fails to 
consider the broader context of  the Kenyan agriculture sector which 
has significantly changed since the structural reforms of  the 1980s 
(Rono 2002). Even though agriculture contributes 25 per cent directly 
and 27 per cent indirectly to the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), the national budget allocation to the sector remains at only 5 per 
cent of  total expenditure (GoK 2013). As such, the sector fails to attract 
and retain skilled human capital capable of  driving profitability and 
sustainability. Most youth are educated to leave the maisha ngumu (hard 
life) in the rural areas.
While some studies show that indeed young people in the past have 
been educated out of  farming (White 2012), others argue that even with 
increased education, migration and urbanisation, many African youth 
will continue to live in the rural areas and thereby will rely directly or 
indirectly on agricultural livelihoods (Filmer et al. 2014). These studies 
underpin the youth in agriculture narrative that seeks to entice young 
people to become farmers by making agriculture ‘cool’, ‘sexy’ and 
‘lucrative’ (AGRA 2015). Fundamentally, this narrative segues with 
neoliberal frames of  entrepreneurship and has produced agribusiness 
– ‘farming as a business’ – as the new opportunity space for youth 
self-employment (Sumberg et al. 2014). In particular, agriculture is 
to be made attractive to educated youth through the combination of  
entrepreneurship and the potential to expand opportunities beyond the 
farm, including service provision, processing and marketing (Proctor 
and Lucchesi 2012).
While for some educated youth, agriculture could be an undesirable 
‘last resort or not an option at all’ (Tadele and Gella 2012) or just boring 
(Lewa and Ndungu 2012), to others, agriculture provides quick incomes 
that facilitate a transition into other activities that promise social and 
economic gain (Berckmoes and White 2014). For instance, Okali and 
Sumberg (2012) found that young Ghanaians farmed tomatoes to build 
capital with which to meet other social and economic needs, attain 
economic independence, and then shift to other types of  livelihoods. 
Fundamentally, the change in perceptions occurs when young people 
start re-imagining agriculture as an entrepreneurial venture facilitating 
their ‘moving forward’ and getting ‘a total reward’ (Fanthorpe and 
Maconachie 2010). What was once seen as a denigrated occupation, 
and not a first choice, becomes desirable because it allows investing in 
oneself  and starting up something on your own (Gough and Langevang 
2015). Here young people view themselves not as farmers, but as 
‘creative agents who try to seize the available opportunities to improve 
their positions’ (Langevang and Gough 2012: 248). While the discursive 
frames of  entrepreneurship and agribusiness camouflage the experience 
of  under- and unemployment within precarious economies, they also set 
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the stage for side-hustling. This article will show how side-hustles allow 
young people to reconstitute themselves as subjects capable of  offering 
products and services, which enable them to meet livelihoods needs, 
achieve elite distinction and transition into social adulthood.
3 Side-hustles and the opportunity space framework
Conceptually, side-hustles are different from hustling. Hustling has been 
described as the everyday survival strategies of  marginalised young 
people to capitalise on every opportunity to earn an income or generate 
symbolic capital in extreme economic landscapes (Munive 2010; 
Thieme 2013). Munive’s research with Liberian youth depicts hustling 
as a common phenomenon in African cities where young men and 
women work, for example, as load carriers, motorcycle riders, weekend 
farmers, petty traders or street food caterers. He argues that hustling is 
both a survival strategy to address material constraints, and a means of  
crafting an identity, creating a self-efficacious and meaningful existence. 
As Thieme (2013) observed among young men in the Mathare slums 
in Kenya, hustling can also be understood as a cumulative set of  
behaviours contesting existing structures of  authority. Importantly, 
hustlers resist the identity given to unemployed youth by those in 
authority as being desperate and lacking opportunities; and instead view 
hustling as offering them a good life on their own terms, and enabling 
them to maintain a status in society even in difficult circumstances. 
Successful hustling reflects an individual’s intentional strategies, 
ingenuity and social networks (Munive 2010; Thieme 2013).
Building on Thieme’s and Munive’s work, this article focuses on what 
my respondents referred to as a side-hustle – to pursue alternative 
livelihood activities on the margins of  a constrained agricultural 
economy. A side-hustle might be income-earning in the present, or 
could lead to economic gain in the future. For the educated youth with 
whom I worked, side-hustling was seen as offering potential for upward 
social mobility (Mwaura 2016).
In the broader framework of  youth employment and livelihoods, the 
inquiry of  side-hustling is important because formal employment 
opportunities are severely constrained. There is, therefore, the need 
to understand how young men and women perceive and respond to 
this challenge. As work opportunities emerge (and others shrink), one’s 
aspirations change and expectations are reformulated to reflect what is 
possible (Hardgrove, Rootham and McDowell 2015).
Sumberg et al. define opportunity space as:
… the spatial and temporal distribution of  the universe of  more or 
less viable [work] options that a young person may exploit as she/he 
attempts to establish an independent life. The opportunity space of  a 
situated person is a function of  global, national, and regional factors 
including institutions, policy, and demand; place; and social and 
cultural norms (2012: 5).
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In this regard, young people’s aspirations and expectations are 
determined by the existing broader circumstances, such as financial 
crisis, education, technology, migration, urbanisation, environmental 
change and social-cultural norms among others (Leavy and Smith 
2010). Opportunity space can be analysed in terms of  depth, diversity 
and dynamism, reflecting on one hand, the interplay of  forces existing 
in the broader geographical, social-economic and political contexts in 
which these opportunities exist and on the other hand, the differentiated 
capabilities and dispositions of  young people. The extent to which a 
young person is able to exploit a given opportunity is a function of  their 
access to key resources; support from social relations and networks; 
information, knowledge and skills; attitudes (e.g. towards risk and travel); 
imagination, alertness and adroitness to judiciously exploit opportunities 
(Sumberg et al. 2012). In effect, opportunities range from last resort 
survival strategies to transformative livelihood strategies that result in 
real incomes, enhance capabilities, address social equity and exclusion, 
and offer livelihood diversification opportunities.
4 Methods
This article draws from my doctoral study carried out in 2014 and 
2015 in Eastern, Western, and Central regions of  Kenya investigating 
the changing aspirations and alternative livelihood options of  educated 
youth. Educated youth were defined as those aged 18–35 years and with 
post-secondary education at degree, diploma or vocational certificate 
levels. I worked with a sample of  60 educated young farmers. First, I 
selected participants from social media platforms of  young farmers who 
then referred me to other young farmers who met my criteria. Second, 
I utilised contact lists of  organisations working on ‘youth in agriculture’ 
to reach out to young people benefiting from their programmes. 
Third, I attended various events on ‘youth in agriculture’ and selected 
participants based on their self-identification as farmers and their 
willingness to participate in the study.
The data collection process involved 60 open-ended interviews and 
field visits. I also followed the young farmers’ online activity via social 
media to monitor any new information regarding their farming and 
other income-earning activities. I transcribed, coded and analysed 
the data using NVivo. This article presents the life stories of  six young 
farmers to show how they pursued alternative livelihoods alongside or 
when seeking formal jobs. The six were selected on the basis of  their 
mention of  agriculture and other activities as ‘side-things’ they engaged 
in. I specifically analyse how these individuals perceived changes in the 
labour market and viewed the potential of  their agricultural activities 
to provide the needed income, achieve elite distinction, and satisfy their 
responsibilities in society.
5 Life stories
The six individuals whose stories are given next belong to a generation 
born in the 1980s during a time of  structural adjustment and economic 
liberalisation. By the 1990s, government spending cuts led to a 
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significant downsizing of  the public sector. While educated youth of  
previous generations were socialised to expect white-collar employment 
upon graduation (Munene and Otieno 2008), this new generation finds 
few formal sector employment opportunities. Officially, although only 
an estimated 15.7 per cent of  25–29-year-olds (the age group coinciding 
with completion of  tertiary and/or higher education) are unemployed, 
the rate of  underemployment is very high, and it takes approximately 
five years for a graduate to secure a job (Njonjo 2011).
5.1 Wangechi
It is a side thing; I did it [farming, training young farmers, blogging, and 
writing farming manuals] for one year in 2013 close to full-time, because I 
had sponsorship from a women’s organisation. Now that I am done with the 
fellowship, I am thinking of  going back to work because I had actually quit my 
job to do this for a year. (Wangechi, female farmer, Central Kenya)
Wangechi (28 years old) was introduced as a strawberry farmer. When 
we met in 2014, she was leading a community-based organisation 
(CBO) in Kiambu County while undertaking postgraduate studies 
in one of  Nairobi’s public universities. In 2013, the CBO received a 
fellowship grant which enabled Wangechi to mobilise and build the 
capacity of  young farmers in her county. She had successfully trained 
over 500 youth; developed one of  the leading blogs on agricultural 
information and youth farming opportunities; and published manuals 
on modern farming practices. At the time of  the interview, she had just 
completed the fellowship grant and was registering a company separate 
from the CBO through which she planned to continue offering the 
trainings for a fee and blogging, while she sought a formal job. However, 
Wangechi had quit strawberry farming after several failed attempts and 
had no intention of  going back to farming. She viewed the trainings, the 
blogging and the publishing of  farming manuals as her ‘side-hustle’ as 
she completed her postgraduate studies and searched for a formal job.
5.2 Wambaya
Wambaya (26 years old) was a telephone3 horticultural and dairy farmer 
in Western Kenya. He was also seeking a white-collar job while pursuing 
other entrepreneurial opportunities in Nairobi. After graduating in 2011, 
Wambaya had volunteered with several international organisations in 
Kenya, Ethiopia and Japan, but none of  these experiences had led to 
a job. He then established himself  as a freelance consultant offering 
online research training, volunteered with development organisations, 
and acquired new information and communications technology (ICT) 
skills. In late 2013, Wambaya invested in a greenhouse that was managed 
by his mother and a farm worker in Migori. He also bought two dairy 
cattle, which provided enough income through milk sales to pay the farm 
worker’s wages. When I visited his farm, Wambaya’s mother described 
her son as unemployed and viewed his investments in agriculture as 
security for when he would return to the rural areas after failing to find 
a formal job. During our interview in mid-2014, none of  the farming 
projects were yet to turn a profit, and Wambaya had not travelled to 
(Endnotes)
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Migori. Nevertheless, he was determined to make agriculture a major 
income source and was already planning his next projects in fish farming 
and drip irrigation. His newly acquired ICT skills had enabled him to 
collaborate with a friend and invest in an online marketing business. 
While his goal was to use the profits from these ventures to expand 
his farm, he also intended to diversify into other enterprises: ‘Like any 
other businessman will tell you, I will also invest outside farming. I want 
to diversify to cushion myself. Because you don’t know what might 
happen in future.’ Even though he referred to himself  as a businessman, 
Wambaya was still seeking a formal job and intended to pursue a 
postgraduate degree the following year. Similar to Wangechi, he was 
using every opportunity in Migori and Nairobi to diversify his options 
and build capital in preparation for his desired future.
5.3 Cherunya
Oh my God, No! I was thinking of  how I would become a diplomat, attend to 
political parties, and be fabulous. I did not imagine soil and stuff. It was never 
in my plan. But that happened during my transition when I got married… 
so I had to naturally blend into the culture. (Cherunya, female farmer, 
Western Kenya)
Cherunya (33 years old) was from a wealthy family in Western Kenya and 
educated at prestigious schools in Uganda and Kenya. Upon graduating, 
she worked with a policy thinktank in Nairobi where she expected to 
rise up the ladder into the diplomatic service. Nevertheless, on getting 
married, she acquired a new identity as a wife which meant ‘blending into 
the culture’ and so migrating to rural Kericho to assume the traditional 
roles of  a Kalenjin wife. She cared for her ageing parents-in-law and 
like other housewives in her community, established a kitchen garden. 
However, given her knowledge and access to resources, Cherunya’s 
kitchen garden included modern poultry rearing and a greenhouse, 
both of  which were income-earning. She also opened a grocery shop in 
the nearby trading centre where she sold most of  her produce. Despite 
assuming the traditional roles of  a Kalenjin housewife, Cherunya also 
positioned herself  in the community as a gender activist, soon establishing 
a women’s empowerment group and becoming a local politician. While 
farming had not been her choice, Cherunya used her kitchen garden to 
teach the local women entrepreneurial skills, thereby achieving her goal 
of  being politically active, while fulfilling her obligations as a housewife.
5.4 Musembi
After my internship, I tarmacked for like a year, that’s when I was very busy 
with the farm. (Musembi, male farmer, Eastern Kenya)
Musembi (28 years old) was a diploma graduate, a development worker, 
and an online degree student living and working in rural Kitui, Eastern 
Kenya. Unlike other educated youth in his community who migrated to 
urban areas to seek formal jobs, after earning his diploma Musembi had 
returned to Kitui where he worked for a local organisation, enrolled for an 
online degree programme, and later married. He self-identified as a young 
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farmer growing horticultural and other crops on a piece of  land inherited 
from his parents. He had started farming to ‘finance the tarmacking’ for 
a formal job after college, but even after he found one (it was seasonal 
and paid very low wages) Musembi continued farming as ‘it supports me 
when I am not on contract’. The income from farming and the contract 
job enabled him to sustain his family and pay for his online degree course. 
Musembi was optimistic that the online course would help him find a 
well-paid job, but in the meantime, farming remained a significant source 
of  income that shaped his identity as an educated man with responsibility 
to support his nuclear and extended family.
5.5 Joe
Joe (30 years old) was a full-time business journalist in Nairobi and 
self-identified as a young farmer, leasing five acres of  land in Kajiado 
County in Central Kenya where he grew onions under a contractual 
arrangement with an international seed company. Our conversation 
started on the subject of  his current occupation, business journalism; 
only later did it emerge that Joe had trained as a veterinary doctor but 
never practised:
I went to university because I passed with a good grade that could take me 
to university to earn a degree. But when I got there, I realised I was drawn 
to communications and not [veterinary] science. It was a long struggle… I 
didn’t like it because we were doing it for a job… I don’t really use it now… 
That’s why we go to university; to identify what we really want to do… [So] 
when at the university I used to do a [radio] show on entrepreneurship and was 
encouraging young people to invest. 
Joe realised his passion for journalism in his first year of  university, 
but the administration and his parents did not allow him to change his 
area of  study. He therefore went ahead to pursue veterinary science, 
but worked as a broadcaster at the university radio station for the four 
years. During this period, he developed an interest in business and 
planned his radio programmes around youth entrepreneurship. This 
experience landed him a business journalism job after university. From 
there he enrolled for a second degree in media studies. Even though he 
was aware that his progress as a journalist depended on his educational 
qualifications, Joe was disappointed that the education system had 
already failed to match his aspirations, or at least, enable learners to 
‘provide solutions to the society’. To get a pay rise or promotion at his 
workplace, Joe needed to earn a postgraduate degree and at the time of  
the interview, was considering enrolling.
Joe’s drive was no longer in just becoming a journalist; he was now 
focused on wealth accumulation and promotion in the journalism 
industry, and success in his side-businesses were major parts of  his plan. 
Only a few months into farming, Joe referred to it as a hobby: ‘I am not 
a journalist on the weekends. I am in my wellies, my hat, and it’s a lot 
of  fun just like going to play golf.’ However, he planned to eventually 
expand it into a large-scale farm for export purposes:
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It [farming] is my pet project, and it is fun… It’s a new thing, but it was not 
cool five years ago. If  you look at it as a business, it’s cool… This business needs 
to grow, because when you move into exports, you are talking big money. I am 
planning to go into farming for export.
Joe’s income from journalism was split between supporting his family, 
saving for a postgraduate degree and investing in the farm. Similar to 
Wambaya, he viewed the current farming activities as experimental 
projects that would eventually grow into major investments.
5.6 Matei
Matei (34 years old) was educated in Machakos, Eastern Kenya, and 
lived and worked there for a development organisation. He identified 
himself  as a successful young farmer and an entrepreneur: he had 
managed to purchase a plot of  land, build a house, and marry. He had 
also inherited a piece of  land from his father where he was farming 
sweet potatoes, cassava, mangoes and bananas. Alongside his formal 
employment, Matei was committed to earning extra income from 
his farm and other side-businesses (the nature of  which he would not 
disclose). When I asked him why diversifying his income was important, 
he responded: ‘I don’t want my family to hustle’, implying the need 
for him to move his family beyond survival mode. He also pointed to 
the fact that formal employment did not give him the independence 
he desired. Thus, agriculture and the other side-businesses were 
progressively opening up new opportunities for him to become 
financially independent while also accumulating capital.
His wife lived in Machakos town and refused to migrate to their newly 
constructed house in the neighbouring rural area. She argued that 
relocating to a rural neighbourhood would symbolise a meagre living, 
not in keeping with the expectations of  society of  an educated and 
modern family.
6 What’s in a side-hustle?
Wangechi, Wambaya, Cherunya, Musembi, Joe and Matei are examples 
of  how present-day educated youth in Kenya are re-imagining their 
futures and pursuing work opportunities in the absence of  formal sector 
employment. Their transition from one activity to another shows how 
they seize contingent labour market opportunities while keeping an eye 
on possible future opportunities. Their strategies to remain employable 
yet entrepreneurially active are similar to the description of  a side-hustle 
in a recent news feature:
A side hustle is a business people run while concurrently doing 
something else. The something else in many cases is a full-time job, 
so you operate your side hustle after working hours and on weekends. 
Or rather, that’s what all employers would like to believe. Most 
probably, you sneak in a few logistical phone calls, emails, meetings, 
etc… The something else could be that you are in university or are a 
stay-at-home parent (Nduati Omanga 2016).
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Indeed, side-hustling is how young people, given their differential 
capabilities, position themselves within and exploit the opportunity 
space. While Betcherman and Khan (2015) argue that youth livelihoods 
in agriculture reflect a variety of  factors – including land tenure, 
lack of  investments in technology and infrastructure, and limited 
profitability – the multiple identities of  these six young farmers suggest 
a need to acknowledge that education changes the nature of  livelihood 
opportunities for young people and in agriculture. Additionally, 
side-hustling is an indicator of  the self-improvement strategies of  young 
people and their continuous efforts to rework their work aspirations in a 
constrained economy.
6.1 A livelihood strategy
Side-hustling has become deeply entrenched in the Kenyan culture of  
work and it is fast becoming socially acceptable among young employed 
professionals, students and those seeking jobs and working in their first 
or temporary jobs. Journalists, teachers, civil servants, doctors and even 
politicians talk of  side-hustles when informally sharing information 
about how they supplement their monthly income. Side-hustles shape 
one’s identity as opportunities for self-advancement present themselves 
in a precarious social and economic context. Ku4 – hustle – is the new 
language and symbol for ‘making ends meet’ among the young people 
who use phrases like ‘I also have a ka-farm5 back in the village’ and 
‘I am thinking of  my next hustle’ to explain their supplementary 
income activities. While it is not class-based (even though class-based 
side-hustles exist), failing to side-hustle is construed as laziness or being 
too posh to earn extra income from presumably available economic 
opportunities. Nevertheless, side-hustles are often difficult, and can 
involve risk, loss and failure.
Among the educated young farmers, side-hustling exhibited the 
temporality and uncertainty of  most agricultural activity as well as 
the possibility of  having options beyond agriculture. Sometimes, as 
in Wangechi’s case, side-hustles can be regarded as short stints of  
profit-making and ways of  accumulating capital, contributing to 
attainment of  social markers of  adulthood. Even so, sometimes they 
are also opportunities of  just moving around rather than moving up 
and away from the economic uncertainties and marginalisation that the 
young people face, for example in Musembi’s case.
The choice of  a side-hustle is determined by one’s availability, expected 
gains, and access to necessary capital. The main goal is to earn an 
income. Those involved remain flexible to stop some or pick up new 
side-hustles as dictated by evolving challenges and opportunities. The 
educated young farmers I interviewed embodied an entrepreneurial 
identity that included a plan to maximise profits, adopt innovations, 
and improve the quality of  their farm products and services, while 
coping with risk. This was the case for Joe, Wambaya and Matei. Many 
were also driven by a last resort instinct and an immediate need to 
accumulate capital that would propel their upward social mobility, to 
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support their families and to maintain certain distinctions in society. 
For example, Musembi’s agribusiness provided the much needed 
economic and symbolic capital that helped him in his efforts to find 
a job; and Cherunya utilised her kitchen garden to empower women, 
hence creating the social capital for her transition into politics. These 
young farmers confirm previous studies indicating that, not only do 
entrepreneurs respond to static economic pressures, they also change 
and mould new opportunities in such difficult situations (Langevang and 
Gough 2012).
6.2 A self-improvement strategy
Side-hustling is an important marker of  a young person’s self-making 
efforts, allowing them to gain financial independence and social 
acceptability among peers and in society more generally. As formal 
employment is declining in number and in status, educated young people 
are choosing occupations that help them develop new subjectivities 
expressed as doing ‘work for myself ’, hence drawing on the neoliberal 
ideologies of  self-making (Durham 2007), competitive individualism 
(Standing 2011), and multiplicity of  identities (Schwiter 2016). Matei 
and Joe’s stories illustrate the creation of  these new subjectivities.
On the other hand, side-hustling can also supplement formal jobs that 
young people find unsatisfactory due to their low wages, temporary 
contracts, skills mismatch, and sometimes lack of  personal development 
opportunities. They turn to side-hustles to recreate work as something 
flexible and that allows them to exercise their agency. As a result, their 
everyday lives are characterised by creative use of  space and time that 
allows self-improvement, re-working new identities, and re-imagining 
their futures. For instance, Wangechi, Musembi, Wambaya and Joe 
planned to pursue further education alongside their side-hustles to 
improve their skillset and remain competitive in their professional fields. 
In the absence of  state social protection mechanisms, Matei, Musembi 
and Wambaya planned to utilise farming to accumulate capital – a 
valuable safety net if  they lost their jobs. Musembi’s formal job was 
contractual, and hence his farming activities provided an income when 
he was without salary, while furthering his education would, he hoped, 
position him for a well-paid job in the future. Similarly, Wambaya’s 
ICT skills helped him operate online businesses, while Joe’s journalism 
experience had landed him a job even without having the specific 
academic qualifications.
However, as in Cherunya’s case, social norms and differences might 
block some opportunities while opening up others. Her hopes of  
becoming a diplomat were curtailed when she married and migrated to 
rural Kericho. Nevertheless, in this new location, given her education 
and access to resources, she was able to reposition herself  and develop 
a new identity as an entrepreneur and gender activist. Similarly, even 
though Wangechi gave up farming strawberries, her experience of  
running a CBO had prepared her to consider establishing her own 
company through which she would continue offering the same services 
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at a fee. This, coupled with her postgraduate education, was her way of  
remaining competitive in the labour market.
6.3 A re-imagination of aspirations
Aspirations are an individual’s desire to obtain a status or achieve a goal 
in the future (Hardgrove et al. 2015). They are developed and evolve 
in certain contexts that are influenced by social and relational factors 
(such as family background, peers, gender and norms) as well as the 
interplay of  forces in the contemporary context spanning globalisation, 
urbanisation, migration, engagement in diverse labour markets, and 
connectivity offered by technology. For instance, while Wambaya had 
not succeeded in finding a formal job, his ability to start up other 
income-earning activities enabled him to reconfigure a future where he 
could have a sustainable livelihood. Likewise, while Cherunya had never 
imagined herself  becoming a farmer; when tradition demanded that she 
live as a Kalenjin wife in a rural area, she found herself  using the very 
traditional roles to re-imagine her future as activist and politician.
Even though side-hustling might be depicted as reflecting 
disenchantment with the education system and economic conditions, 
educated youth are using their education to develop alternative life 
trajectories. Joe’s experience as a radio presenter helped him develop 
an interest in entrepreneurship which informed his drive to accumulate 
wealth. While journalism was his passion, he now aspired to accumulate 
capital which he associated with rising up the ranks in the journalism 
industry and investing in his side-businesses.
These examples of  side-hustling also challenge existing notions of  a 
good life (urban and employed), and instead portray the possibilities of  
a decent life even in the rural areas. Matei described disenfranchised 
urban job seekers as ‘very many clean people coming from towns; but 
they have a lot of  nothing, with a big phone, just for Facebook. Yet they 
are broke’. While migrating to urban areas offers educated youth a 
chance to acquire certain symbols of  modernity such as a smartphone 
and new clothes, often these youth continue to struggle to find decent 
employment, and remain as vulnerable as those in the rural areas.
On the other hand, some young people brought up in urban areas are 
going to rural areas and assuming rural lifestyles, while keeping a close 
connection with their urban social networks – Joe and Cherunya are 
good examples. The rural space takes on new meaning when it offers 
opportunity for economic gain and social acceptability.
7 Conclusion: does a side-hustle employ?
This article illustrates several nuances with regard to youth employment. 
First, that educated youth, whether formally employed or not, earn a 
livelihood from more than one activity. The life stories of  these educated 
young farmers depict their embodiments of  multiple identities in 
response to opportunities emerging from the liberalised yet uncertain 
Kenyan economy. They are acting as self-disciplined citizens who, despite 
their disillusionment with unemployment, do not wait for the state to 
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take action. Rather, they have been socialised to take responsibility for 
dealing with their own problems and thereby also, defining on their own 
terms what is productive and respectable in society.
Second, while traditional conceptions of  youth employment cover the 
informal and formal sector, they fail to explain instances where one 
sector is used as a safety net for the other. They also fail to inform us 
about the haphazard transitions of  young people between formal and 
informal sectors that affect the existing categorisation of  youth work 
opportunities. In the absence of  formal work, young graduates become 
informal sector workers, not out of  choice, but because opportunities 
open up through their education and other factors such as geographical 
positioning and social contexts. They use their limited capital to start 
farming, sometimes with an intention of  transitioning into other 
income-earning activities or into a more established agribusiness. These 
somewhat unknown and unpredictable transitions should inform the 
basis of  continued inquiry into youth livelihoods, especially in how we 
translate the information needed to guide the contribution of  statistical 
analyses of  the categories of  youth work. Fundamentally, the concept of  
side-hustling begs further research questions on whether youth under- 
and unemployment should be addressed from the viewpoint of  youth 
poverty, social organisation and public morality, urbanisation and rural 
depopulation, political unrest, or merely as a problem of  effectively 
utilising the youthful workforce to contribute to national income and 
reconstruction of  the country.
Third, the stories of  the six young farmers challenge the popular 
assumption that those who are educated take up skilled jobs while those 
with little or no education end up in informal, unskilled and semi-skilled 
work (Bennell 2010). Educated young farmers are seen to retain their 
educational identities, while also acquiring and utilising a specialised 
skillset (often entrepreneurial and innovation-based) needed to succeed 
in agriculture. As a result, they may help transform the sector by 
introducing new technologies, by finding new ways of  managing risks, 
and thus changing the opportunity space in which others might engage. 
Whether engagement by educated youth in agriculture will really help 
to address the youth employment challenge remains to be seen, but this 
possibility should not be discounted.
Fourth, efforts to diversify youth livelihoods through the agriculture 
sector engages with ongoing debates on the demographic dividend. 
There is a narrative that new and younger farmers are needed who will 
bring new ideas, energy and technologies into the sector. Nevertheless, 
the side-hustling described in this article portrays a sense of  temporality 
about young people’s engagement with the sector that should raise 
questions about this narrative.
Finally, a recognition of  side-hustling should be brought into youth 
employment policy. Side-hustling challenges orthodox conceptions 
of  employment and the youth employment challenge, as well as the 
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standard set of  policy responses. It would be a mistake to see side-
hustling as a vindication of  youth employment policies that place the 
burden of  job creation on the shoulders of  the young people themselves. 
While side-hustling can be read as young people’s struggle against 
adversity, more than anything else it reflects the failure of  the state to 
uphold its end of  the intergenerational bargain.
Notes
* I am grateful to all the young people who participated in this 
research, my research assistants, and the World Agroforestry Centre 
Evergreen Agriculture Partnership for funding the fieldwork. I 
also thank Professor Patricia Daley, Jacqueline Mgumia, Eyob 
Gebremariam, Jim Sumberg and Carol Smithyes for their comments 
on the initial drafts of  this article.
1 The Kenyan constitution defines youth as those aged 18–35 years.
2 Seventy-eight per cent of  Kenya’s estimated population of  46 million 
people are aged below 34 years (NCPD 2013).
3 Meaning he transacted most of  the farm activities over the mobile 
phone with his mother and a farm worker.
4 Swahili for ‘to’.
5 ‘Ka’ here means something small and on the side.
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Gambling, Dancing, Sex Work: 
Notions of Youth Employment in 
Uganda 
Victoria Flavia Namuggala
Abstract Using the case of Uganda, this article explains how previously 
displaced youth conceptualise employment compared to what is formally 
understood as employment by national and cultural institutions. Using key 
informant interviews, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, the 
study examined the experiences of formerly displaced youth in Northern 
Uganda. Findings indicate that in order to survive, these youth participate 
in socially and culturally unacceptable activities, some of which are criminal 
offences. This article focuses on these deviant forms of employment, 
arguing that the youth population has been framed as unemployed 
based on a formal understanding of work. Yet, in Northern Uganda, this 
disregards the complexities of the lives of the formerly displaced, leading 
to the criminalisation and pathologisation of alternative forms of income 
generation. This research concludes that these forms of work can be 
transformative and empowering for young people and thus deserving of 
attention from policymakers and development practitioners.
Keywords: Africa, gender, risky behaviour, conflict, sex work.
1 Introduction
The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines unemployment 
simply as when people are without work, currently available for work 
and are actively seeking work (ILO 2010). The ILO in addition adopts 
particular indicators in reference to unemployment including hours 
worked, skills required and wages attained by doing a particular 
job. In this article, I argue that this approach to unemployment 
and employment disregards much of  the work done by people who 
find themselves in difficult or irregular situations, such as formerly 
displaced young people from Northern Uganda. It is thus important 
to re-conceptualise what (un)employment means, taking into account 
contextually relevant factors including location, age and gender.
Besides unemployment, internal displacement is another challenge 
facing Africa generally. According to the Internal Displacement 
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Monitoring Centre, by the end of  2014, there were 38 million displaced 
people globally with the majority in sub-Saharan Africa (Lenard 
2015). Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from protracted displacement,1 and 
this hinders reintegration, resettlement and reconstruction, and thus 
development. Uganda has not escaped these dynamics of  displacement. 
The country has been entangled in decades of  civil violence in the post-
independence period (Byamugisha, Shamchiyeva and Kizu 2014). The 
rebels of  the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have particularly affected 
the northern part of  the country. Their rebellion started in 1986 when 
the current government took power and it continued until 2008 (Dolan 
2009). The civilian population, and especially young people, have been 
the rebels’ primary target (Cheney 2007; Machel 2000).
This article draws on a larger qualitative study: ‘Gender, Age and 
Violence: Complexity of  Identity Among Returning Formerly Displaced 
Youth in Uganda’ (Namuggala 2016). This doctoral thesis adopted an 
integrated approach to understanding youthhood. The approach moves 
beyond numerical age definitions (the Uganda National Youth Policy 
defines youth to include persons between the ages of  18 and 35 years) to 
reflect local functional and relational perspectives to human growth and 
development.
Throughout this article, therefore, unless otherwise stated, I use the term 
youth to refer to persons who identify or who the community identifies as 
such, irrespective of  their numeric age. This population is heterogeneous 
in terms of  gender, location, marital status and so on, and therefore 
an approach to youthhood based on the notion of  intersectionality is 
useful (Crenshaw 2006). In addition, it unveils the ways interconnected 
domains of  power organise and structure inequality and oppression and 
thus links research and practice (Dill and Zambrana 2009).
This study examined the experiences of  youth affected by the war 
between the LRA and the Ugandan government in the Northern 
Uganda region. The research is informed by feminist scholarship, as 
well as by indigenous studies, childhood studies, peace studies and 
conflict studies. These interdisciplinary frameworks were crucial in the 
analysis of  complex social issues like unemployment. For instance, by 
conceptualising unemployment essentially as a male youth challenge, 
youth bulge theory2 gives a highly gendered perspective, which is open 
to a feminist critique. Also, local perspectives provide a contextually 
relevant counter to the official age-based construction of  childhood, 
youth and adulthood (Chilisa 2012; Chilisa and Ntseane 2010). Such 
contextual relevance is particularly important for local policy reform.
The article begins by providing a general introduction to the 
understanding of  unemployment and conceptualisation of  youth 
especially in the context of  displacement. Section 2 details the 
methodology that informed the data collection and analysis process. 
To provide a historical overview to the youth unemployment challenge, 
Section 3 explains and provides a critical analysis of  Ugandan 
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government strategies and frameworks to address youth unemployment. 
With a clear understanding of  the history informing current 
employment narratives, in Section 4 I discuss formerly displaced youths’ 
understanding of  employment in relation to the official understanding. 
This includes implications for their work options and choices, as well as 
for policy.
2 Methodology
This research was qualitative. Data collection methods used included 
in-depth face-to-face interviews, key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions. In total, 50 interviews were conducted with 34 
females and 16 males ranging between 10 and 35 years of  age. Ten 
key informant interviews were conducted with non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) employees working as youth, local and cultural 
leaders. Six focus group discussions with the youth were also held.
Soroti District provided a good location for understanding youth 
experiences because it hosted a number of  camps for internally 
displaced persons and a large number of  returnees upon closure of  
the camps. Following the successful Juba peace talks which took place 
between 2006 and 2008, displaced people have returned to their 
communities. However, there have been land disputes, marginalisation 
and violence, which has at times resulted in secondary displacement 
– where formally returned populations are forced to depart again. 
The situation has been exacerbated by high unemployment, especially 
among young people. While the general national unemployment rate is 
high – ranging between 64 and 70 per cent (Magelah and Ntambirweki-
Karugonjo 2014) – the situation is worse in Northern Uganda given the 
breakdown in social structures and systems as a result of  the war.
Study participants were recruited using lists of  formerly displaced 
persons provided by a community organisation called Community 
Integrated Development Initiatives (CIDI), which has worked in the 
region since 2007. Two gender-specific lists of  young people were drawn 
up from which names were randomly selected until the desired number 
of  participants was attained. These youth included those displaced from 
neighbouring districts but also those from Soroti displaced within the 
district, as well as those born and raised in the camps with nowhere to 
return to. Key informants included individuals working on youth issues 
through civil society, NGOs and government. Initial reflection on each 
interview informed subsequent interviews. Upon completion of  the 
fieldwork, all interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed.
3 Overview of youth unemployment
Unemployment, especially as it affects the younger generation, is a 
long-standing development challenge in both developed and developing 
economies. Actors including states, international development partners 
such as the United Nations, World Bank, and civil society have 
focused on unemployment, but in Africa little progress has been made 
(Cleland and Machiyama 2016). Africa has the ‘fastest growing and 
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most youthful population in the world’ (AERC 2013: 1), but youth 
unemployment on the continent is also attributed to interrelated 
dynamics between economic underdevelopment, political instability, 
and a lack of  political will (Opute 2015).
Given the diversity of  situations and young people, dealing with 
unemployment in Africa requires a multifaceted understanding of  
work that privileges the different experiences and perspectives of  young 
people themselves. For example, in Uganda, while the entire youth 
population is affected, the rate of  unemployment among female youth 
is twice as high as that among males (Ahaibwe and Mbowa 2014). In 
addition, female youth are more susceptible to vulnerabilities emanating 
from unemployment, such as sexual exploitation. Besides gendered 
differences, labour market experiences of  rural and urban youth can 
also be very different.
The government of  Uganda appreciates the challenge that 
unemployment poses and has implemented a range of  policies to 
promote youth employment. These must be examined against the 
backdrop of  major reforms implemented during the 1990s that resulted 
in the retrenchment of  many civil servants and the privatisation of  
public enterprises. These reforms reduced the role of  the state as an 
employer and the private sector is currently the biggest employer in the 
country (Ahaibwe and Mbowa 2014). To encourage private investment, 
the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) was established in 1991 
through a parliamentary act. It has, however, not delivered to desired 
standards and is critiqued for failing to create employment, especially 
for youth (Ahaibwe and Mbowa 2014). In addition, the UIA is urban 
based – despite the majority of  Ugandans residing in rural areas. For 
instance, youth in rural regions such as Northern Uganda could not 
access the investment schemes because they were urban centred, and 
because political instabilities meant that the youth lacked information 
and skills for self-employment.
Following disappointing results from the UIA, the government began 
to focus on enterprise development and particularly promoting self-
employment among the youth. The Youth Entrepreneurial Scheme 
(YES) was established in the 1990s, under which youth were given 
loans to start businesses. YES proved unsuccessful because it was used 
as a political tool and the expected loan recoveries were not made 
(Ahaibwe and Mbowa 2014). Other loan schemes implemented by the 
government included the Youth Venture Capital Fund (YVCF), the 
Graduate Venture Fund (GVF) and the Youth Livelihood Programme 
(YLP). All of  these prioritised urban youth; in addition, they had such 
stringent conditions and collateral requirements that relatively few 
young people could access them. While these schemes were gender-
neutral in principle, they delivered gendered consequences. The 
stringent conditions hindered female youth, who generally have more 
limited access to resources including land, motorcycles and other 
household items, which could be used as collateral.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 67–78 | 71
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Besides promoting enterprise development, the government has also 
taken steps to upgrade the skills that young people bring to the labour 
market. This has been done through the Ministry of  Education. For 
example, the government increased pay for science teachers and 
sponsorship for students taking sciences at higher education institutions. 
Skills promotion also involves curriculum review, and encouraging 
technical subjects, entrepreneurship and vocational training. Despite 
being a practical step to dealing with unemployment, this approach 
has been perceived negatively by some (Ahaibwe and Mbowa 2014). 
For example, local communities see vocational training to be for 
academically weak students who may not be able to make it to higher 
education institutions. This has resulted in low recruitment and retention 
rates. Vocational training also suffers from gender biases. Female youth 
are expected to take on training in areas that are traditionally seen as 
‘women’s work’; for instance, tailoring and catering, while male youth go 
for carpentry, motor vehicle mechanics and welding, among others.
It is clear that the government has not turned a blind eye to the youth 
unemployment challenge. Its policies and programmes, however, have 
not been effective. This is particularly the case in areas such as Northern 
Uganda that have been affected by armed violence. In assessing the state 
of  livelihoods in Northern Uganda, scholars have shown that economic 
opportunities open to youth are abysmal, with the principal form of  
income generation being leje leje (casual labour). This kind of  work is 
unprofitable, and ‘the median youth have just days of  work per month at 
wages of  55 cents per day’ (Annan, Blattman and Horton 2006: v).
4 Re-conceptualising youth employment in Northern Uganda
In post-conflict Northern Uganda, young people have developed 
alternative forms of  work that allow income generation and survival, 
but which have either been overlooked, not considered as legitimate 
employment or condemned as criminal. In some cases, these forms 
of  employment can be transformational. I argue that in order to 
challenge dominant discourses that frame youth in Africa as violent 
and unproductive, rather than being socially pathologised, these forms 
of  self-identified employment must be recognised and much better 
understood.
4.1 Sex work
Sex work is common in situations of  conflict and displacement (Machel 
2000) and despite the formal declaration of  the end of  conflict in 
Northern Uganda, it remains a survival strategy amidst food shortages, 
extreme poverty and unemployment. Scholars have referred to such 
sex work as ‘survival sex’ because if  it is not performed, family survival 
may be curtailed (Mulumba and Namuggala 2014). Sex work is highly 
gendered and at the same time it is also age sensitive: in agreement with 
other scholars, my research showed it to be dominated by young women.
Factors explaining sex work in Northern Uganda include women’s 
limited access to communal resources and high rates of  domestic 
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violence. Domestic violence takes the form of  physical abuse and 
rejection of  previously displaced youth by family and community 
members. Rejection can reflect a blaming of  the young people for 
collaborating with, marrying and/or having children with rebels. 
While mothers were encouraged to return with their children, they 
have not received adequate support for reintegration (see Irin News 
2015). Indeed, some female captives who gave birth during captivity 
returned to have these children labelled as ‘rebel children’. Some former 
captives were drawn into sex work in the search for belonging, support 
and survival. Gendered victimisation in this case becomes a cause 
and a consequence of  unemployment. While male youth might have 
fathered children during displacement, they do not go through the same 
experiences as females, especially relating to childcare.
Besides being perceived negatively by society, prostitution is also a crime 
in Uganda. As such, for their own safety sex workers operate under 
cover. Yet the income young women generate through it is used to fulfil 
important social and cultural responsibilities, for instance to pay for 
childcare and the care of  elderly and/or disabled family members. One 
respondent, a young woman and mother of  four noted:
People think because we get money from sex, we are not good people. But we use 
that very money to provide for our families, our children. If  I cannot acquire 
basic needs like food for my children, what do you expect me to do? This is the 
only alternative… we are criticised for being loose but no one criticises us for 
putting food on the table.3
Sex work therefore becomes an accommodated form of  employment 
among vulnerable female youth given the circumstances in which 
they live. These circumstances include their failure to attain a socially 
acceptable role in their communities. One female aged around 24 years 
explained the dilemma she encountered upon returning to her village 
following abduction:
Yes, I was abducted but I was confined and I did not kill anyone. I did not 
even hold a gun. I was married off and used to cook for others during the 
abduction… when we came back, people think we are all murderers and 
heartless. Neighbours mistreated me and no one wanted to talk to me. That’s 
how I joined some other friends and we went to the [town] centre, and later 
started prostitution for food, money and other needs.4
The fact that the community labelled this girl as a ‘murderer’, and the 
resulting stigmatisation, discrimination and eventual isolation, led to a 
failure to re-integrate and unemployment. For excluded young women, 
sex work may be the only available employment option.
Although looked down on by the community, sex work is a form of  
employment that is potentially open to everyone and brings quick income 
for young women. Nevertheless, it comes at a cost since it is culturally and 
religiously despised, stigmatised and pathologised (Namuggala 2016). My 
informants noted that access to some public services such as education 
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and health, and loans, was thwarted when personal recommendations 
were required from opinion leaders and other community members. 
In these circumstances, and given the poor health service provision in 
Northern Uganda reflected in the shortage of  health practitioners, drugs 
and outbreaks of  preventable diseases like malaria, diarrhoea and cholera 
(Annan et al. 2011; Spitzer and Twikirize 2013), sex work becomes a 
source of  livelihood. Survival sex may eventually result in long-term 
consequences including unwanted pregnancies, and exposure to sexually 
transmitted infections including HIV/AIDS.
In addition to the negative moral connotations associated with sex 
work, it runs counter to expectations about the temporal aspects of  
acceptable employment. In Northern Uganda work is expected to be 
done during the day. Sex work, however, is principally night activity, 
when societal gatekeepers are less vigilant. When local leaders and 
government officials observe youth sitting ‘idle’ during the morning 
hours, the assumption is that they are jobless and unemployed. For 
those who are sex workers, however, mornings are used as ‘free’ time 
after working nights. Because sex work is not officially acknowledged as 
employment, working conditions are unregulated and poor, resulting in 
risk, vulnerability and exploitation for those involved.
It is also important to highlight that, while cash is a dominant payment 
method for formalised employment, in some cases, young sex workers 
are paid in kind, for instance in the form of  food including posho (maize 
flour), beans, groundnuts and millet. Such youth therefore understood 
employment broadly as work for survival, even if  cash is not exchanged. 
Phrases like ‘working for food’ were commonly used. One youth 
explained that a way to tell if  someone is employed or not is whether 
they are ‘having food every day’.
4.2 Gambling
Gambling is another activity that youth consider as income-generating 
employment. It takes various forms with the most popular being playing 
cards – locally referred to as zaala or matatu – and sports betting. Unlike 
sex work, gambling is male dominated. It takes place round the clock, 
hence the popular phrase ‘any time is gambling time’. Gambling is 
popular among young people because it has the potential to bring quick 
cash with little effort. Compared to ILO standards relating to time, 
skills and wages, gambling does not require any particular skills and 
thus is not considered work. The youth, however, consider gambling as 
‘working smart’. Asked about this work, one youth said:
Now what’s wrong with that?? Whom have I cheated? We play I win. It takes 
the brain. You get money easily and quickly… Agriculture???? How long does it 
take and how am I going to survive? I have no land, I have no hoe and no seeds. 
We just work smart.5
In another interview, a youth explained sports betting as a type of  
employment:
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Sports betting is a full-time job. It is not easy I’m telling you. You have to keep 
informed in sports. We listen to radio, read newspapers in order to bet right. You 
have to know how teams are performing in the season, which team is likely to 
win or lose. Otherwise you make losses.6
Young people believe gambling and sports betting are forms of  
employment: while they do not require the physical effort associated 
with local notions of  work, they engage the brain. In this context, 
youth understand employment to require access to up-to-the-minute 
information locally and internationally, for example to track 
particular sporting teams or individuals. It also involves the ability 
to take short-term risks. Such an understanding of  employment is 
individualised and not community focused. This deviates from common 
understandings of  work and employment that emphasise the value of  
a relatively long-term community orientation, such as investment in 
agricultural activities like crop production and animal rearing.
Like sex work, gambling is illegal and youth can be incarcerated if  they 
are apprehended. Local leaders believe that gambling reduces young 
people’s productivity, and they use this to rationalise restrictions.
4.3 Contemporary dancing
Dancing is also used by some young people to generate income, especially, 
but not only, young women. Advertising companies hire both male and 
female youth to dance on advertising trucks, podiums and at promotional 
events and are paid in either cash or in kind in the form of  phones, drinks 
or clothing. Informants noted that it takes practice and determination 
to get to the level where they can be hired. They also have to dress in 
‘trendy’ ways and develop links with event organisers and promoters who 
provide access to information hiring and also recommendations. Once 
engaged, they must hang around town centres to ensure they can keep 
up with the trends in the form of  songs, dancing styles and dressing. The 
young people reported that this work empowers them to make decisions 
affecting their lives, for example in the way they dress, act and express 
their sexuality. Also, since most female dancers are not expected to be 
mothers, many young women use contraceptives as a way of  avoiding 
unexpected pregnancies, which they also see as empowering.
Although dancing might appear to be a more acceptable means 
of  earning an income, and be a less risky occupation, most elders 
expressed disapproval of  young women who dance: in their opinion, 
they dress ‘indecently’, but as a group their disapproval includes the use 
of  drugs (especially marijuana), and their disrespectful language and 
behaviour. Also, such dancers are frequently away from home – at times 
for days – and travel during the night, which challenges parental control 
and dominance.
5 Discussion and conclusion
The previous section used examples of  sex work, gambling and dancing 
to illustrate that formerly displaced youth in Northern Uganda do 
not necessarily see themselves as unemployed but rather as involved 
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in forms of  gainful employment that are not recognised or legitimised 
by official definitions and frameworks, or by members of  local 
communities. For example, they do not meet the ILO criteria relating to 
time, wages and skills. Because of  this, their work is not acknowledged 
in international, national and local labour statistics, nor are their 
activities supported through youth employment policy and programmes. 
This undervalues young people’s agency and frames them as vulnerable, 
idle and undeveloped.
The three forms of  survival employment, though different, share some 
important commonalities. First, with their comparatively low barriers to 
entry, they are open to young people who have been rejected, victimised 
or marginalised because of  previous displacement and/or association 
with rebels. Second, despite the fact that these forms of  work allow them 
to earn an income and survive and to fulfil family, social and cultural 
responsibilities, they are all either illegal, seen as morally deviant or 
frowned upon by community elders. Third, they can be associated with 
the use of  drugs. Some informants, for example, reported that the use of  
marijuana was common because it increases stamina, determination and 
endurance in distressing circumstances that included police brutality. 
Drugs are used at times in combination with alcohol and tobacco. 
Finally, aside from the individual income and in-kind benefits, these 
activities promote unity and solidarity among groups of  young people 
who meet regularly. It was reported that if  a particular individual does 
not appear for daily meetings consecutively, the group endeavours to 
reach out and help if  necessary. Regardless of  negative community 
opinion, for the youth involved, these activities may be seen as 
empowering and transformative in the sense that they made it possible 
for them to earn an income and survive in difficult circumstances, and in 
addition, those involved form a valuable support system.
These details make it obvious that these forms of  income-earning 
activity are not to be seen as attractive career choices to be actively 
promoted among young people. Nevertheless, they must be seen as an 
integral part of  any community-level post-conflict reconstruction in 
which the authorities engage. An important first step would be to bring 
the perspectives of  the young people on their work into public debate 
with one objective being to ensure that they have access to essential 
services. This access must not be denied on the basis of  public opinion. 
Local leaders, both male and female, along with other local actors must 
therefore be engaged in this public debate.
There remains the issue of  criminality and illegality of  these income-
earning activities. Although this issue would appear to be a significant 
obstacle facing any attempt to legitimise or support these income-earning 
activities, this has been addressed in a number of  countries in different 
ways and exploring these would seem to be a step in the right direction.
Acknowledging youth agency and resilience would be one way of  
encouraging attitudinal and behavioural change among the returned 
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population. Young people’s ability to survive and cope amidst such 
distress is commendable. Youth have created their own support 
networks, which need to be accommodated institutionally. Since they 
are an especially at-risk population among the returned populations, 
health service centres can for instance come up with youth-friendly 
services targeting the vulnerabilities that youth face. They could also 
avail youth with information relating to HIV/AIDS, and reproductive 
health services such as birth control and family planning.
Notes
1 Protracted displacement is displacement that lasts more than five 
years (Lenard 2015).
2 Youth bulge theory is a theory of  violence that conceptualises poor 
male youth as a security threat. High percentages of  young people 
in the population poses insecurity since youth can easily use violent 
means as a way of  engaging with the state hence their participation 
in armed and other forms of  violence (Urdal 2004).
3 Interview, June 2015.
4 Interview, June 2015.
5 Interview, June 2015.
6 Interview, June 2015.
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Navigating Precarious 
Employment: Social Networks 
Among Migrant Youth in Ghana*
Thomas Yeboah
Abstract This article is concerned with the precarious employment 
situations of migrant youth and the supportive role of social networks. It 
draws on interviews conducted with 30 young migrants in Accra, Ghana. 
The empirical findings reveal that the precarious nature of young people’s 
employment manifests in the uncertain nature of work, exploitation by 
clients and employers, as well as low and irregular income. These lead 
to socioeconomic hardships such as not being able to meet basic needs. 
The article further demonstrates how social networks strengthen young 
migrants’ agency through the provision of financial resources that allow 
them to navigate hardships. However, exploitative practices are also 
inherent within these networks and this article exposes these, alongside the 
demonstrable benefits. Provision of financial support for rural young people 
to further their education, enforcement of laws within the informal sector 
and support for migrants’ networks would help improve the situation.
Keywords: Africa, migration, informal sector, head porters, inequality, 
social injustice, economic survival.
1 Introduction
A decade and a half  of  economic growth across Africa, including 
Ghana, gave birth to the ‘Africa rising’ narrative (Obeng-Odoom 2015). 
Ghana has been lauded as something of  a model. With almost two 
decades of  consolidated democratic institutions and economic growth 
over 6 per cent, the country appears to have avoided many of  the 
pitfalls of  macroeconomic mismanagement afflicting other countries on 
the continent (Rexer 2015).
The irony is that while Ghana has experienced high growth rates, the 
creation of  new formal sector jobs has not matched the number of  
new entrants to the labour market (AfDB 2014). Evidently, labour-
intensive manufactured exports – the driving force behind economic 
transformation and employment creation in East Asian countries – is 
far from taking off in Ghana (Filmer and Fox 2014). This phenomenon 
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of  jobless growth has combined with globalisation, economic 
restructuring and transformation of  labour markets in reducing 
employment opportunities for young people. Shrinking public and 
private sectors have limited the possibility for young people to secure 
wage employment (Langevang and Gough 2012). In 2010, official 
unemployment of  young people aged 15–24 years was estimated to 
average 12 per cent, ranging from 18.1 per cent in Greater Accra 
to 5.8 per cent in the Northern Region (Osei-Assibey and Grey 
2013). However, these figures may underestimate the magnitude 
of  unemployment as they fail to capture the widespread nature of  
underemployment (Hino and Ranis 2013). A recent report by the 
World  Bank (2016) dubbed Landscape of  Jobs in Ghana suggested that 
48 per cent of  all young people aged 15–24 years are jobless.
Many young people find themselves in informal sector jobs, which is 
estimated to encompass approximately 90 per cent of  the labour force 
(Baah-Boateng 2013). While statistics on the participation of  different 
social groups in the informal sector are hard to come by, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that young people from Ghana’s northern regions may 
be over-represented. Their movement to southern cities to participate 
in the booming informal sector is motivated by hopes of  accessing jobs, 
earning income and increasing social mobility. These young migrants 
have few skills and are involved mainly in low-skill, easy-entry activities 
such as mechanical repairs, shoe mending, hairdressing, truck pushing, 
commercial payphone services, dressmaking, barbering, running 
errands, shop assistant work, photography, food preparation and sales, 
and repair works including garment, watch and clock repairs, as well 
as hawking and head portering (Gough, Langevang and Owusu 2013; 
Heintz and Pickbourn 2012). Their working days are marked by 
longer working hours, irregular income, insecurity and lack of  written 
contracts (Yeboah et al. 2015). Youth researchers are now concerned with 
exploring young people’s tactical and navigation strategies in negotiating 
multiple forms of  transitions towards respectable social positions (Ng 
et al. 2016). For example, Hardgrove, Rootham and McDowell’s (2015) 
work on young people in a precarious labour market in the UK revealed 
that experience and exposure to desirable occupations were important 
for transition to imagined future jobs. In her ethnographic account of  
young people’s desire for social mobility and respectable adulthood in 
Madagascar, Cole (2011) reports entry into the sexual economy as a 
tactic employed by young women, although on the surface, this might 
appear to be a sharp break with traditional values and norms. While 
these studies give insight into how young people negotiate multiple forms 
of  transitions, the ways in which social networks facilitate young people’s 
entry into the labour market and help strengthen their agency in 
navigating socioeconomic hardship has received little research attention.
This article focuses attention on the precarious employment situation 
of  young migrants working in the urban informal economy and the 
supportive role of  networks. It draws on data from qualitative interviews 
conducted with 30 young migrants (aged 13–24 years) in Accra, 
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Ghana. The aim is to contribute to the literature by contextualising 
young migrants’ employment situation within the social network and 
social capital literatures. This contextualisation helps us to situate the 
everyday employment struggles of  young migrants. Policymakers could 
draw on the article’s insights to: (1) learn more about young migrants’ 
employment situation and the forms of  social networks utilised, and 
(2) develop specific strategies to harness these social networks to reach 
migrant youth and support employment interventions.
The article starts by discussing the concepts of  social capital and 
networks and their relevance in relation to young people’s social 
mobility. Section 3 then provides a description of  the research site and 
the overall methodology. Section 4 discusses the findings, focusing on 
the background of  study participants, motivations for moving, pathways 
for entry into the labour market, precariousness of  employment 
situation and supportive role of  networks. Finally, Section 5 offers 
concluding remarks with some policy suggestions.
2 Social capital, networks and youth social mobility
The concept of  social capital is well established in social science. It is 
rooted in the nineteenth-century classical social science of  Durkheim, 
Marx, Togueville and Weber (Woolcock 2010). In practice, it is linked 
to material and symbolic relations of  exchange (Bourdieu 1983). While 
the concept is complex and has varied meanings, this article employs 
the definition put forward by Bourdieu as ‘the aggregate of  the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of  a durable network 
of  more or less institutionalized relationships of  mutual acquaintance 
and recognition’ (1983: 249).
Existing research has paid little attention to the ways that young 
migrants ‘socialise in friendship networks… and generate their own 
connections for mutual benefit’ (Edwards, Franklin and Holland 
2003: 12). Youth researchers note that the fact that migrants of  all 
ages are part of  kinship and ethnicity networks obliterates the sense of  
social rupture espoused in sedentarist thoughts (Thorsen 2013). The 
scant scholarly attention given to young migrants’ interaction with their 
networks is partly because the anthropological gaze moved away from 
structures, instead privileging practices and discourses (ibid.). It is partly 
also because trafficking and child rights dominated and framed the 
earlier debates about young people’s spatial mobility. Even though the 
trafficking discourse has begun to recognise young people’s migration 
as inexorable and legitimate, the ways in which young people utilise 
their networks to navigate precarious employment situations figure only 
marginally (ibid.). By using social networks as an analytic optic, we can 
better understand the ways in which young migrants draw on their 
multi-sited social contacts as a resource in the face of  adversity.
Two main forms of  social capital have been identified: bonding and 
bridging. The former occurs within groups while the latter is evident 
across groups. Bonding capital is when people have ties to others who 
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share common characteristics, including family members, close friends, 
neighbours and colleagues within the work place. Bridging capital on the 
other hand is primarily instrumental, links across groups, and generates 
a more varied flow of  resources for advancing aspirations, hopes 
and expectations (Jørgensen 2016). This distinction matters because 
‘reciprocity exchanges’ within groups of  high bonding social capital may 
be facilitated or constrained by the totality of  resources possessed by 
members within the group (Villalonga-Olives and Kawachi 2015).
Allen (2009) has argued that bonding social capital can offer young 
people an initial entry into the labour market, for example through 
employment in co-ethnic firms. Even though bonding networks may be 
limited to members of  the same family or ethnic group, young people 
who are privileged to have such ties may be more likely to find jobs 
than those without. Bonding capital provides physical or emotional 
support in times of  crisis and upholds identity and status. Nonetheless, 
bonding social capital and networks may also curtail opportunities 
for young people to access wider and more diverse networks beyond 
family, locality or ethnic group. De la Haye et al. (2012) and MacDonald 
and Shildrick (2007) analysed social networks among disadvantaged 
youth and discovered that bridging networks provided the support 
needed for economic survival, while those with bonding capital did 
not have access to the diversity of  resources needed for realising 
employment aspirations. Flow of  information within the bonding 
networks encouraged and supported criminal activities which suggest 
further marginalisation. Engagement in criminal activities including, 
for example, pilfering saleable items from garden sheds, motorbikes, 
cars and garages, emerged as street-based leisure activities in response 
to tedious days created by persistent school absence (MacDonald and 
Shildrick 2007). In Ghana, relatively younger migrants residing in 
slum areas may be more likely to join gangs and get involved in risky 
behaviour, sexual exploitation, pilfering and gambling.
Lancee (2012) asserted that there is the possibility for young people 
to diversify their networks over time, and in this way, bonding capital 
will become gradually supplemented by bridging networks. Bridging 
networks create broader identities and reciprocity and are required to 
‘get ahead’ (Putnam 2000: 21–3). Granovetter (1973) equates bridging 
networks with weak ties. Such ties serve as bridges to other networks 
and are essential to a person’s integration in a new society. Young 
people with bridging networks may be able to access a wide range of  
informational resources connected with job placement through, for 
example, the diversity of  people that may be part of  the networks. In 
contrast, individuals with few bridging networks ‘will be deprived of  
information from distant parts of  the social system and confined to the 
provincial news and views of  their close friends’ (Granovetter 1973: 
202). Bridging networks may therefore foster stronger connections 
across social divisions, thereby strengthening the collective ability of  
young people to undertake coordinated actions for a common goal. And 
this may further help facilitate vertical labour market mobility. Research 
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has found that conflict prevention between Muslim and Hindu groups 
in India hinges on the presence of  bridging networks (civic organisation 
membership that cut across religious lines, for example sports groups 
and local business organisations of  which Muslims and Hindus are 
equally represented) (Villalonga-Olives and Kawachi 2015).
In addition to bonding and bridging, a third type of  social capital – 
linking capital – has been noted. This is concerned with ties to people 
in positions of  authority – these links are essentially vertical, to people 
in key economic institutions, or who may provide access to political and 
other resources (Woolcock 2010). Someone with ties to people of  higher 
socioeconomic status may be more likely to access employment avenues 
that are filled through word-of-mouth. Young people with secondary 
and tertiary education in Ghana complained that the ‘school certificate 
takes you nowhere’ (Langevang and Gough 2009: 745) because of  lack 
of  linking social networks that could connect them to employment 
in formal sector jobs. Linking capital may thus provide support that 
bonding and bridging networks may be unwilling or unable to offer to 
young people. In a study of  how runaway and homeless youth navigate 
difficulties in transition towards adulthood, Kurtz et al. (2000) found that 
linking capital of  professional social workers provided services including, 
for example, sending young people to hospital for treatment, counselling 
and shelter. Professionals assisted the young people in developing 
communication and anger management skills, in meeting basic needs 
and the provision of  structures and positive activities, and helped them 
to plan for their futures. The homeless and runaway youth also learned 
how to manage feelings, desist from alcohol and drug use and improve 
family relationships.
A social network is neither given nor granted. Significant and 
continuing effort is required to establish and maintain lasting and useful 
relationships that can help secure material or symbolic benefits. Regular 
acts of  communication, and the resulting mutual recognition, enhance 
a sense of  belonging (Bourdieu 1983: 192–3). However, opportunity 
to build, access and participate in networks may be restricted by time 
and resources. Even when these barriers are overcome, Anthias (2007) 
notes that the benefits from participation in network activities may be 
unequally distributed. Along these same lines, Bourdieu (1983) speaks of  
a more dynamic and somehow less optimistic conception of  social capital 
as a source of  inequality and social injustice, given that some groups may 
be more privileged in accessing valuable networks and resources than 
others. The usefulness of  social capital surfaces from the capability of  
individuals to convert it into other forms of  capital (e.g. economic). Such 
transformation may be stratified by gender, class, ethnicity and other 
social factors. Convertibility may thus be problematic for individuals with 
a low stock of  economic and cultural capital, as well as for those with 
lower social status (Ryan, Erel and D’Angelo 2015). These challenges 
may hinder the conversion of  valuable social capital to economic capital 
and can hinder young people’s access to formal and informal sector jobs, 
wealth accumulation and social mobility.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Research context
The research was conducted at the Agbogbloshie market in Accra (see 
Figure 1). The entire population of  Agbogbloshie is estimated to be 
about 15,000 (Obeng-Odoom 2014), comprising mainly economic 
migrants from northern and other rural parts of  Ghana. They live, 
work, eat and do almost everything in the market and surrounding area. 
Many of  them sleep in wooden structures, uncompleted buildings, open 
spaces and lorry parks. Living conditions are unhygienic, and migrants 
have limited access to bathrooms, kitchens and sanitary facilities.
3.2 Methods
The empirical material for this article comes from a larger project 
investigating the ways in which young people actively shape, negotiate 
and challenge their social worlds through rural to urban migration. The 
study was conducted between December 2015 and August 2016. The 
total body of  empirical material for the project included 42 individual 
interviews; three focus group discussions with young migrants; 
field observations and participatory activities (drawings and photo 
elicitation); policy-level interviews; and a questionnaire-based survey 
with heads of  migrant households in Wungu, a poor rural community 
within West Mumprusi District of  northern Ghana. This article draws 
Figure 1 Map of the Accra Metropolitan Area showing Agbogbloshie market 
Source Redrawn from Wrigley-Asante (2013, Figure 2), reprinted by permission of the 
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specifically on 30 individual interviews with the young migrants to 
illustrate their precarious employment situations and the supportive role 
of  social networks.
The data collection exercise started with young migrants who are 
beneficiaries of  a non-governmental organisation (NGO) called the Kayayei 
Youth Association (KYA). KYA is an association of  young female migrants 
who work as head porters in the Central Business District of  Accra. The 
snowballing sampling technique was employed to reach migrants who did 
not benefit from KYA programmes. This offered more scope to cover the 
diversity of  young migrants in the urban informal economy. With prior 
permission, participants’ interviews were recorded using a digital recorder 
device. These were transcribed verbatim and analysed using the thematic 
coding and analysis technique. The analysis also relied on narrative data 
from diverse sources which provided a framework for comparison of  
perspectives and triangulation of  findings across sources.
4 Findings
4.1 Background and motivation for migrating
The 30 young people (18 females and 12 males) whose accounts are 
reported in this article are migrants from several rural parts of  northern 
Ghana including Bimbila, Gushegu, Savelugu, Namumba South, 
Yendi, Karaga, Nakpali and Tamale. Their ages range from 13 to 
25 years. The young migrants belong to large families ranging from 
three to 15 siblings. The data suggest that all of  them are from poor 
rural socioeconomic backgrounds with parents engaged in low-income 
occupations including small-scale farming and petty trading. With 
large families and limited income, it was difficult for parents to meet 
the young migrants’ educational and economic needs: 13 never had 
any formal schooling; five were junior high school (JHS) graduates or 
dropouts respectively; while the remaining seven were senior high school 
(SHS) graduates. Similar to findings reported by Langevang (2008), 
the young migrants bemoaned the fact that their families had failed to 
provide them with the resources needed to further their education or 
start-up capital to establish their own ventures:
If  I get the sewing machine and money to sew I wouldn’t have come here. 
My parents don’t have money to buy it for me. I am here to make money. (Ishak, 
20-year-old female, from Yendi)
A clear gender difference in educational history is evident. Except for two 
females who had completed JHS, all the females were either dropouts 
from school or had not been to school at all. On the other hand, all the 
seven SHS graduates were males. Gender differences in the educational 
outcomes of  the young migrants is attributed to the socialisation processes 
and culture in much of  rural northern Ghana. Largely confined to the 
domestic sphere, young women are viewed as temporary members of  the 
household since they will invariably marry and move to their husbands’ 
village (Hashim and Thorsen 2011). The preference of  sons over 
daughters makes education a privilege for males and not females:
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I have never been to school before. I was staying with my mum and dad but my 
father said we are many so I should stop schooling and join them in the farm 
so that my brothers rather go to school. (Anasa, 15-year-old female, from 
Tamale)
Understanding young people’s motivation to migrate is crucial for 
analysing and contextualising their lived experiences. Many of  them 
(19) were motivated by the need to work, earn income and either restart 
or further their education, or establish a business:
I came here last year, my aim is to be able to establish my own business, so I 
came to look for money to establish my business back home.… If  today I get 
15 million as we speak I will go home but I am still planning towards it. 
(Mariam, 18-year-old female, from Tamale)
I came here to make money to continue school because I gained admission 
to Walensi SHS. I made part payment but the school authorities did not 
accept that. If  they had accepted I would have been a candidate by this year. 
(Amaalu, 22-year-old male, from Bimbila)
The remaining 11 who are all females were interested in using 
migration to enter the world of  work, in preparation for marriage. As 
key players in the domestic sphere, the young females are socialised to 
accept responsibility as the sole providers of  household items such as 
basins and pots before marriage (Awumbila and Ardayfio-Schandorf  
2008). But their confinement to the domestic sphere where their labour 
is not remunerated makes it difficult if  not impossible to procure these 
items. Migration in search of  paid employment is the only viable option.
4.2 Sectors of employment and pathways to entry
Given their limited education and skills, the informal sector provides the 
only plausible avenue for these young migrants. The types of  work they 
were engaged in at the time of  the interviews are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Distribution of participants by type of work
Type of work Number 
Head portering (kayayei) 18
Construction work 5
Scrap dealer 2
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Engagement in particular types of  work is highly gendered: all of  the 
18 who reported doing head portering (kayayei) were females. Other 
researchers have suggested that while the young male migrants do 
multiple jobs, females are confined to head portering (Awumbila and 
Ardayfio-Schandorf  2008; Yeboah et al. 2015). Engagement in multiple 
jobs by one male migrant is to ensure higher daily wages and insure 
against any non-payment by his employers. Thorsen (2013) suggested 
that this was also a way to develop new skills and broaden work 
experience.
As Allen (2009) has suggested, bonding social networks can help 
migrants’ entry into the labour market, and the young migrants 
interviewed in Accra also emphasised the importance of  networks for 
their entry into the informal sector. For example, the only requirement 
for starting work in kayayei is a head pan which costs on average GH¢30. 
The rest is about being physically fit. However, in order to overcome 
their limited finances, young females relied on families and friends for 
the money to secure a new pan, or the loan of  an old pan: ‘My sister 
assisted me to get head pan to start work. She gave me GH¢30 to buy 
the pan’ (Alima, 16 years old, from Tamale).
The supportive role of  networks in facilitating young migrants’ 
transition to the labour market is consistent with Awumbila, Owusu 
and Teye (2014) who report that rural–urban migrants in Ghana mostly 
receive financial support and information about jobs in the destinations 
through social networks. Further, the initiation into the informal labour 
market via social relations is central to the creation of  occupational 
niches. In Accra, most kayayei are from the Mumprusi and Dagomba 
ethnic groups, while almost all itinerant shoe-shiners in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso) are of  Bisa ethnicity (Thorsen 2014). However, there 
is a downside to this: for example, growing competition and market 
saturation in the kayayei business as a result of  supportive social networks 
may reduce earning potential (ibid.).
Eight young female migrants demonstrated their agency through 
traversing and negotiating the structural constraints that might have 
hampered their migration and entry into the labour market. For 
example, Anasa, a 15-year-old from Tamale, said: ‘I do kayayei. I came 
with money, I harvested groundnut to raise the money for my movement 
and head pan’. Thus, in contrast to the image of  a passive or powerless 
actor, Anasa planned ahead and acted to make her migration successful.
Other jobs such as construction, scrap dealing and driving require 
no financial resources. Rather, social connections are critical: ‘I do 
construction work with one Chinese firm. My friends assisted me to 
get that job’ (Alhamo, 24-year-old male from Bimbila). Mahamadu 
describes how he combined schooling and work and this allowed him 
to develop skills as a mason, which became useful when he migrated to 
Accra after linking up with his friends:
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I was learning mason after my JHS but I continued my education. Shortly 
after when my results came, I communicated with my friends in Accra who told 
me that I could use that skill to make a living in Accra. When I arrive in Accra 
I told them I was looking for a job, they took me to a construction company at 
Tema station and then they took me. (Mahamadu, 22-year-old male, from 
Yendi)
4.3 Young migrants’ precarious employment situations
The work of  the young migrants is characterised by complex 
interlocking difficulties. Findings on the precariousness of  young 
migrant employment centred on uncertainty and exploitation by clients 
and employers manifested through lowering or non-payment of  wages, 
all of  which affect earning potential. This further results in an inability 
to meet daily consumption, accommodation and health needs. However, 
these experiences differed by gender and type of  work.
The young migrants spoke of  how every day they remained uncertain 
as to whether their services would be required. For the males who are 
engaged in construction for example, the possibility of  going to work 
depended on whether their services would be required by their employers:
As for you being called to work, it depends. Sometimes my master will call me 
to come, other times he will not. When there is more work then you are sure that 
you will be called. (Mahamadu, 22-year-old male, from Yendi)
Female head porters experience uncertainty differently:
I wake up around 4am and goes straight to yam market. By this time the lorry 
from north will have arrived to offload yam. I go there to see if  I will get some 
load to carry. Sometimes you will get something to carry. Other times, nothing. 
From there I go to the Makola market to see if  I will get load. During the day, 
it is all about walking and walking. If  you are lucky you will get every load, 
if  you are not, you won’t get anything to carry. I take break in the afternoon 
with my friends under a tree. We talk about our lives and how we can make 
it here and play. By 4pm I return to the market to look for some load to carry. 
(Asanafi, 13-year-old female, from Gushegu)
There is no assurance that her services will be required, and ‘walking 
and walking’ looking for something to carry inevitably leads to fatigue 
and stress. The possibility of  getting a load to carry, which Asanafi 
argued depends heavily on luck, was keenly discussed by the other 
females interviewed. A few of  the female head porters had developed 
connections with owners of  larger shops or supermarkets, which provide 
some greater stability. Although Asanafi alludes to taking breaks in the 
afternoons and engaging in conversation and play with her friends when 
tired, for these young women, navigation of  the cityscape in search of  
work is done individually.
Interview data reveal that the income that the young migrants earn 
in a day ranges from GH¢3 to about GH¢26 (US$0.21 to US$5.47), 
depending on the kind of  job. Some, however, said that there were days 
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when they earned nothing. Susceptibility to low or irregular earnings 
is linked to factors such as the fortunes of  the market, attitude of  
employers and clients, gender and power relations, as well as lack of  
written work contracts or standards:
I sometimes carry people stuff but they refuse to pay. They see me to be young. 
(Memu, 16-year-old female, from Tamale)
Initially it was difficult to get work or load to carry when I first came to Accra 
but now it is quite okay. The payment for our services is irregular. People 
don’t treat us fairly. They pay any amount they want. Sometimes you can earn 
nothing. (Mariam, 18-year-old female, from Tamale)
The accounts of  Memu and Mariam raises several issues. Firstly, 
because female head porters can be desperate to get something to carry, 
they may fail to agree a price with their clients beforehand. The lack of  
any guidance on amount to be paid allows customers to offer amounts 
that are not commensurate with the weight of  the load or the distance 
covered. The latter part of  Mariam’s account further suggests that the 
lower income earnings of  females are also enforced by issues of  power 
relations and patriarchy embedded in the fabric of  the local culture. 
The patriarchal structures dominant in Ghana often paint a picture of  
the ideal woman or girl as submissive, respectful and tractable. Thus, 
any articulation of  dissatisfaction and expression of  displeasure in their 
own language can be construed as an insult, resulting in reproach, 
intimidation and physical abuse:
I once carried the items of  one man from Agbogbloshie to Tema station. When 
we got to the station he did not give me any money. When I asked him why 
in my own language, he started to insult and beat me. (Alima, 16-year-old 
female, from Tamale)
Those who had been employed by companies had similar experiences. 
Some employers particularly in the construction sector fail to pay the 
wages of  the migrants. Alhamo narrates how his employers – a Chinese 
construction firm – failed to pay the agreed monthly wage to him and 
his colleagues:
They normally pay us on monthly for the work through a time card. Just 
last month they misplaced my time card so they said they can’t pay me about 
GH¢300, about five of  us. There was nothing I could do. My problem now is 
getting new job. (Alhamo, 24-year-old male, from Bimbila)
Alhamo’s experience is widespread among many informal sector workers 
in Ghana. This resonates with the findings of  Thorsen (2013) in Burkina 
Faso, when she reports that employers, particularly in the food sector, 
deliberately introduce wage cuts or fail to pay young migrants when 
business slackens or when the young employees break or waste something. 
In addition to a sense of  abuse and injustice, this kind of  behaviour leads 
to socioeconomic hardship, including inability to meet daily subsistence 
needs and the symbolic culture of  sending remittances home.
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4.4 Social networks and navigation in times of economic hardship
The young migrants do not accept the situation passively but navigate it 
as best they can by drawing on their social connections. The role of  social 
networks in young migrants’ navigation of  economic hardship manifested 
largely through the provision of  financial resources in meeting basic 
needs (e.g. food, shelter, water and accommodation), encouragement and 
emotional support for those who encounter non-payment or lowering of  
wages by clients or employers. Young migrants’ networks also enabled 
them to save part of  their earnings. However, exploitative behaviours 
including, for example, pilfering and inability to retrieve savings from 
network leaders, were inherent within these networking ties.
Ethnic-specific bonding networks are thought to provide not only 
information about jobs and services, but also to help migrants to get 
by through the provision of  financial, emotional and moral support 
(Sime and Fox 2015). Similarly, the young migrants interviewed spoke of  
how networks of  families and friends from the same community or ethnic 
group are instrumental in providing financial support to meet basic needs:
We have a group whom sleep together. So, when I don’t have money I borrow 
money from my group. Sometimes they will not give you, they will tell you to go 
and work for money. (Sarafina, 14-year-old female from Gushegu)
Most of  them are full of  praise for friends and family members for 
the financial help they provide. Some (15) of  the participants also 
mentioned receiving encouragement and advice from their friends and 
family members not to give up when wages are not paid by clients or 
employers. The latter part of  Sarafina’s account, however, highlights 
the fact that support from social networks is not guaranteed. Very 
young migrants (less than 15 years old) may receive few benefits from 
these networks, and they do not necessarily provide them with support 
or protection. For example, it is common for young migrants to rent 
a single room, splitting the cost between them equally. While this 
reduces the cost of  accommodation, it can have unintended negative 
consequences, including fighting and theft: ‘My phone was stolen last 
week. I don’t know who did but I suspect someone whom I sleep with at 
the mosque’ (Alidu, 20-year-old male from Wungu).
The young migrants also spoke of  involvement in savings groups. Each 
ethnic group has their own savings model, making them exclusionary. 
The groups are mediated by relatively respected older people who the 
young migrants could identify with and who are from their home town. 
Participation in such a savings model is said to be voluntary and out 
of  free will; there is no set amount one must contribute. The principle 
is that the individual will request the savings to be returned at the end 
of  the month. Nonetheless, in the event of  circumstances such as lack 
of  payment by clients or employees, the young migrants draw on such 
savings to meet subsistence needs: ‘We have a susu [savings] group where 
I save some of  my money. When I do not have money, I go to our leader 
to get some of  my money’ (Anasa, 15-year-old female, from Tamale).
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Awumbila, Teye and Yaro (2016) have argued that under certain 
circumstances participation in social network activities may be a site for 
exploitation of  young migrants. Consistent with this is an account of  
misunderstanding and tension among members in one savings group:
I was saving my money with our group but there was misunderstanding. The 
leader was one woman from the north who was keeping the monies. The woman 
was not staying with us in our room. One girl requested for her money, and 
the woman gave it to her. Other girl requested for her money and there was 
misunderstanding because the woman was not happy. I requested for my money 
and did not get. Since then I have not set my eyes on the woman again. I saved 
about GH¢50 but I did not get. (Faati, 20-year-old female, from Tamale)
5 Conclusion and policy implications
Young migrants’ transitions into the labour market demonstrates the 
important role that their networks can play in providing the finance 
necessary for travel and to secure work. Their precarious employment 
situation involves considerable uncertainty and risk, and exploitation 
by employers and clients. Incomes are low and irregular, which brings 
additional difficulties in fulfilling daily subsistence needs. Some of  these 
difficulties are mitigated through social networks. These networks are 
therefore fundamental in the life trajectories of  young migrants, right 
from the time the decision to migrate is taken (see also Awumbila et 
al. 2016). However, they are also associated with discrimination and 
exploitative practices.
The empirical findings have implications for both research and policy. 
Future research could focus on young migrants’ utilisation of  linking 
social capital and the extent to which it supports their life trajectories. 
In relation to policy, there is the need for supportive systems that can 
provide an enabling environment for young people to realise their 
aspirations around education with the aim to gain decent employment 
in the formal sector. While schooling in Ghana is in theory free from 
primary to junior high school, there are school-related expenses 
which parents must pay. Moreover, at the senior high school level, 
fees become payable. While the fees vary between schools depending 
on the perceived status and desirability of  the school and its nature 
(day-school or boarding school), they can be prohibitive for parents 
in rural northern Ghana whose livelihoods are dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture. One way to address this is to provide direct support to poor 
families for children’s education: just as there is a youth employment 
fund, government could set up a school development fund for young 
people from poorer rural backgrounds to further their education.
Deliberate action is also needed by the state to better protect informal 
sector workers from exploitation by clients and employers. While laws 
such as the Labour Act (2003) are supposed to protect the rights of  
all workers (including migrants), they are only enforced in the formal 
sector (Awumbila et al. 2016). Thus, the vast majority of  workers, 
who are, after all, within the informal economy, receive no protection. 
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The operations of  Ghanaian institutions such as the National Labour 
Commission, the Department of  Social Welfare, the Ministry of  
Employment and Labour Relations as well as the Ministry of  Gender, 
Children and Social Protection must now be strengthened and 
expanded to cover the informal sector.
Lastly, there is an opportunity for government bodies and NGOs to 
work much more closely with migrants’ networks to better provide for 
the health, safety, education and wellbeing of  young migrants.
Note
* This work was supported by the Smuts Memorial Fund, managed by 
the University of  Cambridge in memory of  Jan Christiaan Smuts.
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Abstract Agriculture is a leading source of employment for rural 
populations in Kenya. Through a mixed methods approach, this study 
sought to investigate youth participation in smallholder livestock production 
and marketing in Baringo County. The specific focus is on how social norms 
and micropolitics enable or constrain participation of particular groups 
of young people. The study established that personal choice, preference 
for paid over unpaid labour and gender norms in asset access, ownership 
and control influence smallholder participation in livestock production 
and trade. This shows a disconnect between Kenya’s youth policy which 
advocates for equitable distribution of employment opportunities and the 
reality at community level. Interventions that seek to improve livestock 
production and marketing, particularly involving young people, should 
therefore adopt strategies that recognise these norms as a first step to 
addressing social exclusion.
Keywords: Africa, transformation, empowerment, Kenya, Baringo, 
livestock production, livelihoods, participation, smallholder, markets, 
gender norms.
1 Introduction
In 2014, Kenya’s agriculture sector employed three in every four 
workers in rural areas and contributed to 27.3 per cent of  the country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP), mainly from crops (19.7 per cent) and 
livestock (4.9 per cent) (MoALF 2015). Sixty per cent of  the country’s 
livestock is found in the arid and semi-arid areas which make up 80 per 
cent of  the national land mass (MoLD 2008). The total monetary value 
earned from animal products in 2014 was US$464.5 million from 
beef, US$279.2 million from goat, US$375.0 million from mutton, 
US$331.8 million from poultry and US$1.6 billion from milk (MoALF 
2015). There is growing demand for meat and milk fuelled by increases 
in population, purchasing power and urbanisation (Delgado et al. 1999; 
MoALF 2015). It is estimated that in developing countries such as 
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Kenya, 48 per cent of  food protein and 20 per cent of  food energy is 
derived from livestock (FAO 2009).
Despite agriculture being the leading source of  employment, young 
people are often said to prefer employment in non-farm sectors. Negative 
attitudes towards agriculture have been associated with drudgery, low 
returns, poor access to markets and market information, limited credit, 
lack of  prestige compared to white collar jobs and awareness of  the 
disparities between rural and urban life (Afande, Maina and Maina 
2015; Leavy and Smith 2010). Other factors include non-involvement 
of  youth in policymaking processes (Afande et al. 2015). In Kenya, the 
constitution classifies persons between 18 years and 34 years of  age as 
youth (GoK 2010). This categorisation is used in the remainder of  the 
article, but it is critically important to recognise that even within this age 
range there is a tremendous level of  diversity across the broad range of  
social and economic indicators (Leavy and Smith 2010).
The Ministry of  Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries 2013–2017 
strategic plan proposes to draw youth into agriculture through the 
introduction of  new farming technologies such as irrigation and 
aquaculture (MoALF 2013). However, the plan does not explain how 
youth engagement in livestock production and marketing will be 
improved. Similarly, the national youth policy advocates for equitable 
distribution of  employment opportunities but does not explain how that 
will be achieved in the livestock sector (MoYA 2006). The government’s 
Vision 2030 recognises Kenya’s youth as an important segment of  the 
population and the livestock sector as key to Kenya’s economic growth 
but does not state how the youth can gainfully engage in the livestock 
sector (GoK 2007).
The research reported here sought to explore the factors affecting youth 
participation in livestock production and marketing in Baringo County, 
Kenya, and the implications of  these for youth employment and 
livelihoods. At the heart of  the study is the question: who participates in 
livestock production and marketing, and what are the social norms and 
micropolitics around participation?
2 Materials and methods
Baringo County is part of  Kenya’s semi-arid regions, and in 2014 
contributed to 2.4, 3.5, 2.2 and 2.1 per cent of  the country’s chicken, 
goat, cattle and sheep populations respectively (MoALF 2015). The 
study was conducted in three sub-counties, Baringo Central, Baringo 
North and Marigat, which make up the central part of  the county (see 
Figure 1). The study site was divided into four ecological zones, namely 
riverine, highland, midland and lowland. The highland zone, defined as 
an altitude greater than 1,500 metres above sea level (masl), is the most 
favourable for crop and dairy farming. The midlands are at an altitude 
of  1,000–1,500 masl and have a high goat population. In the lowland 
and riverine zones, irrigated crop farming and livestock production 
are practised in the Perkerra Irrigation Scheme and along sections 
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of  the Kerio River, respectively. The highland, midland and riverine 
zones are predominantly populated by Tugen people who are mainly 
agro-pastoralist, while the lowlands are populated by the pastoral 
Ilchamus people.
A cross-sectional, mixed methods approach was used. Quantitative data 
was collected through two surveys that included 335 household heads 
and 203 livestock traders respectively. The household survey focused 
on household demographic characteristics, livelihood activities, types 
and numbers of  livestock kept, and quantities of  milk produced. Each 
zone was subdivided into five clusters, and households were selected 
through stratified random sampling. The trader survey was conducted 
on six different market days in November 2015 in three main livestock 
markets within the study site. All traders in the market were surveyed. 
Figure 1 Map of study site
Source Redrawn from authors’ original, from the project titled ‘Early Warning Systems for Improved Human Health and 
Resilience to Climate-Sensitive Vector-Borne Diseases in Kenya’.
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Data collection focused on demographic characteristics, types and 
numbers of  livestock traded and trading frequency. Household survey 
respondents did not participate in the livestock traders’ survey.
Qualitative data was collected through focus group discussions and 
direct observation. Twenty-six focus groups were organised – half  
included only men and half  only women. Each group had 7–10 
participants, for a total of  231. Participants were selected purposively, 
with the following inclusion criteria: having lived in the county for at 
least one year, and being a livestock keeper or coming from a household 
that keeps livestock. The discussions covered livelihood activities, how 
individuals become livestock owners, types of  livestock ownership, and 
division of  labour in livestock production and marketing practices. 
Following Quisumbing (1999), dimensions of  livestock ownership 
were categorised as management, access, withdrawal, alienation and 
exclusion. Direct observation techniques were used to collect additional 
data that would further contextualise the research findings.
Quantitative data was entered and cleaned with CSPro6 and analysed 
with SPSS7 using both summary and inferential statistics. Qualitative 
data was transcribed and coded into emergent themes using NVivo8 and 
analysed using the content analysis method. All respondents were of  
consenting age and voluntarily agreed to participate in the study.
This study gives a snapshot of  the context within which different people 
engaged in livestock production and marketing. The study did not 
investigate whether the livelihood activities the respondents engaged in 
were a result of  choice or necessity, or whether they were considered 




A total of  335 household heads, comprising 260 males and 75 females 
participated in the household survey. Just over a quarter (27.8 per cent) 
were 34 years old or less, while the rest were 35 years or more. Three 
quarters of  the young household heads were male (75.5 per cent) while 
the rest were female. Among household heads aged 35 years and above, 
78.6 per cent were male and 21.4 per cent female. The vast majority of  
both young (88.6 per cent) and older household heads (79.7 per cent) 
were married. There was a statistical difference between the education 
levels of  the young and the older respondents, with the youth having 
more primary, secondary and tertiary education (c2 =28.810, df=3, 
p<0.001). Among the youth, there was a statistical difference in education 
levels between the men and women (Fisher’s test p=0.013), with more 
men than women having primary, secondary and tertiary education.
Nearly half  of  the traders interviewed (49.3 per cent) were 34 years old 
or less, and most of  these were aged 25–34 years. Traders of  all ages 
were overwhelmingly male (96.1 per cent overall). There was a statistical 
difference between the education level of  young and older traders, 
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with more youth having post-primary education (c2 =26.948, df=4, 
p<0.001). The study participants were predominantly Christian.
3.2 Livelihoods and livestock
The main livelihood activities in this region are crop farming, livestock 
keeping, self-employment in supply of  goods (such as firewood, water 
and food items), wage and salaried employment. As primary livelihood 
activities, household heads reported engaging in crop farming (50.2 per 
cent), livestock keeping (19.1 per cent), goods delivery (15.4 per cent), 
wage labour (9.5 per cent) and salaried employment (5.8 per cent). Their 
main supplementary activities were livestock keeping (52.1 per cent) and 
crop farming (32.1 per cent). Compared to their older counterparts, 
young household heads were more likely to engage in goods supply, 
wage labour and salaried employment than crop or livestock production 
as primary livelihood activities (c2 =10.610, df=4, p=0.031).
A clear majority of  households (83 per cent) reported keeping livestock, 
with 29.7 per cent having goats, 29.1 per cent cattle, 25.6 per cent 
chickens and 15 per cent sheep. Heads commonly reported that their 
households keep more than one livestock species. The livestock are 
mainly of  indigenous breeds: few farmers kept cross-breed cattle, 
favoured for higher milk production compared to local breeds. 
Households headed by young people had on average 11.1 tropical 
livestock units (TLUs),9 slightly lower than the average for older 
household heads (13.0). Among the youth, male-headed households had 
more livestock TLUs (12.3) than female-headed households (9.4).
The animals were considered sources of  food (meat, milk, blood, eggs 
and animal fat), medicine, income and prestige; as well as stores of  wealth 
and means of  social acceptance. For household heads, livestock keeping 
was considered an important indicator of  wealth: households with few 
cattle, sheep or goats were perceived as poor and those with more were 
considered wealthy. The size of  herds was also associated with the level 
of  social capital and the respect extended to household heads and their 
families. Persons from households with a lot of  livestock were more 
respected, had greater voice and were easily accepted as leaders. Inclusion 
and non-inclusion of  women into groups locally referred to as ‘merry-
go-rounds’ was partially determined by the members’ perception of  an 
applicant’s individual wealth status, and thus livestock holdings mattered. 
‘Merry-go-rounds’ are a form of  rotating savings group in which 
members contribute savings at regular intervals with each member taking 
the pot in turn. Members with more livestock might be seen as less risky.
3.3 Sources of livestock and ownership
Men and women, young and old, reported sourcing livestock through 
purchase, gifting and loaning, as well as through the reproduction 
of  animals already owned. Animals were purchased from friends, 
neighbours or from markets. The purchase was often done by the 
person that wanted the animal or a proxy assumed to be knowledgeable 
of  prevailing market prices and skilled at selecting good animals. 
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Cattle, sheep and goat transactions were mainly handled by men, while 
chickens, eggs and milk were handled by women. A newer strategy 
of  acquisition of  cattle, sheep and goats by women was through the 
‘merry-go-round’ groups.
Livestock were gifted to young persons as a result of  good performance 
at school and at home. Boys were also rewarded for exhibiting bravery 
during circumcision, whereas girls were gifted animals upon getting 
married in a culturally acceptable way, and also after childbirth. 
Additionally, a bride’s parents were gifted livestock by the groom’s 
family (bride price). In some instances, the bride price was also shared 
with the bride’s uncles and aunties, with the expectation that those who 
received these gifts would reciprocate when their children married.
Only sons were reported to inherit livestock from their parents, with the 
animals being bequeathed to the sons at a time of  the father’s choosing 
or after his demise. Traditionally, among the Tugen community, a 
father’s livestock was only inherited by the firstborn son while the 
last-born inherited from the mother. However, this practice was 
reported to be in decline as sons press for equal shares of  inheritance 
regardless of  birth order. For girls, it was reported that inheritance of  
any kind of  property encouraged insubordination and decreased the 
probability of  getting and remaining married.
Sourcing livestock through traditional borrowing was reported as a 
last resort, when, for example, all other livestock had been lost. In this 
region, lack of  cattle, sheep or goats is equated to nakedness, and the 
culture demands ‘an individual borrows clothing to cover the shame’. 
Thus, an individual who does not have animals can borrow from 
one who has many, and utilise the milk in exchange for caring for 
the animal. Once the borrowed animal reproduces, the owner gives 
the caregiver a female offspring to start their own herd, then often 
repossesses the mature animal and any other young ones.
Livestock ownership was reported by men and women, but ownership 
has several different dimensions. For example, ownership claims 
are manifest in making decisions about livestock management 
(management); in determining who has access to livestock or their 
products (access) or not (exclusion), and which animals are sold, gifted 
or loaned, and to whom (alienation); and over the benefits accrued 
from the livestock and derived products (withdrawal). Management is 
the ability to make decisions on care of  livestock. At household level, 
management of  cattle, sheep and goats is primarily a male responsibility 
regardless of  who or how the animal was sourced. Prior to marriage, 
cattle, sheep and goats belonging to male and female children are 
held in trust by their parents. According to focus group discussants, 
the majority of  young women married aged 20–25 years while 
young men married aged 25–30, both well within the youth category. 
Upon marriage, most dimensions of  ownership by young women are 
transferred to the new male head of  household regardless of  their age:
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As a woman, you have nothing to say is yours. You won’t say this livestock 
[cattle, sheep and goats] it is mine. (Female discussant, Litein4)10,11
As far as livestock [cattle, sheep and goats] are concerned, women do not have 
authority to own or sell them. (Male discussant, Lorok1)12
There are those women who can buy cattle, but when it reaches home it does 
not belong to the woman because the home is the husband’s, there is no home 
belonging to a woman. The home belongs to the man. So everything in the home 
belongs to the man. The children and the woman are his. Everything in that 
house is his. (Male discussant, Litein1)13
Despite these cultural norms, women still source and keep cattle, 
sheep and goats. However, their security of  ownership depends on 
maintaining anonymity of  who sourced the animal:
If  you come to brag at home that you have [cattle, sheep or goats] he gets angry. 
He can sell or slaughter them. (Female discussant, Litein4)14
He [the household head] does not want you to tell others that you have [cattle, 
sheep or goats]. Even if  they are full in the home and he doesn’t have even one 
you don’t tell anyone. You let it look like they are his. (Female discussant, 
Litein1)15
Chickens, milk and eggs are considered to be of  less value than cattle, 
sheep and goats; they are mainly managed by women, even young women.
The average milk volumes reported by young and old household heads 
were 1.4 litres and 1.7 litres respectively, with the milk mainly being used 
for domestic consumption. Among the youth, male- and female-headed 
households produced nearly equal amounts of  milk, on average 1.4 litres 
and 1.5 litres respectively. In cases where the volumes produced were 
high and milk value chains were commercialised, management claims 
reverted to men except in female-headed households:
There is no time men say that chicken are theirs. If  someone comes to ask me 
[the man] for chicken, they will not be given because I am not the one that 
deals with chicken. I cannot take chicken and say I want to give this one out. 
For small things you ask the mother/wife because it is women who deal with 
chicken. (Male discussant, Borowonin2)16
Men consider chicken, eggs, milk as something small. Women are then ones 
concerned about them and when they are sold, nobody will question. (Female 
discussant, Kipcherere4)17
If  the cow [you have] is a cross-breed that produces 3–4 litres of  milk or more, 
it is the man who will decide whether it will to be sold in a hotel or somewhere 
else. (Female discussant, Perkerra1)18
Access to livestock and livestock products is granted to all family 
members regardless of  age. However, household heads can also deny 
access (exclusion).
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In day-to-day activities related to the animals, men typically construct 
sheds, treat sick and injured cattle, sheep and goats, dip or spray animals 
infested with insects, brand or ear notch, castrate and slaughter. On 
the other hand, milking, caring for the sick, injured and those about to 
deliver, cleaning animal sheds and constructing sheds for young livestock 
are primarily female activities. Grazing and watering of  livestock can 
be done by both men and women, who can be assisted by both male 
and female children. Girls do milking, while the care of  chickens is left 
to women and children, with men rarely getting involved. Increasingly, 
women are involved in the treatment of  sick livestock, particularly in 
households where the head stayed or worked away from home.
Decisions concerning the sale or lending of  cattle, sheep and goats 
(alienation) and use of  income generated from their sale (withdrawal) 
are predominantly made by household heads. Household heads may 
make these decisions before or after internal consultations with their 
spouses. Women independently make decisions on chickens, eggs and 
milk in non-commercialised systems. Consequently, in the study site, 
cattle, sheep and goats were considered male products while chickens, 
eggs and milk were for women, therefore influencing the types of  
livestock trade men and women engage in.
3.4 Market participation
Different livestock and livestock products are traded in different spaces 
and by different people. Cattle, sheep and goats are mainly traded by 
men in livestock markets where animals are publicly auctioned. Reasons 
provided as to why, despite a thriving livestock trade, only a few women 
participate include lack of  market information and avoidance of  male 
spaces:
Women do not know the price of  cattle. So even if  a woman is allowed to sell 
cattle, how will she sell? (Male discussant, Kipcherere2)19
Women don’t trade in the livestock [cattle, sheep and goat] markets. They shy 
away the livestock section of  the market. (Male discussant, Kipcherere1)20
Market participation occurs at two levels. There are traders who are 
either selling cattle, sheep or goats to raise income to meet household 
needs, buying livestock for domestic purposes, or offloading stock to 
minimise losses in the dry season. These are essentially needs-driven 
traders and they comprised 44.8 per cent of  all traders interviewed. 
The other 55.2 per cent of  traders were those who derived a livelihood 
from livestock transactions. There was a significant statistical difference 
between the cattle volumes transacted by young traders and older 
traders, with the older ones trading larger quantities (c2 =9.935, df=2, 
p=0.007). For sheep and goats, there was no statistical difference in the 
volumes traded by young and old traders.
Most of  the young male traders were aged 25–34 years, the age range 
within which most got married and assumed ownership of  livestock. 
Of  the eight female traders interviewed, only three were aged 34 years 
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or less, and two of  these were aged 25–34 years. It appeared that half  
(4) were needs-driven and half  (4) were regular traders. There was only 
one young female who worked as a regular trader. Three of  the four 
regular female traders came from Trans-Nzoia County and Nairobi. 
They traded by negotiating with livestock owners before the animals 
were taken to the auction yard or by having male representatives or 
companions in the auction yard to help with sale or purchase. On 
livestock market days, women generate income indirectly from livestock 
trading through the sale of  ropes for tethering livestock and ready-to-eat 
food items to the traders.
Livestock sales were not restricted to established markets and market 
days only. Traders and farmers also buy livestock at the farm gate for 
resale, slaughter and herd expansion. Potential sellers declare their 
intentions to neighbours and local butchers as a strategy for attracting 
buyers. The key benefits of  selling at the farm gate as reported by focus 
group discussants are that a seller does not bear the cost of  moving the 
animal and they could utilise their social networks as market sources. 
The key weaknesses of  this strategy are that it results in lower returns 
compared to established livestock markets, and buyers might not always 
be readily forthcoming.
Chickens, milk and eggs are mainly sold by women at the farm gate or 
in local centres. Despite these products being considered of  low value, 
sales were reported to be more regular than large stock. The incomes 
gained were used to meet small needs in the household such as food 
items, stationery and payment of  school fees. Women valued these 
products because they could use their discretion in relation to when to 
sell, and exercise control over incomes earned:
When it comes to milk and chickens and eggs you don’t have to ask. That is 
yours. (Female discussant, Perkerra1)21
We [men] are just not concern with chicken, eggs and milk. Women sell 
them and use the money to solve small financial issues. (Male discussant, 
Lorok1)22
4 Discussion
Overall, the study shows that livestock farmers and traders are not 
homogeneous groups. Social norms introduce differences in claims 
and privileges based on gender and age, inhibiting women’s ability to 
gainfully engage with livestock. A detailed analysis of  the differences 
in choice of  livelihood activity, livestock sourcing, ownership and 
marketing highlights the norms and micropolitics that affect the 
participation of  different social groups. Caution must be exercised, 
however, as it is not straightforward to distinguish between statements of  
community norms from those describing individual behaviour.
In the study area, young household heads reported a preference for 
self-employment, wage or salaried employment, while those aged 
35 years and above mainly engaged in crop and livestock farming. This 
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suggests that while young people may be unwilling to provide unpaid 
agricultural labour in their household, they would provide it if  it was 
paid. Young people’s choice is informed by the need for regular income 
which small-scale crop and livestock farming do not offer. An important 
research question is whether the employment aspirations of  the young 
household heads will shift more towards farming and livestock as they 
grow older.
Young household heads and traders had more primary, secondary and 
tertiary education compared to the older ones. The difference can 
be explained by improved access to learning institutions and growing 
parental appreciation for the value of  formal education. An emergent 
research question is how the difference in education achievement 
will shape youth employment aspirations, engagement in livestock 
production and marketing, and parental expectations.
The study has demonstrated that there are gender differences in how 
men and women acquire livestock. The differences emerge in purchase, 
gifting and inheritance. Ability to purchase is determined by availability 
of  the money to invest. A strategy adopted by women to circumvent 
financial constraints is purchasing through ‘merry-go-rounds’. Through 
combining savings from different people, an individual is able to afford 
an animal that would otherwise have been difficult to buy. While men 
can purchase cattle, sheep and goats without consulting their spouses, 
women are required to declare their intentions beforehand. This opens 
up a possibility that the resources planned for livestock purchase are 
diverted to other purposes by the household head. Additionally, a 
household head can block or encourage purchase of  livestock based on 
their considerations around land use. In the study area, women and girls 
rarely own land. They can, however, access it through their spouses or 
fathers but rarely have any decision-making capacity regarding its use.
Norms and practice around gifting of  animals are interpreted flexibly, 
influenced by personal choice, cultural norms or implied expectation of  
reciprocity. A parent who feels that their child has excelled and deserves 
a reward gifts the child voluntarily. The parent whose son successfully 
undergoes a rite of  passage is compelled by local culture to reward him 
with cattle, sheep or goats depending on their livestock endowment. 
When parents marry their daughters, the groom’s family is expected to 
pay bride price. When a bride’s parents share bride price with relatives, 
it is with the expectation that they will also receive a similar gift in 
future. It is clear that young people can benefit from gifting, but it is less 
clear whether gifting constrains participation of  particular social groups 
such as young women.
On the other hand, only sons gain access to livestock and land through 
inheritance, but of  course this can only happen when parents have 
livestock. By default, this practice excludes young women from sourcing 
livestock through inheritances. Even in the case of  sons, inheritance is 
at the discretion of  the parents: children have no control over the time 
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when a parent decides to redistribute their resources and cannot with 
certainty tell how redistribution will be effected amongst siblings.
The study suggested a clear delineation of  the livestock species that can 
be owned by men or women. Livestock assumed to be of  higher value 
such as cattle, sheep and goats are in the male domain, while chickens, 
milk and eggs are in the female domain. While women do own cattle, 
sheep and goats, this fact is usually kept hidden. Pursuit of  livestock 
ownership is a potential source of  intra-household conflict because it 
can be interpreted as a strategy to challenge the head’s control over 
household assets. Nonetheless, women still pursued livestock ownership, 
an indication of  the desire to be involved in production. While this 
norm does not exclude women completely, it certainly constrains their 
participation in large-animal activities. This constraint is probably even 
greater for young women.
No matter who owns them or how they were acquired, with the 
exception of  female-headed households, decisions relating to 
management, alienation, exclusion and withdrawal of  cattle, sheep and 
goats rest with men. This potentially inhibits women’s participation in 
production of  large stock and by extension, limits their ability to pursue 
livestock production as a means of  livelihood. While women can claim 
ownership of  milk, the quantities produced are very low, and availability 
is periodic (i.e. dependent on having a lactating animal).
Relatively few women are engaged in cattle, sheep and goat trading. 
According to prevailing social norms, livestock markets and marketing 
are predominantly male spaces and activities. Consequently, most of  
the women that regularly traded in livestock came from outside Baringo 
County, away from their home areas where cultural inhibitions would 
be greater. Further, because the animals the female traders purchased 
were either resold whole or as meat and were never considered as part 
of  the domestic herds, the women gainfully participate in the trade 
and could exercise more decision-making powers over the gained 
resources. That there was only a single female regular trader aged 34 
or less indicated that livestock trading was either not an accessible or a 
favoured livelihood activity among female youth, probably due to the 
cultural inhibitions experienced in the county.
5 Conclusions and implications  
Agriculture and livestock will remain important sources of  income and 
employment for many people in years to come, especially in rural areas 
where youth under- and unemployment rates are higher than urban 
areas (White 2012). Gainful participation in agriculture is determined 
by an individual’s ability to manage the barriers to entry (Coles and 
Mitchell 2011). This study has demonstrated that coming from a 
livestock-producing community does not necessarily result in gainful 
engagement in livestock production. Participation can be inhibited 
by social norms and micropolitics that affect the choice of  livelihood 
activities and access to other requisite resources such as land. While 
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the Kenya national youth policy advocates for equitable provision of  
employment opportunities for youth by creating enabling environments, 
the current study shows a disconnect between this ideal and the reality 
on the ground. This implies that programmes to promote livestock 
production and marketing should be carefully designed so that they 
do not perpetuate or deepen inequalities, particularly among the 
young. The programmes might consider implementation strategies 
that challenge existing barriers in ways that increase employment 
opportunities for male and female youth without attracting backlash 
from other groups. Further research should also be conducted to inform 
policymakers as to how increasing education among the youth will 
influence their employment aspirations and engagement in livestock 
production and marketing.
Notes
*  This research was carried out within a larger three-year study on 
early warning systems for improved human health and resilience to 
climate-sensitive vector-borne diseases in Kenya, funded through a 
grant by WHO/TDR/IDRC Project ID B20278. The work was also 
partly supported by the CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture 
for Nutrition and Health led by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington DC.
**  The authors acknowledge the contributions of  the veterinary 
department, local administration and the people of  Baringo County for 
their generous non-financial support which made this study a reality. 
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9 The tropical livestock unit is a measure used to standardise across 
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Non-Farm Enterprises and 
the Rural Youth Employment 
Challenge in Ghana
Monica Lambon-Quayefio
Abstract Non-farm enterprises have generally been perceived as a silver 
bullet solution for rural unemployment. This article therefore provides 
some insights on their potential to resolve the youth unemployment 
challenge in rural Ghana. Non-farm enterprises in Ghana are 
heterogeneous in nature based on type of enterprise, range of activities 
and productivity. Evidence suggests that motivations for operating these 
enterprises are mixed. Some households operate them as a coping 
mechanism to deal with household or agricultural shocks, while others may 
also be operated as business entities with the potential to grow sustainably 
and offer employment to young people. In order to harness the full 
potential of non-farm enterprises to address the rural youth employment 
challenge, it is imperative for policymakers in Ghana to identify specific 
sub-sectors that lend themselves to growth and have the capacity to offer 
sustainable employment avenues, and to critically interrogate and examine 
the primary reason of their establishment.
Keywords: Ghana, coping, policy, non-farm enterprise, rural, 
unemployment.
1 Introduction
Despite impressive economic growth, Ghana, like many other 
African countries, is confronted with a significant youth under- and 
unemployment challenge. Although the Ghana Statistical Service 
report on labour force (GSS 2013) pegged the unemployment rate of  
Ghana at 5.2 per cent, the same document reveals that unemployment 
among the youth (15–35 years) is 32.2 per cent. Additionally, the report 
indicates that urban unemployment is higher (6.3 per cent) than the 
national average as well the rural unemployment rate (3.9 per cent). The 
majority of  youth who are employed in urban areas are engaged mainly 
in wholesale and retail businesses, as well as very low productivity service 
areas. In rural areas, many youth who are engaged in low productivity 
agricultural activities seek the opportunity to migrate. Given the 
relatively low levels of  education and skills of  most rural youth, a large 
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body of  literature has hinted that non-farm enterprises have the potential 
to create the much-needed employment opportunities in rural areas.
This article examines and critiques the efficacy of  existing policies and 
programmes in Ghana that are meant to promote non-farm activities in 
rural areas. It draws on existing research literature and relevant policy 
documents to evaluate the extent to which non-farm enterprises can 
serve as a solution to the rural youth unemployment challenge. This is 
important because non-farm enterprises are being promoted for their 
perceived potential to absorb surplus labour in rural areas. This is 
particularly important as the capacity for agriculture (in its current state) 
to provide a sustainable source of  livelihood is low, and prospects for 
unskilled workers in urban areas have dwindled. The logic, therefore, 
is that non-farm activities like agro-processing and services are the next 
best alternative for rural youth.
The argument I present is that merely expanding non-farm activities in 
rural areas may not resolve the rural unemployment problem because 
in large part these are operated as coping mechanisms rather than 
as businesses. Although some evidence suggests that achievement of  
asset accumulation and upward mobility from diversification through 
the operation of  non-farm enterprises within the rural economy is 
possible, this article suggests that such a benefit is not likely for most 
rural households in Ghana whose goal of  survival is a more probable 
outcome of  diversification.
The next section provides a description of  non-farm enterprise in 
Ghana, and in Section 3 the capacity of  the non-farm sector to absorb 
surplus labour in the rural economy is evaluated. Section 4 explores 
the motivation for households’ engagement in non-farm enterprises, 
and Section 5 reviews existing youth policies and programmes geared 
towards the promotion of  non-farm enterprises. Section 6 concludes 
and provides a set of  policy recommendations.
2 Characteristics of rural non-farm enterprise in Ghana
In the income diversification literature, the terms non-farm, off-farm 
and non-agricultural activities are used interchangeably to refer to 
all income-generating activities aside from those gained directly from 
the farm. Nagler and Naudé (2014) use the term ‘rural non-farm 
enterprises’ to refer to small, informal household enterprises including 
agribusiness, trade and retail, tourism, rural industrialisation, 
construction and mining. Similarly, Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon 
(2010) describe non-farm activities to include mining, agro-processing, 
utilities, construction, commerce and financial services. Reardon 
(1997) points to a body of  evidence that shows the common non-farm 
enterprises in most developing countries are mainly in commerce, 
manufacturing and services. The World Bank (2008) reports that 
80–90 per cent of  these enterprises rely exclusively on family labour. 
For the purposes of  this article, I adopt the definition of  rural non-farm 
enterprises provided by Nagler and Naudé (2014) which includes all 
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income-generating activities excluding income generated directly from 
traditional farming activities.
Data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GSS 2013) indicate 
that about 44.3 per cent of  households in Ghana operate non-farm 
enterprises, of  which more than half  (50.4 per cent) are located in 
urban areas, with about 36.8 per cent found in rural areas. The survey 
report describes the main non-farm activities to include manufacturing, 
trading and other economic activities such as mining, construction and 
services such as education, hotels and restaurants. In terms of  gender 
differences, about 70.6 per cent of  non-farm enterprises are operated by 
women. The proportion of  women operating these enterprises is slightly 
higher in urban areas (71.4 per cent) compared to rural areas (69.1 per 
cent). With respect to gender differences in non-farm activities in urban 
areas, a slightly higher proportion of  females (69 per cent) than males 
(67 per cent) are engaged in trading activities. The reverse holds true 
in rural areas, where a marginally higher proportion of  males (32.9 per 
cent) are engaged in trading activities than females (31 per cent).
With respect to people engaged in other economic activities, more 
males (53.5 per cent) compared to their female counterparts (35 per 
cent) are casual workers. For skilled workers who operate non-farm 
enterprises, about 51.7 per cent of  females are in trading activities while 
46.9 per cent of  skilled males engaged in other economic activities. 
Contrary to expectations, relatively few skilled workers are engaged 
in manufacturing activities: 24.8 per cent and 24.3 per cent of  skilled 
males and females, respectively, engaged in manufacturing activities 
are skilled workers. More unskilled females (45.5 per cent) than males 
(40.3 per cent) are involved in trading activities.
Household savings are the primary source of  capital for the operation 
of  non-farm enterprises in Ghana. According to GSS (2013), household 
savings constitute about 73 per cent of  capital required for non-farm 
enterprises, followed by support from relatives or friends which make up 
about 14.6 per cent of  funds needed. Borrowing from formal financial 
institutions constitute only 1.9 per cent. Other notable sources of  capital 
for non-farm enterprises include funds from family farms (4.6 per cent) 
and informal money lenders (1.1 per cent). Some other minor sources 
of  capital also include non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well 
as religious organisations and cooperatives. Disaggregating source of  
capital by gender and activity, the data reveal that significantly more 
males engaged in manufacturing activities rely on household savings 
to finance their operations compared to females. A similar pattern is 
apparent for trading and other non-farm activities.
The data show that the annual average expenditure on inputs for 
households operating non-farm enterprise is very low at about 
GH¢110.40 (approximately US$25.26). The highest average 
expenditure is incurred on raw materials and is about GH¢641.7 
(US$146.84), followed by purchase of  articles for resale of  GH¢387.8 
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(US$86.68) and expenditure on fuel and lubricants, which is 
about GH¢316.8 (US$72.49). The total revenue earned from all 
non-farm enterprises in the survey period was GH¢48,645.9 million 
(approximately US$11,131.78 million), of  which the highest 
contribution was from trading activities (GH¢31,134.3 million, 
US$7,124.55 million), followed by revenue generated from other 
economic activities. Revenue received from manufacturing enterprises 
was the least at GH¢7,897.5 million (US$1,807.21 million).
As suggested by Nagler and Naudé (2014), the majority of  non-farm 
enterprises in Ghana are found in the informal sector, where women 
seem to be more engaged than men. These enterprises predominantly 
create employment avenues for family members, employing an average 
of  five people. The sector is also characterised by relatively low skilled 
workers with a large percentage of  casual workers, especially in 
manufacturing. Savings from households seem to be the main source 
of  capital for its operations, especially in the manufacturing sector. As 
a result, these enterprises are less likely to have working relationships 
with financial institutions. This therefore reduces the possibility of  
good record-keeping of  their business activities. The sub-sector that 
seems to generate much revenue is trading activities, despite the general 
perception that it creates relatively low employment opportunities 
compared to the manufacturing sector.
3 Coping strategy or a source of sustainable livelihood?
Ample evidence from Assan and Beyene (2013), Bryceson (2004), 
Barrett, Reardon and Webb (2001), Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003), and 
Hussein and Nelson (1998) suggests that income diversification is 
an important strategy adopted by rural households in Africa. The 
diversification options available to rural households include intensive 
cropping and/or marketing of  non-conventional commodities and 
animal rearing (Aduse-Poku et al. 2003), commerce (Adi 2007), 
migration (Lay, M’Mukaria and Mahmoud 2007) and non-farm 
activities (Lay et al. 2007; Adi 2007). Others point to self-employment 
versus wage labour as another diversification option (Hussein and 
Nelson 1998; Ellis 2000; Barret et al. 2001).
Non-farm activities are clearly an important element of  income 
diversification and employment generation. Empirical evidence from 
Haggblade et al. (2007, 2010) indicates that non-farm enterprises account 
for about 35 per cent of  rural income in Africa. Fox and Sohnesen (2016) 
provide an optimistic projection of  38 per cent of  new employment 
avenues between 2010 and 2020. However, while there is some consensus 
regarding the relative importance of  non-farm enterprises in income 
diversification, there is debate about the incentives for participating in 
these activities and their ability to create employment avenues to absorb 
surplus labour from the agriculture sector.
The ongoing debate on rural livelihoods is inconclusive as to whether 
diversification into non-farm enterprises results in sustainable wealth 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 109–126 | 113
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
accumulation or is just a desperate strategy for survival within 
resource-poor societies (Assan and Beyene 2013). For example, 
Warren (2002) argues that diversification may be occasional, where 
the change in the household livelihood portfolio is temporary, or may 
be more strategic, reflecting a deliberate attempt to take advantage of  
changing opportunities and cope with unexpected constraints. Ellis 
(1998) identifies diversification to be an accumulation strategy which 
is likely to result in improvement in household incomes and assets. 
However, Whitehead and Kabeer (2001) and Dercon and Krishnan 
(1996) caution that accumulation through diversification may not be 
equally available to all rural households. De Janvry and Sadoulet (2001) 
report forms of  accumulation in the rural non-farm service sector 
such as tourism and wage labour activities, conceding that the rural 
non-farm service sector has a better potential to enhance accumulation 
from diversification. These studies therefore suggest that the asset 
accumulation motive of  non-farm enterprises is not uniform, but rather 
depends on other determining factors such as the initial wealth of  the 
household as well as the specific enterprise operated by the household. 
Although Reardon (1997) agrees that diversification via non-farm 
enterprises offers a pathway out of  poverty, he notes that available data 
are not clearly indicative of  whether the strategy is about survival or 
purely an asset accumulation strategy which has the potential to offer 
the needed employment avenues for the rural labour force.
Some literature describes the diversification of  rural incomes to be 
a coping mechanism, creating the opportunity to respond to a shock 
or contingency, and thereby spreading the risk associated with, for 
example, small-scale farming. Empirical evidence shows that in rural 
Africa, non-farm enterprise to a larger extent fulfils a risk management 
and survival function (Nagler and Naudé 2014; Rijkers and Costa 
2012). In the same way, Whitehead and Kabeer (2001) and Ellis 
(2000) argue that as a result of  previous experience with poor crop 
yields and food insecurity, households diversify in an attempt to spread 
the perceived risk of  shocks on household consumption and other 
important household expenditure. Other push factors discussed in the 
literature may include: limited availability of  agricultural land and 
environmental degradation. Neihof  (2004) aptly describes diversification 
into non-farm activities as a stopgap or filler strategy which merely 
enables households to cope with economic gaps on a temporary basis. 
Similarly, Davies (1996) argues that a household’s diversification into 
rural non-farm enterprises serves as insurance against indebtedness and 
borrowing, and boosts its ability to survive.
Specifically, evidence on Ghana from Ashong and Smith (2001) and 
Canagarajah, Newman and Bhattamishra (2001) suggests that rural 
households participate in non-farm enterprises mainly to escape 
food insecurity and poverty. Using data from a peri-urban area in 
Kumasi, Ashong and Smith (2001) note that during poor seasonal rains 
households may deplete their assets through sale of  cattle in order to 
purchase food. However, relatively poorer households that are unable to 
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afford cattle are forced into non-farm sources of  livelihood. Descriptions 
provided by the authors therefore hint that operating non-farm 
enterprises is the last resort for survival in most poor households. Assan 
(2014) also provides empirical evidence from southern Ghana which 
identifies diversification as a strategy for survival rather than asset 
accumulation as the predominant reason. However, the author makes 
an interesting observation with regard to households that operate 
non-farm enterprises. He observed that households operated more than 
one enterprise with the particular reason of  ensuring income security. 
To achieve this, they engage in multiple enterprises with the ability to 
switch between enterprises should one fail. Using more robust empirical 
techniques and data from the northern part of  Ghana, findings from 
Owusu, Abdulai and Abdul-Rahman (2011) indicate that non-farm 
work is a valuable source of  income which helps in income smoothing, 
which is in turn useful for household consumption smoothing. Fox 
and Sohnesen (2016) disagree and suggest that these enterprises have 
existed for long periods and are therefore sustainable in the solutions 
they may proffer to the employment challenge. This argument may 
be problematic in the sense that enterprises may have existed for 
long durations but may still operate at the subsistence level, using low 
productivity technologies and largely dependent on family labour. 
Particularly for Ghana, despite the growth of  the sector in the past 
few years, the characteristics described in the previous section give an 
indication of  the low levels of  investment by households as well as heavy 
reliance on family labour.
Diversification has also been viewed as a process which takes advantage 
of  opportunities in the rural economy in order to maximise household 
income and other household goals. For example, Warren (2002) suggests 
that households may engage in non-farm activities to accumulate the 
resources needed to educate the younger generation and increase 
land holdings to assure prosperity and stability. Ellis (1998) supports 
the finding that diversification can lead to improved income and asset 
accumulation. Also, Whitehead and Kabeer (2001) and Dercon and 
Krishnan (1996) contend that non-farm activities may be a source 
of  surplus income which can be invested in productivity-enhancing 
methods on farms, and other forms of  capital or asset accumulation. 
Using data from Mozambique, Fox and Sohnesen (2016) argue that 
non-farm enterprises offer a particularly unique opportunity for upward 
mobility and consumption growth for households with relatively low 
education levels.
This review suggests that engagement in rural non-farm enterprises 
may be motivated by immediate need or may represent an active, 
forward-looking strategy. The dichotomy of  survivalist versus strategic 
diversification may be of  limited value. In most cases, households that 
diversify their incomes are able to enjoy greater flexibility and resilience 
compared to households that do not diversify (Warren 2002). In most 
cases, diversification is more dynamic than static, involving continuous 
rearrangement of  the livelihood portfolios in response to changing 
(Endnotes)
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constraints and opportunities (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1995). 
What starts off as a survivalist or a coping strategy may evolve into 
something more strategic, and vice versa.
Overall, although livelihood diversification strategies such as the 
operation of  non-farm enterprises may eventually lead households 
out of  poverty, the outcomes may not be unidirectional. Outcomes 
and effects may vary with geographical locations and type of  activities 
engaged in. In essence, outcomes of  diversification are not uniform 
with respect to derived benefits for households. Due to the diversity and 
dynamism within non-farm activities as well as across countries, it is 
imperative to have in-depth, sector-specific and country-specific analysis 
based on good quality panel data, before any conclusive generalisations 
may be put forward.
4 Capacity of non-farm enterprises to address the youth employment 
challenge
Haggblade et al. (2010), Rijkers and Costa (2012) and Fox and Sohnesen 
(2016) argue that non-farm enterprises play an important role in the 
rural economy, and its relative contribution to household employment 
and income continues to rise across the African continent. Estimates by 
Fox et al. (2013) suggest that these enterprises are expected to employ 
about 15 per cent of  Africa’s labour force; they are also expected to 
create millions of  jobs in rural Africa over the next decade (Fox and 
Pimhidzai 2013; Fox and Sohnesen 2016). But what does the literature 
say about who is presently involved in the rural non-farm economy?
Evidence from Ackah (2013) and Dary and Kuunibe (2012) points to 
declining participation in non-farm enterprises as people grow older: 
younger people are more likely to take up opportunities in the non-farm 
sector than older people. This is in sharp contrast to findings from Nagler 
and Naudé (2014) who analysed World Bank data from Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Niger, Nigeria and Uganda and found that older cohorts were more likely 
to engage in non-farm activities, which might reflect the fact that many of  
those who are less than 25 years old are still attending school.
Using data from the Upper West region of  Ghana, Dary and 
Kuunibe (2012) found that men were more likely to be employed in 
formal non-farm enterprises compared to women. This may be due 
to the relatively low levels of  education among rural women. Aside 
from education, Gordon and Craig (2001) note that rural women’s 
concentration in informal non-farm enterprises may reflect factors 
such as tradition, religion, childcare responsibilities and other social 
expectations.
In general, the levels of  education and skills required for gainful 
employment in rural non-farm enterprises are not very high (Fox and 
Sohnesen 2016). Dary and Kuunibe (2012) provide evidence from 
Ghana that education increases the likelihood that people will engage in 
formal, rural non-farm enterprises. Also, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2001) 
show that even amongst educated people who participate in the 
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non-farm sector there is a significant association between level of  literacy 
and type of  enterprise: operators with more education tend to use 
more modern technology. Education may increase labour productivity 
in non-farm enterprises and in turn increase employment potential 
(Wennberg and Lindqvist 2010; Owoo and Naude 2014). Indeed, there 
is ample evidence of  a correlation between education and return to 
non-farm employment. In Ghana, Jolliffe (2004) shows that the returns 
to education are higher in non-farm compared to on-farm activities.
Linking back to the discussion of  survivalist and strategic diversification, 
it is important to note the observation by Nagler and Naudé (2014) that 
the motive for starting a non-farm enterprise may have implications for 
its productivity, and thus the potential to create employment.
Although the non-farm sector offers some potential to create jobs for the 
rural labour force, and particularly the youth, assessment of  the rural 
investment climate reveals some significant challenges (Wang et al. 2006). 
Constraints include poor access to and high cost of  credit, poor quality 
roads and infrastructure, as well as inadequate and unreliable supply of  
electricity, and weak governance structures in rural areas (World Bank 
2008). Another constraint is low market demand. In most instances, about 
70 per cent of  non-farm outputs go to satisfy local demand – the rural 
non-farm sector can only thrive if  the economy delivers inclusive growth. 
Resolving these challenges will improve the employment-generating 
capacity of  rural non-farm enterprises, particularly towards the youth.
5 Youth policies and programmes in Ghana1
Ghana, like many other African countries, faces a high youth 
population growth rate and a serious employment challenge. Despite 
this, Hoetu (2011) posits that with appropriate policies and interventions 
the unemployment challenge could be transformed into opportunities 
that could yield maximum benefit to the country at large. Due to the 
enormity and the complexity of  the challenges that confront the youth, 
policymakers and government institutions that are responsible for 
youth programmes are at a loss as to how to proceed (Hoetu 2011). 
Policymakers therefore operate in an environment of  despair and 
desperation in a bid to find solutions to these problems. This may often 
lead to a number of  disjointed policies and programmes rather than 
more carefully planned and complementary policies. The following 
chronicles a number of  youth policies that have turned out to be more 
duplicative than complementary.
The National Youth Authority, formerly known as the National 
Youth Council, was established in 1974 by an act of  parliament to 
coordinate youth development activities. This authority was located in 
the then Ministry of  Youth and Sports, but the ministry came under 
heavy criticism for focusing its attention and resources on sports to the 
detriment of  youth development. The sense of  neglect only deepened 
when responsibility for youth was split across various ministries, 
and programmes intended to benefit youth lacked coherence and 
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coordination. To address this situation, the National Youth Policy was 
formulated in 1999 and identified particular priority areas for action. 
However, this policy was never implemented, and in 2008 it was 
abandoned and replaced with a new National Youth Policy. Again, 
even though the 2008 version was backed by an implementation plan, 
the new government that took over in 2009 ignored the existing policy, 
opting instead to launch a new policy framework two years after taking 
office. The 2010 National Youth Policy for Ghana articulated new 
priority areas which included youth employment.
Prior to 2006, a nationwide survey by the National Development 
Planning Commission (NDPC) revealed the enormity of  the youth 
employment challenge and made recommendations which culminated 
in the establishment of  the National Youth Employment Programme 
(NYEP). The main objectives of  this programme were to provide the 
youth with employability skills, offer work experience after mandatory 
national service, and provide employment opportunities through various 
modules such as the youth in agriculture module, the community health 
module and others. While well intentioned, this programme provided 
relatively few jobs, and then only for a period of  two years, with a 
possible extension of  one year.
Under the new government in 2012, the NYEP was rebranded as the 
Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Agency (GYEEDA). 
According to the new government, this repositioning was necessary 
to address the youth employment challenge in a more systematic way. 
After a few years of  operation, the GYEEDA was mired in scandal: 
due to the fact that there was no legislative instrument to regulate the 
activities of  the programme, implementation challenges were rife. In 
2015, GYEEDA metamorphosed into the Youth Employment Agency 
(YEA), and the age bracket shifted slightly to cover all young people 
between the ages of  18 and 35, including those with disabilities. Among 
all the modules created by the agency, only community health and 
youth in agriculture are relevant to rural youth. Although the youth 
in agriculture has not yet been clearly spelt out, the community health 
module is somewhat geared towards absorbing educated rural youth. 
These two modules are particularly relevant to the rural youth due to 
the relatively low skillset they require and the demand for these services 
within rural settings compared to urban settings. Data from GSS (2013) 
show that the literacy rate in urban areas is higher than in rural areas. 
Also, the report suggests that the youth in urban areas have higher 
educational attainment compared to their rural counterparts. As a 
result, the skillset of  the urban youth is relatively higher than the skillset 
of  the rural youth. Given that agricultural activities in the context of  
Ghana do not require highly skilled personnel, this module suits the 
current skillset of  the rural youth and has the potential to absorb them.
In order to improve on health indicators through improved access 
to health care (especially in rural areas where indicators such as 
maternal, infant and child mortality are high) the government of  
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Ghana, in partnership with the Japanese government, introduced the 
Community-Based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) Compounds. 
As part of  the policy, the Ghana Health Service and the Ministry 
of  Health were responsible for posting health personnel to these 
communities. Uptake of  posts in rural communities has over the years 
been very low due to the absence of  critical social amenities and 
infrastructure required for the daily survival of  the health workers. The 
community health assistant module is therefore very relevant in tapping 
into the relatively educated rural youth who can assist in providing 
the needed assistance to the few health professionals in the delivery 
of  health care in rural areas. This is because these assistants hail from 
rural areas and are thus able to cope relatively easily. This, combined 
with the increasing demand for health professionals, creates a unique 
opportunity for the rural youth in respect of  employment opportunities.
In contrast, other modules such as the youth in community service 
module, and the security services module, may not be relevant to the 
rural youth. This is because the services of  such modules are needed 
more in urban congested areas where the youth in this module are 
deployed to ease traffic. Other modules such as youth in trade and 
vocation, and youth in entrepreneurship may seem to offer some 
opportunity for rural employment. However, their sustainability may 
be in question as the local rural demand to support these ventures in 
the long run may be very low due to the relatively low income levels of  
the rural population. Eventually, out of  frustration, these ventures may 
be abandoned altogether as the same youth may resort to migration to 
urban areas as a livelihood strategy. Also, a major deficiency of  the YEA 
is that it provides employment opportunities for a period of  two years 
only, after which the beneficiaries are left on their own.
These efforts to address youth employment must be seen in the light 
of  efforts to liberalise the Ghanaian economy under the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP). With the removal of  subsidies, the ERP 
had important implications for the viability of  the agricultural sector, 
and the privatisation of  the mining sector resulted in a massive laying 
off of  workers. During this period, there was an economic and social 
crisis in urban areas due to the inability of  the rural economy to provide 
employment opportunities for the rural labour force. Those who were 
unable to move to urban areas resorted to other subsistence endeavours 
in order to survive.
In response, in 1995 the government, in partnership with the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), launched the 
Rural Enterprise Project (REP). With an initial limited coverage in only 
two districts, the goal of  the first phase of  the REP was to improve the 
lives of  the rural poor through increased productivity, with particular 
focus on rural youth and women. In 2002, the project indicated its goal 
to increase coverage to 66 districts by 2011. The enterprises supported by 
this programme include rural non-farm activities such as soap-making, 
bead-making, textiles and clothing, artisanal services such as carpentry 
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and hairdressing, as well as value-addition agro-processing activities such 
as nut and oil processing, and juice processing among others. Due to 
its success, the programme attracted additional funding which led to a 
third phase, scheduled to run from 2013 to 2017, and intended to cover 
161 out of  the 171 rural districts. The goal of  the third phase is to scale 
up the outcomes of  the first two phases, with a particular objective of  
increasing the number of  rural micro- and small-scale enterprises that 
generate profit, growth and employment opportunities.
The REP included four main components: business development 
services; technology promotion and dissemination; access to rural 
finance and institutional building; and programme coordination, 
monitoring and evaluation. The business development component 
aims to upgrade the technical and entrepreneurial skills of  rural 
cottage, micro- and small-scale activities by providing access to business 
development services. The main objective of  the technology promotion 
and dissemination component is to upgrade the technology used by 
rural micro- and small-scale enterprises. Under this component, the 
REP supports the rural technology facilities at the district level with the 
particular aim of  strengthening the basic engineering and technology 
transfer capacity of  the districts to improve product and service quality, 
as well as the productivity and competitiveness of  the rural enterprises. 
Access to rural finance ensures that rural enterprises have access to 
finance, while the sub-component, which is institutional capacity 
building, ensures that they obtain the necessary support from institutions 
which have the potential to contribute to the creation of  a conducive 
environment for the growth of  rural enterprises.
The REP also supports other special initiatives to stimulate employment 
creation. For example, since its inauguration in 2009, the Graduate 
Apprenticeship Scheme has created about 12,000 new businesses. 
Another such initiative is the Northern Rural Growth Programme 
which began in 2009 and focuses on rural areas of  the northern regions 
with the specific objective of  working with the rural poor to develop 
income-generating activities to supplement subsistence farming. 
Ultimately, the programme aims to strengthen the linkages among 
actors in agricultural value chains. It makes use of  District Value Chain 
Committees.
Government has taken other steps to use enterprise development as 
a tool for creating job opportunities for youth. The Youth Enterprise 
Support programme is a multi-sectoral initiative that aims to provide 
support to youth between the ages of  18 and 35 to transform creative 
ideas into business enterprises. This support was to take the form 
of  interest-free loans to participating youth to be accompanied by 
mentorship. In addition, the initiative has a regular training component 
that is meant to upgrade the youth skillset so that their businesses remain 
competitive. Soon after its inauguration in 2014, a major shortcoming 
in the initiative was exposed – namely that the requirements excluded 
a large proportion of  rural youth. The application process required 
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prospective beneficiaries to have a business plan and be able to effectively 
communicate in writing. This quickly created a sharp disconnect 
between educated urban youth and rural youth who might have good 
business ideas but not the skills to communicate them.
In response, more tailored sub-components were designed and 
implemented to support urban youth and rural youth. The rural 
entrepreneurship programme was piloted in the Upper East region 
with regular fora called business clinics to engage rural youth and to 
provide basic skills and training on how to combine local resources and 
knowledge about the market to create competitive business ventures. 
This sub-component is focused on rural value addition and other related 
ventures. A number of  on-farm and off-farm activities are supported, 
including production of  crops such as pepper, rice and cassava, as well 
as poultry and animal husbandry for the urban market. Other off-farm 
value-addition processing activities such as shea butter production, palm 
oil production, starch making, and fruit juice processing are supported.
As a public–private partnership which commenced in 2010, the Local 
Enterprises Skills Development Programme (LESDEP) is implemented 
by the Ministry of  Local Government and Rural Development in 
partnership with the Ministry of  Employment and Labour Relations. 
Its main objective is to alleviate youth poverty through employment 
creation, by providing youth with the necessary skills to be able to 
own, start and operate their own income-generating enterprises. The 
programme adopts a district-level service delivery approach, and 
has offices in 170 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. 
Various skill development modules are offered based on a nationwide 
needs assessment of  unemployed youth. Prospective beneficiaries are 
given training which lasts from three weeks to three months or more, 
depending on the module. After completion, they are given equipment 
for their chosen trade which they are expected to repay in instalments 
starting six to twelve months after commencing their business 
activities. Programme areas include crop farming, animal rearing and 
fish-farming, as well as value addition to the agricultural products 
through agro-processing.
In its relatively short lifespan, the LESDEP was reported to have 
achieved a success rate of  about 85 per cent, creating a substantial 
number of  new businesses across the country. Nevertheless, it became 
non-operational in its third year of  operation due to reduced budgetary 
allocations, resulting in an inability to meet implementation targets. 
Second, the financial woes were deepened because the programme was 
unable to recover monies it had invested since 2011.
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Non-farm enterprises have been appraised as the next best alternative to 
traditional agriculture as an employment generator in Africa, with the 
capacity to absorb a large number of  rural youth. This perception has 
governments and development agencies investing in a cocktail of  policies 
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and programmes in a bid to provide the necessary environment and 
support for non-farm enterprises to develop and thrive.
Based on a review of  research and policy literature relating to the rural 
non-farm sector, and with a particular focus on Ghana, a number of  
conclusions can be drawn and policy recommendations suggested. First, 
rural non-farm enterprises in Ghana are characterised by a high degree 
of  heterogeneity based on location, range of  activities, education of  
owners and productivity. As such, any policy geared towards developing 
the potential of  this sector should be more targeted rather than a 
general policy or programme which puts all non-farm enterprises in 
the same category. For instance, given that all non-farm enterprises 
do not enjoy the same level of  sophistication in terms of  technologies 
employed, blanket policies such as the provision of  interest-free loans 
to enterprise owners made to cover all categories of  agro-processing 
enterprises may not yield the required impact as some of  these 
enterprises may require different kinds of  assistance in order to grow in 
a sustainable manner. Also, given the large proportion of  females in the 
industry, gender-specific policies may be apt. There is therefore the need 
to disaggregate non-farm enterprises based on specific characteristics – 
this will allow more targeted and effective policy.
Second, if  they are to be seriously considered as the solution to rural 
unemployment, a better understanding of  the motivation to establish 
non-farm enterprises will be absolutely critical. Empirical evidence 
available does not lead to a firm conclusion on the main motivation 
for operating non-farm enterprises. In some cases, the motive is purely 
survival and one of  mitigation against shocks and other household 
risks, while in other instances households operate these ventures for 
capital and asset accumulation. It is therefore difficult to distinguish 
which households are likely to operate under a particular motive. This 
therefore creates the added challenge of  accurately recognising which 
enterprises to target as vehicles for growth. In effect, any policymaking 
in this area warrants a careful and circumstantial analysis if  effective 
policy outcomes are desired.
Third, youth policies and programmes in Ghana are diverse and often 
disjointed. A review of  policies and interventions indicate a lack of  
continuity, consistency and depth. Youth policies and programmes 
have been reformulated with each change of  government. The 
resulting politics around them mean that consistent long-term 
programming is impossible. Also, there is little coordination when it 
comes to formulating policies and programmes to create employment 
opportunities for youth. New programmes duplicate the efforts of  
existing ones. In order to solve the problem of  youth unemployment, 
it must be recognised that this is a challenge that cuts across all sectors 
of  the economy and as such, a sustainable solution requires much more 
effective coordination. Specifically, with respect to policies on non-farm 
enterprises, despite the perceived potential to absorb the rural youth 
there is a dearth of  specific policies and programmes which targets the 
122 | Lambon-Quayefio Non-Farm Enterprises and the Rural Youth Employment Challenge in Ghana
Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’
rural youth based on their skillset. At best, some of  the policies and 
programmes offer accidental benefits to the rural youth rather than 
providing benefits through carefully planned policies and programmes.
Lastly, the government of  Ghana, and indeed all African governments, 
should make concerted efforts to address the major constraints faced 
by rural non-farm enterprises. Even though some progress has been 
made in recent times with regard to rural infrastructure, more needs 
to be done to speed up development of  rural areas. In addition, given 
the potential that it offers to the rural labour force and the rural 
economy, it will be beneficial for policymakers to draft a comprehensive, 
evidence-based policy in relation to the non-farm sector. This should 
be based on high-quality data, spanning a long period of  time, which 
will allow a more rigorous contextual analysis, and accounting for the 
diversity in the sector. Such a policy would provide a road map for the 
development of  the sector in ways that create good job opportunities for 
rural young people.
Note
1 Information for this section was obtained from the author’s review 
of  referenced and non-referenced material as well as interviews with 
officials from some of  the youth agencies mentioned in this article.
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Does Kenya’s Youth Enterprise 
Development Fund Serve Young 
People?
Maurice Sikenyi
Abstract This article analyses issues surrounding a state-supported 
self-employment and entrepreneurship programme in Kenya, the Youth 
Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF). Analysis of secondary data in 
addition to youth interviews suggest that although the YEDF generated 
employment and income for some young people, the frameworks are 
narrow and lack supportive implementation structures. In particular, 
YEDF projects are marred by mismanagement of funds, corruption, 
and ambiguous eligibility criteria. Moreover, young people lack social 
networks, entrepreneurial skills and mentorship that would allow them to 
effectively participate in the YEDF. Inadequate support structures exclude 
young people from the YEDF. Future policies and programmes must 
consider flexible and transparent eligibility criteria, stringent accountability 
mechanisms to curb corruption, and development of business skills 
and mentorship.
Keywords: Africa, unemployment, livelihoods, youth bulge, education, 
entrepreneurship.
1 Introduction
The unemployment challenge is global and presents an economic and 
social crisis that threatens the dignity and livelihoods of  millions of  
individuals, including young people (ILO 2010). Globally, over 75 million 
young people between the ages of  15 and 24 years are outside the formal 
labour market, yet they are looking for work (ILO 2010). A study by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) found that over 75 per cent of  
young people aged between 15 and 29 are involved in informal work as 
their primary economic activity (Elder et al. 2015). Many of  the under- 
and unemployed young people are in the least developed countries 
(LDCs) in the global South (ILO 2010). In sub-Saharan Africa, young 
people constitute more than 50 per cent of  the entire population (United 
Nations 2012); furthermore, it is estimated that ‘each year between 2015 
and 2035, there will be half  a million more 15-year-olds than the year 
before’ (World Bank 2014: 2). While the high numbers of  young people 
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present an opportunity for the continent, the ‘youth bulge’ also presents 
significant economic, social and political challenges.
With limited growth in opportunities for formal sector employment, 
state-supported self-employment and entrepreneurship initiatives 
have become increasingly common. As such, governments and 
development partners have developed and advocated for national 
youth policies, programmes and budgetary allocations aimed at 
supporting self-employment and enterprise development by young 
people (Anyidoho et al. 2012; Burchell et al. 2015; GoK 2008; Muiya 
2014). In sub-Saharan Africa, successive governments and agencies 
have encouraged youth engagement in agricultural-related initiatives as 
a means to counter youth under- and unemployment (Anyidoho et al. 
2012; te Lintelo 2012; Ping 2011). Other policies and programmes 
promote youth engagement with new technologies, vocational training 
and entrepreneurship (GoK 2007; te Lintelo 2012).
In Kenya, the government sought to promote youth employment 
and empowerment through the Youth Enterprise Development Fund 
(YEDF) and Kazi Kwa Vijana (jobs for youth) initiatives. These aimed 
to transform youth from ‘jobseekers’ to ‘job creators and employers’ 
(GoK 2008). Despite these efforts to engage young people in the 
labour market, the majority of  the youth in Kenya are still under- or 
unemployed, and vulnerable. The uptake of  the YEDF is dismal among 
young people in both rural and urban settings. This conundrum calls 
for reflection on the efficacy of  the YEDF in fostering self-employment 
and enterprise development by youth. Understanding young people’s 
experiences with the YEDF, particularly those in rural areas and urban 
slums, and the extent that this programme shapes youth livelihoods is 
important for future policy and practice relating to youth employment.
It is against this backdrop that this article analyses the contextual, 
practical and policy-level issues surrounding and shaping state-supported 
self-employment and entrepreneurship initiatives in Kenya, notably the 
YEDF. The article argues that although the YEDF was established to 
increase young people’s self-employment and entrepreneurship through 
greater access to credit, the programme framework is too narrow and 
the YEDF lacks supportive implementation structures. The inadequate 
support structures contribute to the exclusion of  young people, especially 
in rural regions and urban slums.
The introduction of  the YEDF moves the state’s focus from being a 
direct employer, to a facilitator or enabler of  employment opportunities 
for youth. This shift, though promising, is also problematic because it 
puts the central responsibility for youth employment on the shoulders 
of  the youth themselves. Although some might argue that young people 
should be encouraged to shape their own destiny (including decisions 
about forms of  employment), this article argues that the social and 
economic conditions that young people experience in rural areas and 
urban slums necessitates greater affirmative action and supportive 
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policies to better youth uptake of  state-supported initiatives. In the 
wake of  massive under- and unemployment in Kenya, access to credit 
is not enough to better young people’s livelihoods. The YEDF is one 
of  the biggest state-supported initiatives on youth employment, and 
commands an enormous budgetary allocation and elaborate legislative 
framework. However, because of  mismanagement and ineffective 
implementation, it has done little to address young people’s vulnerability 
and disillusionment.
The findings are based on a review of  documentation, particularly 
YEDF progress reports and case studies. In addition, a limited number 
of  interviews and a focus group discussion were conducted in October 
and November 2016. The semi-structured interviews involved three 
young people from Bumula, in Bungoma County, and the focus group 
discussion with five young people in Dandora, in Nairobi.1 The young 
participants had varied levels of  education, half  having completed 
secondary education, and one having had tertiary-level training. While 
this article does not claim a generalised view of  youth experiences with 
the YEDF, the document review raises important concerns about the 
YEDF that call for immediate attention.
The article proceeds as follows. To understand the genesis of  the 
YEDF and issues surrounding it, I first provide an overview of  youth 
under- and unemployment in Kenya. I then discuss the emergence of  
the YEDF and the issues surrounding this initiative. The last section 
concludes and provides some recommendations for policy.
2 Overview of youth under- and unemployment in Kenya
Many factors have contributed to unemployment in Kenya including 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), and the economic and 
political reforms that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank spearheaded during the 1980s and 1990s (Kipkemboi 2002). 
These institutions envisioned that SAPs would rapidly generate economic 
stability through private ownership, free markets and price liberalisation, 
and reduce government expenditure on social services including 
education and health (ibid.). Despite these intentions, studies suggest that 
the SAP in Kenya and other sub-Saharan African countries resulted in 
high-income inequalities, retrenchment and high unemployment rates 
that carried over into the 2000s (Heidhues and Obare 2011).
In 2009, the National Population and Housing Census found that there 
were 13.5 million young people between the ages of  15 and 35 years, 
constituting 30 per cent of  the entire population (GoK 2010). With the 
labour force constituting only 40 per cent of  Kenya’s population, over 
78 per cent of  the unemployed in Kenya are young people (IEA 2011). 
The employment challenge weighs particularly heavily on youth.
The high population growth rate is not matched by the economic growth 
rate (Njonjo 2011). The Kenyan economy is generating only 150,000 
jobs per year, and cannot absorb the over 500,000 youth that graduate 
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from school every year (Muiya 2014). As a result, there is a large number 
of  young people seeking work, yet there are few opportunities for formal 
employment. Other studies suggest that education and training are 
not aligned with industry demands (Wambugu, Munga and Onsomu 
2009), and that many college graduates lack the relevant skills and 
knowledge that employers demand (ibid.). Moreover, an examination-
oriented curriculum that puts little emphasis on technical or life-skills, 
and negative perceptions of  agriculture, contribute to graduates seeking 
employment as opposed to creating their own jobs (Njonjo 2010).
Youth under- and unemployment put enormous pressure on Kenya’s 
economic, social and political stability. Studies on the effect of  
unemployment show that young people who undergo long periods 
of  unemployment are likely to experience decreased wages and more 
challenges in future employment compared to others (Skans 2004). 
In particular, a 10–15 per cent wage ‘scar’ is attributed to early 
unemployment, and youth can experience wage losses for up to 20 years 
following early unemployment (Skans 2004; Vandenberghe 2010). 
Youth unemployment has contributed to disillusionment, frustration 
and despondency which have been linked to political instability. Some 
observers have suggested that disillusioned youth are more likely to 
engage in organised crime, political violence or join militant groups like 
Al Shabaab (Collier et al. 2003; Kriegler and Waki 2009; Muiya 2014). 
Similarly, prostitution, drug abuse and HIV/AIDs are prevalent in 
areas with high rates of  poverty, and under- and unemployment (Muiya 
2014). It is essential to understand the major government initiatives to 
address the youth employment challenge. The remainder of  the article 
focuses on state support for self-employment and entrepreneurship, 
particularly the YEDF, and youth experiences with this intervention.
3 The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF)
To address the challenges of  under- and unemployment and poverty 
affecting young people, the government established a broad national 
youth policy framework (GoK 2002). A major initiative was the 
formation of  the YEDF in 2006 (GoK 2002, 2007; Muthee 2010). The 
fund focuses on microfinance and enterprise development, with the aim 
of  ensuring that young people (ages 18–35) have access to affordable 
loans so that they can grow their small and medium businesses (GoK 
2008). The operational framework and objectives of  the YEDF entail 
providing funds to financial intermediaries such as banks, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), savings and credit co-operative organisations, and 
licensed non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to give loans to 
youth-run enterprises. It also supports the development of  commercial 
infrastructure that can enhance youth enterprises, including the 
establishment of  market spaces, model businesses and incubators. 
Additionally, the YEDF aims to introduce goods and services produced 
by the young people into local and international markets, and develop 
linkages between the youth-run small and medium enterprises with 
large enterprises. Lastly, the fund was to facilitate employment of  young 
people in the international labour market (GoK 2007, 2011). As the 
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YEDF makes clear, national policy on youth employment has shifted 
from education and training, and private and industrial partnerships, to 
self-employment and enterprise development.
A report on the performance of  the YEDF between 2007 and 2012 
indicated that KSh94 million (US$940,000) had been allocated to the 
47 counties (GoK 2011). The fund targeted slightly over 13 million 
young people. However, by 2011, only 158,000 youth enterprises had 
received YEDF loans – only 1.2 per cent of  the target. Almost half  of  
the funds had not been distributed to youth groups.
Access to the YEDF is low in rural compared to urban constituencies. 
A study in Matungu Constituency showed that by 2015, only 83 young 
people had received YEDF funds (Barasa and Githae 2015). The mode 
of  disbursement of  loans to groups poses operational challenges. For 
example, when a loan of  KSh45,000 is given to a 15-member youth 
group, each member receives only KSh3,000 (US$30) to support their 
business. Such a limited sum cannot be expected to boost a business in 
a significant way. In many constituencies, only a few young people have 
received direct funds. In Bumula Constituency, for example, the direct 
funding mechanism where an individual young person receives between 
KSh100,000 and KSh2 million (US$1,000–20,000) has not been made 
available to any youth since the establishment of  the fund. Many rural 
constituencies experience low uptake of  the YEDF and great disparities 
in the amounts allocated among youth groups (Barasa and Githae 2015; 
Mburung’a 2014). Moreover, the sector-oriented loans require that 
youth groups raise a deposit of  10 per cent of  the loan amount (GoK 
2012), which many groups find impossible.
Mismanagement and corruption are major issues. According to 
investigations by the Criminal Investigation Departments and the Ethics 
and Anti-Corruption Commission of  Kenya (EACC), senior officials 
diverted youth funds to their personal accounts (Agoya 2016; Kibet 
2016). Furthermore, the EACC stated that ‘senior leaders at the YEDF 
have been trying to cover up huge losses of  funds’ (Kibet 2016: 1). In 
other cases, well-connected adults have registered companies and used 
them to tender for youth funds. The Vision 2030 Youth Entrepreneurs 
Associates claimed that YEDF ‘money had been irregularly awarded 
to family members’ (ibid.). A recent court proceeding established that 
some YEDF managers conspired to ‘defraud the Kenyan public through 
unlawful payment of  KSh180,364,789 (US$1.9 million) from the Youth 
Enterprise Development Fund to Quorandum Limited for services not 
rendered’ (Agoya 2016). Moreover, the directors of  the YEDF were under 
investigation for irregularly receiving Khs64,654,789, which the YEDF 
channelled to their individual companies for services that they did not offer.
4 Does the YEDF serve young people?
4.1 Unclear eligibility criteria and stringent lending conditions
Analysis of  primary documents, particularly YEDF progress reports and 
case studies, in addition to some interviews, revealed that the lending 
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procedure is convoluted with unclear eligibility criteria, strict lending 
conditions and inadequate support (Barasa and Githae 2015). The 
intermediary financial institutions do not provide youth-friendly products 
and services. In the focus group discussion, young people expressed 
concerns that the demands for collateral, recommendation letters from 
administrative units, and high interest rates make the YEDF inaccessible. 
In particular, contracted financial institutions require that youth groups 
raise at least a 10 per cent deposit of  any loan, and the youth are also 
required to meet all the criteria to open a bank account. For example, 
one young woman who participated in the focus group stated:
It’s hard for us to get loans, we do not have salary and items to give to secure the 
loan. They want us to produce some money and yet we are looking for the money… 
our parents don’t have money to lend us. (Female 003, November 2016)
This quote highlights the fact that many young people have not 
accumulated assets that they can use as collateral. Moreover, youth 
groups could hardly raise the 10 per cent deposit fees or provide 
references. These factors make the YEDF inaccessible to young people. 
Furthermore, in rural environments young people have challenges 
completing the online applications, or developing their business plans 
and proposal. A young interviewee said that ‘I finished class seven, now 
I am asked so many proposals that I cannot write. The officers at the 
YEDF can’t help us’ (Male 002, October 2016).
Moreover, the long waiting period for loan processing and approval 
at the financial institutions and constituency offices is a major issue 
affecting youth engagement in YEDF programmes. Young people have 
to wait between six months and one year in order to receive the funds. 
In some cases, they never receive any communication about the status 
of  their application. A youth group participant stated:
It takes so long for one to receive the funds. We applied for the funds as group ya 
vijana hapa Dandora [youth in Dandora]. We gave them all the documents, the 
group minutes. We kept on going back to ask about it, but we were told they could 
not trace our application papers. (Male 002, November 2016)
4.2 Corruption
The unfriendly application process has opened up avenues for corruption 
in the dissemination of  YEDF funds, especially at the constituency level 
offices. For example, programme officers and go-betweens extort funds 
from young people in order to help them ‘win the youth funds’. The 
corruption surrounding the management and disbursement of  YEDF 
funds has created a negative perception among young people to the point 
that some are unwilling to apply for the funds. As one youth stated:
There are some cartels, because you know, I can help you get the funds and even 
apply for tenders, but you have to give a percentage of  funds to the cartels. They 
will even say they help you in the application. But if  you give them half  the 
money and you pay back the whole loan how do you make profit? (Male 003, 
November 2016)
(Endnotes)
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Corruption has enabled well-connected individuals and some outside 
the eligibility criteria to access the YEDF. Although the YEDF policy 
states that the fund focuses on young people (ages 18–35), it is known 
that ineligible individuals have been awarded the funds and tenders. 
These individuals often have connections to the political class or the 
management of  the YEDF at the constituency level. In the focus group 
discussion with youth in Dandora, a participant stated that:
The rules say 30 per cent of  procurement must go to youth people. That 
the YEDF funds are for youth. But someone at 50 years gets the funds for 
youth. So, if  you do not know anyone you can’t get the funds. (Female 003, 
November 2016)
Another youth with a disability lamented that ‘You do everything they 
require, but some people get funds without merit’ (Male 001, November 
2016). These sentiments concur with the findings of  a report which 
showed that young people with disabilities had little knowledge about the 
YEDF application processes and some believed that the YEDF officers 
had exclusive authority to award whomever they wished, irrespective of  
any official criteria (Action Network for the Disabled 2012).
The YEDF eligibility policy is primarily based on age, following the 
Kenyan constitution definition of  youth as all persons ‘who have attained 
the age of  eighteen years, but have not yet attained the age of  thirty-five 
years’ (National Council for Law Reporting 2010: 65). However, this 
fails to take into account the unique experiences among youth in 
various geographical regions in the country. Young people in pastoral 
communities, youth with disabilities, rural versus urban youth, or 
youth with different levels of  education – all of  these have implications 
on work transitions and successful self-employment. Moreover, the 
age-based definition of  youth is inadequate because it does not account 
for the cultural, sociological and functional forces that also shape youth 
livelihoods in various contexts. For example, a teenage parent becomes 
an adult and might not qualify for community-level programmes or 
opportunities geared towards young people. An interviewee stated: 
‘I got a child after I finished primary school. I was 15 years. Now I am 
a mother. People do not see me as a youth. The village elders will not 
recommend me for the youth funds’ (Female 003, November 2016).
4.3 Business skills development and mentorship
Entrepreneurship and self-employment are risky endeavours that many 
young people undertake due to the lack of  alternatives. In some cases, 
there is no aspiration to become an entrepreneur. These young people 
may not have the entrepreneurial or business attitudes or skills to 
enable them to establish or run successful businesses. In the focus group 
discussion, young people stated that they need mentors to guide them 
on how to successfully navigate the business environment, particularly 
with knowing how to invest in the right products, increasing their sales 
and learning how to save:
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I am teaching myself  how to do business… it gets hard; I didn’t study any 
business in primary or secondary school. Maybe it would be good to have an 
established business man to mentor me. (Male 001, October 2016)
Although the YEDF identifies business skills development as one strategy 
to enhance young people’s success in self-employment, few programmes 
have been developed to train youth in proposal or business plan 
development, or provide skills in identifying and running an enterprise. 
Moreover, the education system at the primary and secondary levels 
does not have compulsory studies in business or entrepreneurship. 
Many young people start businesses that only act to exacerbate market 
competition, subsequently reducing the incomes of  other operators. A 
young interviewee put it this way: ‘I started a barber shop, but there were 
so many barber shops, I was not making any profit. I sold the shop to pay 
back the loan, I still owe them money’ (Male 002, November 2016).
Inadequate business and entrepreneurial skills have enormous 
consequences for the youth enterprises as well as the repayment of  any 
loans. In particular, loan repayments are affected when young people 
fail to effectively manage their enterprises and move towards growth 
and profits. This is where mentorship programmes should come in. 
A randomised controlled trial on the effect of  grants, business training 
and mentorship on micro-enterprise development among women in 
Dandora, Kenya showed that mentorship significantly contributed to 
enterprise development (Brooks, Donovan and John 2016). Women 
were able to develop social networks and grow their business as a 
result of  the mentorship that they received from established women 
entrepreneurs. A mentorship programme for young people taking 
YEDF loans might enable youth to learn about business opportunities 
and risks, as well as develop the social networks that are essential for 
running a successful business.
4.4 Social capital and social networks
Social capital refers to the set of  resources and relations within families 
and communities that can facilitate actions for the development of  
individuals (Coleman 1988). According to Coleman, social capital is 
identified by its functions, and how these functions become resources for 
actors to use to achieve their interests and navigate social structures. He 
argues that social capital has a productive or instrumental component 
that results in the attainment of  certain things that would otherwise 
be unachievable. Although Coleman aimed to conceptualise how 
individuals are socialised and their actions ‘governed and shaped by 
social norms and customs’ (ibid.: 95), and the ways that education 
systems enable this form of  socialisation, social capital has emerged as an 
important consideration in youth enterprise development interventions.
Social capital plays a role in enabling young people to successfully 
place an application for YEDF funds, as well as set up an enterprise. 
Young people recognised that they need a social network to help 
secure the required recommendations from local religious institutions 
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or community-level officials. In other cases, social networks help in 
providing the required collateral or directly assist in developing the 
application materials. However, many young people in rural settings 
have social networks that are not conversant with YEDF procedures, or 
not powerful enough to influence the outcomes of  the fund allocation 
process. One young interviewee stated that, ‘sijui mtu yeyote huko wa 
kunizaidia kupata bisna au pesa ya YEDF [I don’t know anyone to help me 
in getting the business, funds or tenders from youth fund]’ (Female 003, 
November 2016).
4.5 Politicisation of youth programmes
Programmes supporting youth enterprise are intertwined with party 
politics. While in principle state engagement is positive, in Kenya 
political parties propose policies on employment as a means to gain 
legitimacy and support from young people. As such, youth perceive 
the YEDF as a political project, a strategy to buy loyalty to a particular 
political party or regime – ‘hii pesa ni ya politicians [this is money for 
politicians]’ (Male 002, October 2016):
I have always been here mataani [in the community], nobody tells us about the 
fund. We only hear it during campaign times. In fact, I will not apply because 
we didn’t vote for the regime. How can it give us funds for empowerment? 
(Male 001, October 2016)
The links between youth funds, political parties and government reduces 
the sustainability of  state-funded youth initiatives. Creating a less 
political policy, and legislative documents to guide the implementation 
of  national youth policies, is essential to ensuring both effective 
accountability and sustainability.
4.6 The potential of youth enterprise in Kenya
Although much displeasure has been expressed by youth in 
relation to the YEDF, there is clearly potential to develop successful 
young entrepreneurs. This is not to mean that states should see 
entrepreneurship programmes as the ultimate solution to youth under- 
and unemployment, but initiatives that enable self-employment of  
young people and financial independence can support youth livelihoods. 
For example, one youth stated:
I started a poultry farm through a loan that I received from YEDF. I now have 
tenders to supply eggs and chicken to schools and restaurants in town. It was 
tough to start but now I am liking the business. It is better than working for 
someone else. (Male 005, October 2016)
Other evaluations of  youth and entrepreneurship in Kenya show that 
secondary school graduates prefer working for themselves to working 
for others (Nikoi et al. 2016). A five-year longitudinal study on youth 
livelihoods indicated that youth who have received entrepreneurial 
and life-skills training had self-confidence and the ability to start 
an enterprise while also working for others (ibid.). This desire for 
self-employment among young people can be strengthened through 
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providing an enabling policy framework that not only identifies young 
entrepreneurs but provides both the funds and the support services 
to enable them to thrive. While in principle this is exactly what the 
YEDF seeks to do, in practice its effectiveness has been blunted by poor 
implementation, mismanagement and corruption.
5 Conclusion
The YEDF was established in Kenya to respond to the problem of  
access to credit, particularly the need for collateral and the inflexible 
payment procedures that affected young entrepreneurs. The youth 
fund was also viewed as part of  a strategic national policy agenda to 
introduce young people into the labour market, and thereby address 
high under- and unemployment. However, the fund also suggests a shift 
in state policy, where the state moves from being the primary employer, 
to a facilitator or enabler of  employment opportunities for youth. This 
shift, though promising, is also problematic because it puts the central 
responsibilities of  youth employment and livelihoods on the shoulders 
of  the youth themselves. In other words, the state is not to blame for 
rampant unemployment – rather, the finger can be pointed at the 
limitations of  individual youth capabilities, aspirations and efforts.
Analysis of  issues surrounding the YEDF revealed that the 
implementation framework is too narrow and there is a lack of  support 
structures. In addition, YEDF suffers from unclear eligibility criteria, 
mismanagement of  funds and corruption. Further analysis indicates 
that many young people lack the social networks, entrepreneurial skills, 
and a supportive business environment, which would allow them to 
benefit from credit. The weak support structures around the YEDF not 
only contribute to the exclusion of  many young people, but also reduce 
the success of  the loans that are made. Overall, young people appear to 
have gained little from what is supposed to be a flagship programme.
What can be learned from this experience? Assuming the problems of  
mismanagement and corruption can be addressed, and youth policy 
can be depoliticised, the YEDF experience suggests three lessons for 
policymakers. First, development of  entrepreneurial and business skills 
and provision of  mentorship are paramount to the long-term success of  
these kinds of  programmes. In other words, young people require more 
than access to credit through state-supported funds. If  entrepreneurship 
primarily entails the application of  skills, knowledge, creativity and 
innovation, as well as taking strategic risks with the aim of  catapulting 
success of  an enterprise business risk, then youth can only make effective 
use of  YEDF funds when equipped with the relevant skills. As such, 
programmes designed to promote self-employment through business 
development must prioritise training and social network support, as 
well as create an enabling business environment for start-up businesses 
to flourish. Second, young people are key stakeholders who must be 
continually engaged in the implementation of  state-level initiatives. 
In particular, state initiatives must pay attention to the pluralities and 
unique challenges that various categories of  young people experience, 
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to avoid more homogenous national programmes that fail to address 
the needs of  the population they seek to assist. Youth in rural areas and 
urban slums need specific policy initiatives that support their efforts at 
livelihood building. Third, and perhaps most importantly, governments 
and non-state actors must move towards a comprehensive, coordinated 
approach to youth employment and livelihoods that incorporates 
education and training, industrial partnerships and vocational 
training. This kind of  approach will help counter the limitations of  
self-employment and entrepreneurship programmes like the YEDF.
Note
1 Dandora is one of  the urban settlements in Nairobi. It faces 
significant challenges with its housing, water and sewerage system. 
It also has major environmental problems as the primary dump 
site for Nairobi County. Dandora has been cited as one of  the 
regions with high crime rates and drug abuse among youth, the 
majority of  whom attained minimal education. The main sources of  
livelihood for young people in Dandora are self-employment through 
entrepreneurship initiatives (Huchzermeyer 2008).
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Promoting Youth Entrepreneurship: 
The Role of Mentoring*
Ayodele Ibrahim Shittu
Abstract The risks and rewards associated with mentoring young 
people for entrepreneurship are attracting growing attention among 
policymakers, development organisations and scholars. This article 
examines entrepreneurship mentoring relationships from the perspective 
of young people. Based on the model of youth mentoring, it explores how 
entrepreneurship mentoring can influence the entrepreneurial intentions 
of young people. Findings from the review of the literature show that 
mentoring relationships are beneficial whether they are formal or informal. 
The implications of mentoring relationships for the promotion of youth 
entrepreneurship are discussed.
Keywords: youth, unemployment, employment, Africa, entrepreneurship, 
group monitoring.
1 Introduction
Despite the dominant discourse that highlights the many inherent benefits 
associated with youth entrepreneurship (Chigunta et al. 2005; Brixiová, 
Ncube and Bicaba 2014), there can be issues and challenges which 
discourage young people from embracing entrepreneurship. For example, 
the short durations of  youth empowerment initiatives, undue emphasis 
on supply-side training, insufficient or non-existent financial support, the 
tenuous linkage to viable market opportunities, and the strong focus on 
bringing together young people as a group rather than as stand-alone 
entrepreneurs can all be problematic (ILO 2012; Flynn et al. 2017). Yet, 
economic uncertainties, and the limited supply in formal paid jobs and 
other career opportunities, push young people into self-employment, 
what some have called ‘entrepreneurship by necessity’. However, they are 
neither prepared nor equipped with the requisite skills and knowledge 
needed to establish and manage a business successfully.
In terms of  benefits, Chigunta et al. (2005) argue that youth 
entrepreneurship promotes employment opportunities, fosters innovation 
and resilience among young people, and increases their social and 
cultural identity. The suggestion is that these empower young people 
to contribute positively to their own development and the economic 
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development of  their local communities (Gilmore 2009). Through 
employment creation, entrepreneurship can bring marginalised 
youths into the mainstream of  economic activities. While evidence 
abounds that many young people, especially in developing countries, 
are pushed into entrepreneurship due to lack of  or limited options for 
formal employment (Schoof  2006; Amin 2010), their motivations for 
establishing micro-enterprises also shift over time (Williams and Williams 
2014). Indirectly, it ameliorates the socio-psychological position of  jobless 
youths at large. The growth in the sense of  community acceptance and 
appreciation among these young people, therefore, shapes their cultural 
and social identity, irrespective of  their background.
Despite these benefits, there are constraints that impede young people 
from starting businesses. A few of  the common barriers include access to 
information, access to credit, acquisition of  relevant skills, access to market, 
and relevant institutional supports. While these barriers are common in 
both developed and developing countries, the perception of  the severity 
of  each barrier varies among the young people (Chigunta 2002; Gilmore 
2009). When they persist unabated, these barriers pose serious threats 
to the promotion of  youth entrepreneurship. The International Labour 
Office (ILO 2012) identified five measures for promoting effective youth 
entrepreneurship: (1) target specific barriers confronting the youth; (2) offer 
a broad range of  services including mentoring; (3) embed entrepreneurship 
curricula in both secondary and tertiary education; (4) establish a 
favourable regulatory environment for promoting business expansion; and 
(5) undertake impact assessments for continuous improvement.
Three specific barriers that have received attention in the literature are: 
fear of  failure; disengagement with entrepreneurship; and diminishing 
levels of  awareness. Fear of  failure is a personality trait that results in 
the avoidance of  the possibility of  failure irrespective of  the prevailing 
circumstances. In relation to entrepreneurship, this has two broad 
dimensions (Singh, Corner and Pavlovich 2007). The first is the problem-
focused dimension, which emphasises distress due to unemployment 
and financial pressures. This is associated with the strong dislike of  
shame, embarrassment, and loss of  one’s self-worth. The second is the 
emotion-focused dimension, which emphasises emotional reactions such 
as guilt, depression, anger and frustration. These set in when potential 
entrepreneurs pay too much attention to what their immediate family 
members, relatives, and other members of  society think about their 
performance. In addition, the feeling of  having limited entrepreneurial 
experience and skills, poor ability to plan and implement priorities, and 
low self-esteem can trigger avoidance behaviour among young people. 
When it persists, it becomes a potential barrier to youth entrepreneurship.
Young people can disengage themselves from entrepreneurship depending 
on the extent to which they perceive the barriers confronting them. 
Specifically, limited access to capital, loss of  cultural identity, and weak 
institutional support capabilities can influence young entrepreneurs’ 
decision to abandon their start-up efforts. This is also known as uninformed 
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entrepreneurial exit. Conversely, young entrepreneurs can exit the start-up 
process based on informed decision-making – for example, that the 
existing business is unlikely to succeed. This is also known as the intelligent 
exit. Whether the disengagement is voluntary or not, the importance of  
feasibility analysis as a learning tool cannot be overemphasised (Yusuf  2012).
Even though there are young people who have decided not to be 
entrepreneurs in a business sense (Chigunta et al. 2005), it is not enough 
to diminish the importance of  entrepreneurial awareness in the pursuit 
of  youth entrepreneurship. There are three channels to promoting 
entrepreneurial awareness: (1) improving entrepreneurial mindsets; 
(2) creating a sustainable climate for inspiring people to embrace 
entrepreneurship; and (3) raising motivation, and capacities to identify 
and take advantage of  economic and social opportunities. Despite 
these, the paucity of  information and limited access to professional 
networks or mentoring programmes increase the difficulty young people 
have in identifying, starting, growing and sustaining an enterprise. 
Consequently, the level of  entrepreneurial awareness is not only low, 
but also the link between the realities and mentorship programmes is 
characterised by ambiguity.
Against this backdrop, this article focuses on the role of  mentoring in 
the promotion of  youth entrepreneurship, and specifically responds to 
the growing call for systematic inquiry into the relationships between 
entrepreneurship and mentoring from the point of  view of  young 
people (Bisk 2002; O’Neil 2005; Cull 2006; Tonidandel, Avery and 
Phillips 2007; St-Jean and Audet 2013).
2 Mentoring
Nigeria provides a useful context for an exploration of  entrepreneurship 
and mentoring. The entrepreneurial attitude of  young Nigerians is 
generally considered to be high (GEM 2013) and many observers assume 
that they are naturally ready to embark on an entrepreneurial journey. 
In fact, the GEM report, Supporting Africa’s Young Entrepreneurs (2015), states 
that 82 per cent of  young Nigerians, irrespective of  gender, are ‘potential 
entrepreneurs’. Yet their entrepreneurial activities are heavily oriented 
towards trading: 50 per cent prefer to invest in wholesale and retail 
activities; 24 per cent in consumer services and hospitality; and less than 
7 per cent invest in the agro-industry. Further, more than 23 per cent 
struggle to develop a viable business (Amorós and Bosma 2013). This 
situation has led some to call for greater attention to entrepreneurship 
mentoring (Herrington and Kelle 2012; Schøtt, Kew and Cheraghi 
2015). Mentoring is generally considered to be useful when starting a 
new business venture (Waters et al. 2002; Smith and Perks 2006).
In the last four years, there has been a surge in the development of  
formal entrepreneurship mentoring programmes. These programmes 
are meant to provide young entrepreneurs with access to sponsorship, 
exposure, visibility, coaching, protection, and challenging assignments 
that are designed to enhance skills and improve the entrepreneurial 
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mindset. Generally, such programmes are based on the premise that 
mentoring is a purpose-driven channel for transferring entrepreneurial 
knowledge, skills and ability to young entrepreneurs (Taylor and Bressler 
2000; Rhodes 2002; Rhodes et al. 2006; Wilbanks 2013), and to develop 
their entrepreneurial identity.
Nigerian commercial organisations have put forward a number of  
justifications for investing in entrepreneurship mentoring. The Bank 
of  Industry, for example, suggested that mentoring is necessary to 
improve the quality of  life of  aspiring young nascent entrepreneurs 
(Punch Newspaper 2016), while the Central Bank of  Nigeria (CBN) 
stated that mentoring can strategically help the nation to harness its 
youthful resources for its economic development agenda (Onuba 2016). 
The Lagos Chamber of  Commerce and Industry (LCCI) argued that 
mentoring is a means of  investing in the future of  Nigerian youths 
(Okon 2016) and the SABMiller Foundation claimed that through 
mentoring, the bright business ideas inherent in the teeming youths of  
south-east Nigeria can be turned into reality (Ogunfuwa 2016). There 
is clearly a belief  that entrepreneurship mentoring can help nascent 
entrepreneurs develop into successful business operators.
The academic literature around mentoring is significant. Crisp and 
Cruz (2009) review this literature between 1990 and 2007 and conclude 
that neither mentoring nor a mentoring relationship has an operational 
definition. Tonidandel et al. (2007) discuss how to maximise returns on 
mentoring. O’Neil (2005) acknowledges that a mentoring relationship is, 
indeed, a complex set of  helping behaviours and suggests the need for 
a distinction between the effects of  formal versus informal mentoring. 
Fagenson-Eland, Marks and Amendola (1997) suggest that more 
research on mentor–mentee relationships is needed, particularly around 
structural factors.
In relation to mentoring within the entrepreneurship domain, St-Jean 
and Audet (2009) explore mentees’ satisfaction with a mentoring 
programme for entrepreneurs in Quebec, Canada. Gimmon (2014) uses 
the case study approach to investigate mentoring and its influence on 
entrepreneurship within higher education. Turker and Sonmez Selcuk 
(2008) wonder why entrepreneurship mentoring is hard to find in Turkish 
universities. These studies focus more on formal entrepreneurship 
mentoring relationships with little or no attention accorded to informal 
relationships. Existing studies are yet to explore entrepreneurship 
mentoring relationships from the perspectives of  recent university 
graduates. Schøtt et al. (2015) assert that skill development and/or 
market access is unlikely to produce a significant increase in youth 
entrepreneurial activity without a concomitant investment in mentoring.
3 Conceptual framework
Mentoring is one of  a variety of  interventions for promoting 
positive development of  young people (Rhodes 2002; Grossman and 
Rhodes 2002). Despite its increasing popularity, the extant literature 
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suggests that there is much ambiguity around the concept (Noe 1988; 
Crisp and Cruz 2009). Scholars approach mentoring from a number of  
organisational, educational and developmental perspectives.
Building on the work of  Grossman and Rhodes (2002), Rhodes and 
DuBois (2008) provide a useful model of  youth mentoring (see Figure 1). 
This model is particularly relevant because it spells out in clear terms 
the processes and conditions necessary for understanding the effects 
of  a mentoring relationship on young people. Specifically, it posits 
that entrepreneurship mentoring can influence the entrepreneurial 
intentions of  young people through three processes: socio-emotional 
development, cognitive development and identity development (see also 
Rhodes et al. 2006).
The ultimate goal of  socio-emotional development is improved ability to 
relate to others. Following Erikson’s (1950) eight stages of  development 
and Etzioni’s (1988) decision-making model, the socio-emotional 
capability of  both the mentor and the mentee can be developed 
through shared value commitment and emotional involvement within 
a social space. This implies that a mentoring relationship that is rich in 
companionship, genuine care and proximal relationships can increase 
the chances of  learning how to communicate, act, react, interact, and 
to interpret others’ feelings. Thus, when the mentee learns how to get 
along with others, it increases his or her chances of  making informed 
business-related decisions. Consequently, the exposure of  the mentee 
to genuine care and companionship through a mentoring relationship 
should have a significant impact on his or her intention to be an 
entrepreneur, and indeed on subsequent outcomes.
Bandura (1993: 144) posits that individuals with a high sense of  efficacy 
see difficult tasks as challenges to be mastered, and attribute failure to 
Figure 1 Model of youth mentoring
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insufficient effort, knowledge, and skills that are acquirable. This implies 
a positive correlation between perceived self-efficacy and cognitive 
development. Albert and Luzzo (1999) add that outcome expectations 
and goals can also make any given career option seem unattainable. So, 
when a mentoring relationship focuses on building both cognitive and 
affective capacities, it empowers the mentee with new skills and new 
approaches to effective problem-solving and decision-making (Rhodes 
et al. 2006). Consequently, higher cognitive development should have a 
positive impact on the intention of  a mentee to be an entrepreneur.
Identity development helps to shift young people’s order of  consciousness 
(Komives et al. 2006), leading to a generational shift in aspirations 
towards a ‘dream career’ (Fernández-Kelly and Konczal 2005). With 
respect to entrepreneurship, development of  an entrepreneurial identity 
is viewed as a dynamic process of  self-identification (Jones, Latham 
and Betta 2007), self-definition (Vesala, Peura and McElwee 2007), 
or self-picturing (DeFillippi and Arthur 1994) that is associated with 
either the category of  entrepreneurship or the role of  entrepreneurs. 
The determinants of  entrepreneurial identity include know-how 
competencies (ibid.), self-awareness (Komives et al. 2006), experience 
(Donnellon, Ollila and Middleton 2014), and social bonds and networks 
Table 1 Differences between formal and informal mentoring relationships
Type of mentoring relationship
Property Formal Informal
Formation • Put together deliberately by the organisation
• Requires intention to demonstrate interests by 
means of application
• Formal mentors are formally invited to perform the 
mentoring functions
• Develops on the basis of mutual identifications, 
perceived competence, and interpersonal comfort
Intensity • Weak emotional attachment
• Generally professionally managed
• Very strong emotional attachment
• Natural and intrinsic commitment
Visibility • Visible to the organisation
• As such, they cautiously interact with the mentees
• Generally less visible
• Relationship with mentees driven by impunity
• Strong tendency to ‘stretch’ mentees to achieve more 
Focus • The organisation designs the focus of the 
relationship
• Socialises mentees into a given culture
• Lowers attrition
• Project coordinator drafts the goals and objectives
• Generally focuses on the career and psychosocial 
development of the mentee
• Goals of this mentoring type evolves with time
• Goals built around the long-term career needs of 
the mentee
Durability • Generally time-bound
• Often lasts 6–12 months 
• Generally lacks time frame
• Often last 3–6 years
Source Compiled by the author.
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(McKeever, Jack and Anderson 2015). On the one hand, a mentoring 
relationship impacts entrepreneurial identity (Rhodes and DuBois 2008); 
while on the other hand, entrepreneurial identity has a strong influence 
on the outcome of  nascent entrepreneurship (Jones et al. 2007).
The relationships displayed in Figure 1 are indications that the path of  
influence between mentoring relationships and positive entrepreneurial 
outcomes may not necessarily be linear. For instance, the Rhodes 
and DuBois (2008) model of  youth mentoring acknowledges that for 
mentoring relationships to have a significant effect on socio-emotional, 
cognitive and identity development, both the mentor and the mentee 
must share a strong sense of  mutual trust and empathy. In addition, 
the model emphasises that when the odds of  interaction between 
socio-emotional and cognitive development, as well as cognitive 
and identity development are high, the chances that the mentoring 
relationship will positively influence the expected outcome is also high.
Mentoring relationships have been broadly categorised into two 
types: formal and informal. While the former are often initiated by 
an organisation or programme, the latter arise through a variety of  
circumstances. Formal and informal mentoring relationships can be 
differentiated in relation to five properties: formation, intensity, visibility, 
focus and durability (Table 1).
Mentoring relationships within organisations can also reflect an element 
of  formal supervision. Three specific forms of  supervisory mentoring 
relationship are acknowledged in the literature: the traditional 
relationship with the mentor multiple levels away from the mentee; peer 
mentoring with the mentor occupying a similar level to the mentee; 
and step-ahead mentoring with the mentor one level ahead of  the 
mentee (Tonidandel et al. 2007: 106). On the other hand, informal, 
non-supervisory mentoring relationships are often based on a personal 
relationship or commitment between the mentor and the mentee.
4 Evidence from the literature
This section reviews literature relating to different aspects of  mentoring, 
with the objective of  identifying insights relevant to the use of  
mentoring in youth entrepreneurship programmes.
4.1 Mentoring process
A mentoring process defines the various stages in the development 
of  a mentoring relationship. Kram (1988) showed that a mentoring 
process is systematic, differentiated and complex. Its systematic nature 
is attributed to the developmental needs surrounding the evolution of  
a mentoring relationship. As seen previously, according to Rhodes and 
DuBois (2008), developmental needs include socio-emotional, cognitive 
and identity development, and these require different levels of  structure, 
direction and support. As such, the differences in the ability of  mentors 
to manage the inherent challenges associated with the developmental 
needs of  mentees are critical. The mentoring process is also believed to 
be complex because the channel of  leading mentees through levels of  
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dependency to autonomy and self-reliance is non-linear (Rhodes and 
DuBois 2008). Besides, understanding of  the relational processes that 
underpin the mentor–mentee bond is relatively limited (Spencer 2006).
4.2 Mentoring functions and roles
Evidences from classical studies show that mentors perform a number 
of  functions within a mentoring relationship. According to Schockett 
and Haring-Hidore (1985), mentors perform eight different functions 
in a mentoring relationship: as role model, motivator, counsellor, 
friend/colleague, educator, consultant, sponsor and protector. They 
also function as transitional figures. In their discussion of  how adult 
relationships with peers offer opportunities for personal and professional 
growth in a work setting, Kram and Isabella (1985) highlight nine 
mentoring functions: sponsorship, coaching, exposure and visibility, 
protection, challenging work assignments, acceptance and confirmation, 
counselling, role modelling and friendship. They suggest that these 
functions can be categorised as either career-related or psychosocial. 
An empirical study of  Noe (1988) lends support to the proposition 
that mentoring supports these two groups of  functions. On the other 
hand, Jacobi (1991) proposes 15 mentoring functions that are broadly 
divided into three dimensions: emotional and psychological, career and 
professional, and role modelling. Scandura (1992) proposes three slightly 
different groupings of  mentoring functions: vocational, role modelling, 
and social support functions.
Crisp and Cruz (2009) critically review and synthesise emerging empirical 
literature on mentoring with the broad objective of  reframing and 
updating Jacobi’s (1991) characteristics of  mentoring. They show that 
for college students, the provision of  support, role modelling, friendship, 
empowerment and career advice top the list of  mentoring functions.
4.3 The mentoring relationship
Empirical evidence comparing the effect of  formal versus informal 
mentoring relationships on mentoring outcomes is relatively scarce. 
Chao, Walz and Gardner (1992) conducted a field study with a view to 
comparing three measures of  outcome (i.e. organisational socialisation, 
job satisfaction and salary) between individuals with and without 
a mentoring relationship. Their findings suggest that mentees in 
informal mentoring relationships enjoy more favourable outcomes than 
non-mentored individuals. Outcomes for mentees in formal mentoring 
relationships are not significantly different from: (1) mentees in informal 
mentoring relationships, and (2) individuals without mentors.
A comparative study of  Ragins and Cotton (1999) shows that mentees 
who are in informal mentoring relationships are more satisfied than 
those in formal relationships. They are also more effective and earn 
more than those in formal mentoring relationships. Compared to 
non-mentored individuals, those in informal mentoring relationships 
also benefit more in career outcomes because they are more responsive 
to a mentor’s career development capabilities. The duration of  
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relationship between the mentor and the mentee also accounts for the 
accrued benefits from informal mentoring relationships. Consequently, 
mentees in informal mentoring relationships enjoy improved 
commitment, motivation, trust, and communication with their mentors. 
In spite of  these findings, the authors warn that formal mentoring 
relationships have inherent values that cannot be overemphasised.
Evidence suggests that individuals who engage in mentoring relationships, 
whether formal or informal, benefit one way or the other (Chao et al. 
1992; Ragins and Cotton 1999). But formal and informal mentoring 
relationships are not equally beneficial: empirical evidence shows that the 
odds of  a significant effect are higher for informal mentoring relationships 
than formal mentoring relationships. For instance, the findings of  Noe 
(1988), Ragins and Cotton (1999), Scandura and Williams (2001) and 
Allen, Day and Lentz (2005) support the argument that organisations that 
expect mentees to have the same benefits from both formal and informal 
mentoring relationships will be disappointed.
5 Implications for the promotion of youth entrepreneurship
The results of  this review suggest that mentoring can influence 
entrepreneurial intentions among young people. However, the literature 
that specifically addresses mentoring of  young people in developing 
countries is limited, and does not provide a very clear picture of  what 
kind of  mentoring works, and for whom. This lack of  clarity is a major 
constraint to policy and programmes promoting youth entrepreneurship.
Over 15 years ago, Chigunta et al. (2005: 15) noted that ‘even though 
the benefits of  youth entrepreneurship are visible to all, there is little 
empirical data to show how the perceived benefits are realized in reality 
in Africa’. In the intervening period, the situation has not changed 
significantly, and the need for rigorous research into entrepreneurship 
mentoring among young people is even greater now.
One objection to investment in mentoring as a development intervention 
arises because of  the potential expense of  scaling up what are most 
often conceived of  as intensive one-to-one relationships. It is one thing 
to identify and organise mentors for tens or even hundreds of  young 
people, and quite another to try to address Africa’s youth employment 
challenge in this way.
Future research around young people and mentorship might focus on 
competing motivations for starting a business venture, and the relationship 
between mentorship and ‘temporally fluid motivations’ (Williams and 
Williams 2014). The gender dimensions of  entrepreneurship mentoring 
in Africa also deserve attention. Future research might also explore 
the social and economic benefits and costs of  mentoring initiatives for 
young people with different levels of  education, and in rural and urban 
settings. Besides exploring the situations in which group mentoring can 
be successful, it is now imperative to situate the challenges of  youth 
entrepreneurship training and mentoring within different African contexts.
150 | Shittu Promoting Youth Entrepreneurship: The Role of Mentoring
Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’
Note
* The author wishes to acknowledge that the research was funded in 
partnership with The MasterCard Foundation. He is also grateful to 
the anonymous reviewers for their stimulating comments.
References
Albert, K.A. and Luzzo, D.A. (1999) ‘The Role of  Perceived Barriers 
in Career Development: A Social Cognitive Perspective’, Journal of  
Counselling and Development 77.4: 431–36
Allen, T.D.; Day, R. and Lentz, E. (2005) ‘The Role of  Interpersonal 
Comfort in Mentoring Relationships’, Journal of  Career Development 
31.3: 155–69
Amin, M. (2010) Necessity vs Opportunity: Entrepreneurs in the Informal Sector, 
Enterprise Note Series 17, Washington DC: World Bank
Amorós, J.E. and Bosma, N. (2013) Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2013 
Global Report on Fifteen Years of  Assessing Entrepreneurship Across the Globe, 
London: Global Entrepreneurship Research Association (GERA)
Bandura, A. (1993) ‘Perceived Self-Efficacy in Cognitive Development 
and Functioning’, Educational Psychology 28.2: 117–48
Bisk, L. (2002) ‘Formal Entrepreneurial Mentoring: The Efficacy of  
Third Party Managed Programs’, Career Development International 7.5: 
262–70
Brixiová, Z.; Ncube, M. and Bicaba, Z. (2014) Skills and Youth 
Entrepreneurship in Africa: Analysis with Evidence from Swaziland, WIDER 
Working Paper 2014/131, Helsinki: World Institute for Development 
Economic Research
Chao, G.T.; Walz, P.M. and Gardner, P.D. (1992) ‘Formal and Informal 
Mentorships: A Comparison on Mentoring Functions and Contrast 
with Nonmentored Counterparts’, Personnel Psychology 45.3: 619–36
Chigunta, F.J. (2002) Youth Entrepreneurship: Meeting the Key Policy Challenges, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chigunta, F.; Schnurr, J.; James-Wilson, D. and Torres, V. (2005) 
Being ‘Real’ About Youth Entrepreneurship in Eastern and Southern Africa: 
Implications for Adults, Institutions, and Sector Structures, SEED Working 
Paper 72, Geneva: International Labour Office
Crisp, G. and Cruz, I. (2009) ‘Mentoring College Students: A Critical 
Review of  the Literature Between 1990 and 2007’, Research in Higher 
Education 50.6: 525–45
Cull, J. (2006) ‘Mentoring Young Entrepreneurs: What Leads to Success?’, 
International Journal of  Evidence Based Coaching and Mentoring 4.2: 8–18
DeFillippi, R.J. and Arthur, M.B. (1994) ‘The Boundaryless Career: 
A Competency‐Based Perspective’, Journal of  Organizational Behavior 
15.4: 307–24
Donnellon, A.; Ollila, S. and Middleton, K.W. (2014) ‘Constructing 
Entrepreneurial Identity in Entrepreneurship Education’, International 
Journal of  Management Education 12:3: 490–9
Erikson, E. (1950) Childhood and Society, New York NY: Norton
Etzioni, A. (1988) ‘Normative-Affective Factors: Towards a New 
Decision-Making Model’, Journal of  Economic Psychology 9: 125–50
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 141–154 | 151
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Fagenson-Eland, E.A.; Marks, M.A. and Amendola, K.L. (1997) ‘Perceptions 
of  Mentoring Relationships’, Journal of  Vocational Behaviour 51.1: 29–42
Fernández-Kelly, P. and Konczal, L. (2005) ‘ “Murdering the Alphabet”: 
Identity and Entrepreneurship Among Second-Generation Cubans, 
West Indians, and Central Americans’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 28.6: 
1153–81
Flynn, J.; Mader, P.; Oosterom, M. and Ripoll, S. (2017) Failing Young 
People? Addressing the Supply-Side Bias and Individualisation in Youth 
Employment Programming, IDS Evidence Report 216, Brighton: IDS
GEM (2015) Supporting Africa’s Young Entrepreneurs: An Investment in Job Creation 
and Future Prosperity for All, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Nigeria, 
www.gemconsortium.org/country-profile/93 (accessed 17 March 2017)
GEM (2013) Promoting Entrepreneurs: Insights for Policy, Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor, Nigeria, www.gemconsortium.org/
country-profile/93 (accessed 17 March 2017)
Gilmore, D.R. (2009) ‘Expanding Opportunities for Low-Income Youth: 
Making Space for Youth Entrepreneurship Legal Services’, Journal of  
Affordable Housing and Community Development Law 18.3: 321–34
Gimmon, E. (2014) ‘Mentoring as a Practical Training in Higher 
Education of  Entrepreneurship’, Education + Training 56.8/9: 814–25
Grossman, J.B and Rhodes, J.E. (2002) ‘The Test of  Time: Predictors 
and Effects of  Duration in Youth Mentoring Relationships’, American 
Journal of  Community Psychology 30.2: 199–219
Herrington, M. and Kelle, D. (2012) African Entrepreneurship: Sub-Saharan 
African Regional Report, London: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
ILO (2012) The Youth Employment Crisis: Highlights of  the 2012 ILC Report, 
Geneva: International Labour Office
Jacobi, M. (1991) ‘Mentoring and Undergraduate Academic Success: 
A Literature Review’, Review of  Educational Research 61.4: 505–32
Jones, R.; Latham, J. and Betta, M. (2007) ‘Narrative Construction 
of  the Social Entrepreneurial Identity’, International Journal of  
Entrepreneurial Behavior and Research 14.5: 330–45
Komives, S.R.; Longerbeam, S.D.; Owen, J.E.; Mainella, F.C. and 
Osteen, L. (2006) ‘A Leadership Identity Development Model: 
Applications from a Grounded Theory’, Journal of  College Student 
Development 47.4: 401–18
Kram, K.E. (1988) ‘Mentoring at Work: Developmental Relationships in 
Organizational Life, Lanham MD: University Press of  America
Kram, K.E. and Isabella, L.A. (1985) ‘Mentoring Alternatives: The 
Role of  Peer Relationships in Career Development’, Academy of  
Management Journal 28.1: 110–32
McKeever, E.; Jack, S. and Anderson, A. (2015) ‘Embedded 
Entrepreneurship in the Creative Re-Construction of  Place’, Journal 
of  Business Venturing 30.1: 50–65
Noe, R.A. (1988) ‘An Investigation of  the Determinants of  Successful 
Assigned Mentoring Relationships’, Personnel Psychology 41.3: 457–79
Ogunfuwa, I. (2016) ‘SABMiller Foundation to Train 120 Entrepreneurs’, 
Punch Newspaper, 3 December 2016, http://punchng.com/sabmiller-
foundation-train-120-entrepreneurs/ (accessed 13 December 2016)
152 | Shittu Promoting Youth Entrepreneurship: The Role of Mentoring
Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’
Okon, A. (2016) ‘Prospects of  Job Creation Greater in Private Sector’, 
Punch Newspaper, 21 October, http://punchng.com/prospects-job-
creation-greater-private-sector/ (accessed 16 December 2016)
O’Neil, R.M. (2005) ‘An Examination of  Organizational Predictors of  
Mentoring Functions’, Journal of  Managerial Issues 17.4: 439–60
Onuba, I. (2016) ‘CBN Targets One Million Jobs Through Youth 
Entrepreneurship Programme’, Punch Newspaper, 16 June,  
http://punchng.com/cbn-targets-one-million-jobs-youth-
entrepreneurship-program/ (accessed 16 December 2016)
Punch Newspaper (2016) ‘BoI Boss Tasks Young Entrepreneurs with 
Economic Recovery’, 3 August, http://punchng.com/boi-boss-tasks-
young-entrepreneurs-economic-recovery/ (accessed 13 December 2016)
Ragins, B.R. and Cotton, J.L. (1999) ‘Mentor Functions and Outcomes: 
A Comparison of  Men and Women in Formal and Informal 
Mentoring Relationships’, Journal of  Applied Psychology 84.4: 529–50
Rhodes, J.E. (2002) Stand by Me: The Risks and Rewards of  Mentoring 
Today’s Youth, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
Rhodes, J.E. and DuBois, D.L. (2008) ‘Mentoring Relationships and 
Programs for Youth’, Current Directions in Psychological Science 17.4: 254–8
Rhodes, J.E.; Spencer, R.; Keller, T.E.; Liang, B. and Noam, G. (2006) 
‘A Model for the Influence of  Mentoring Relationships on Youth 
Development’, Journal of  Community Psychology 34.6: 691–707
Scandura, T.A. (1992) ‘Mentorship and Career Mobility: An Empirical 
Investigation’, Journal of  Organizational Behaviour 13.2: 169–74
Scandura, T.A. and Williams, E.A. (2001) ‘An Investigation of  the 
Moderating Effects of  Gender on the Relationships Between 
Mentorship Initiation and Protégé Perceptions of  Mentoring 
Functions’, Journal of  Vocational Behaviour 59.3: 342–63
Schockett, M.R. and Haring-Hidore, M. (1985) ‘Factor Analytic 
Support for Psychosocial and Vocational Mentoring Functions’, 
Psychological Reports 57: 627–30
Schoof, U. (2006) Stimulating Youth Entrepreneurship: Barriers and Incentives to 
Enterprise Start-Ups by Young People, SEED Working Paper 76, Geneva: 
International Labour Office
Schøtt, T.; Kew, P. and Cheraghi, M. (2015) Future Potential: A GEM 
Perspective on Youth Entrepreneur 2015, GEM 2015 Global Report,  
www.gemconsortium.org/report (accessed 3 February 2017)
Singh, S.; Corner, P. and Pavlovich, K. (2007) ‘Coping with 
Entrepreneurial Failure’, Journal of  Management and Organization 13.4: 
331–44
Smith, E.E. and Perks, S. (2006) ‘Training Interventions Needed for 
Developing Black Micro-Entrepreneurial Skills in the Informal 
Sector: A Qualitative Perspective’, SA Journal of  Human Resource 
Management 4.1: 17–26
Spencer, R. (2006) ‘Understanding the Mentoring Process Between 
Adolescents and Adults’, Youth and Society 37.3: 287–315
St-Jean, E. and Audet, J. (2013) ‘The Effect of  Mentor Intervention 
Style in Novice Entrepreneur Mentoring Relationships’, Mentoring and 
Tutoring: Partnership in Learning 21.1: 96–119
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’ 141–154 | 153
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
St-Jean, E. and Audet, J. (2009) ‘Factors Leading to Satisfaction in a 
Mentoring Scheme for Novice Entrepreneurs’, International Journal of  
Evidence Based Coaching and Mentoring 7.1: 148–61
Taylor, A.S. and Bressler, J. (2000) Mentoring Across Generations: Partnership 
for Positive Youth Development, New York NY: Springer Science + 
Business Media
Tonidandel, S.; Avery, D.R. and Phillips, M.G. (2007) ‘Maximizing 
Returns on Mentoring: Factors Affecting Subsequent Mentee 
Performance’, Journal of  Organizational Behaviour 28.1: 89–110
Turker, D. and Sonmez Selcuk, S. (2008) ‘Which Factors Affect 
Entrepreneurial Intention of  University Students?’, Journal of  
European Industrial Training 33.2: 142–59
Vesala, M.K.; Peura, J. and McElwee, G. (2007) ‘The Split 
Entrepreneurial Identity of  the Farmer’, Journal of  Small Business and 
Enterprise Development 14.1: 48–63
Waters, L.; McCabe, M.; Kiellerup, D. and Kiellerup, S. (2002) ‘The 
Role of  Formal Mentoring on Business Success and Self-Esteem in 
Participants of  a New Business Start-Up Program’, Journal of  Business 
and Psychology 17.1: 107–21
Wilbanks, J.E. (2013) ‘Mentoring and Entrepreneurship: Examining 
the Potential for Entrepreneurship Education and for Aspiring New 
Entrepreneurs’, Journal of  Small Business Strategy 23.1: 93–101
Williams, N. and Williams, C.C. (2014) ‘Beyond Necessity Versus 
Opportunity Entrepreneurship: Some Lessons from English 
Deprived Urban Neighbourhoods’, International Entrepreneurship and 
Management Journal 10.1: 23–40
Yusuf, J. (2012) ‘A Tale of  Two Exits: Nascent Entrepreneur Learning 
Activities and Disengagement from Start-Up’, Small Business 
Economics 39.3: 783–99
This page is intentionally left blank
Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’
154 | Shittu Promoting Youth Entrepreneurship: The Role of Mentoring
© 2017 The Author. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2017.133
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 
International licence, which permits downloading and sharing provided the original authors and source are credited – but 
the work is not used for commercial purposes. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’; the 
Introduction is also recommended reading.
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Programme-Induced 
Entrepreneurship and Young 
People’s Aspirations
Jacqueline Halima Mgumia
Abstract This article unpacks the experiences of 52 young men and 
women from relatively poor households who received a grant of US$125 
from a research project to start a business. Only 26 per cent aspired to 
be entrepreneurs while the remainder were either interested in business 
as a side activity or as a stepping stone towards employment. Using the 
concept of programme-induced entrepreneurship, the article explores 
interventions aimed at promoting entrepreneurship in contexts where 
young participants have a diversity of career aspirations, only some of which 
involve entrepreneurship. It argues that for those young people whose 
career aspirations do involve entrepreneurship, these interventions may 
be important gateways, whereas for youth whose aspirations do not, they 
are at best stepping stones and at worst distractions. As such, programme-
induced entrepreneurship can fragment youth aspirations. The article calls 
for a more holistic approach to the promotion of entrepreneurship that 
takes explicit account of youth aspirations and family dynamics.
Keywords: Africa, Tanzania, unemployment, poverty, waithood, 
uncertainty.
1 Introduction
The general framework that informs most research on youth 
entrepreneurship in developing countries posits that the lack of  capital 
(Chigunta and Mkandawire 2002; de Gobbi 2014) and business 
knowledge (Kourilsky, Walstad and Thomas 2007; DeJaeghere and 
Baxter 2014) explains, to a large extent, why innovative business 
ventures are not successful among poor people. As a PhD student 
in 2012, I participated in a microfinance research project known 
as ‘Mechanics of  Microfinance’, which was designed within this 
framework. Specifically, it offered entrepreneurship training to youth 
coming from poor families who were likely to fail their secondary school 
final examinations. Its overall aim was to prepare them for careers as 
entrepreneurs once their academic paths closed. It is important to note 
that in Tanzania the term entrepreneurship (i.e. ujasiriamali in Kiswahili) 
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is generally used to refer to starting and operating a small business; it is 
not used to imply innovation (see Schumpeter 1934). In the remainder 
of  this article, therefore, entrepreneurship and starting, or operating, a 
small business are used synonymously.
It is also important to highlight that the Mechanics of  Microfinance 
research project was rooted in a simple observation made by a 
beneficiary of  Femina, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
working on reproductive health, who stated, ‘It’s all good that we 
get information about reproductive health and HIV/AIDS, but we 
need jobs!’ (Sekei 2011: 6). To address the challenge, in 2011 Femina 
collaborated with the Norwegian School of  Economics (NHH) to design 
a reality TV entrepreneurship competition, with 11 episodes aired over 
three months. The show offered entrepreneurship training by bringing 
six entrepreneurs together to compete around issues of  finance, business 
skills, entrepreneurship knowledge and related attitudes (Sekei 2011). 
To measure the impact of  the show, a randomised controlled trial was 
conducted with a sample of  1,918 students who were about to graduate 
from 43 public secondary schools. A treatment group (drawn from 
22 schools) was provided with information and incentives to watch the 
11 episodes of  the Ruka Juu show, while a control group (drawn from 
21 different schools) was encouraged to watch 11 films that were aired 
at the same time. One of  the immediate outcomes was that 12 per cent 
of  the treatment group and 8 per cent of  the control group expressed 
willingness to pay money to attend future training on entrepreneurship. 
From these individuals, 60 were randomly selected and invited for two 
weekend training sessions on entrepreneurship at the University of  
Dar es Salaam Entrepreneurship Centre (UDEC) in November 2011.
My study was thus designed to test whether the provision of  capital to 
youth who had received entrepreneurship training would enable them 
to start and run small businesses successfully. To measure the impact of  
the training, capital was also provided to youth who did not receive any 
training. The capital injection, however, became an intervention in its 
own right as it incentivised youth to start up in business.
As I engaged with these youth in the initial stages of  starting and 
running their business, I realised that there was a need to revisit the 
‘training + capital’ framework because other factors seemed to be 
critical in determining success. For example, it appeared that family 
dynamics and participant aspirations were important in shaping their 
engagement with the entrepreneurship intervention and emergent 
outcomes. By family dynamics, I mean the give-and-take interactions 
between youth and other members of  their families as the young 
people sought to access money and the family sought to meet basic 
household needs. In poor families, these dynamics can involve difficult 
trade-offs. I use the term ‘youth aspirations’ to refer to what youth were 
anticipating they would be and do in the future. I argue that aspirations 
and family dynamics impacted on the ways that young participants 
used the capital and training that they had received. As they engaged 
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in business, their aspirations and family situations interacted with, and 
played as important a role as the entrepreneurship intervention.
The body of  this article is divided into three main sections. In the 
next section I present the Social Lab as a site and methodology for 
studying what I conceptualise as programme-induced entrepreneurship. 
Following this, I unpack the career aspirations of  the youth participants 
in relation to family dynamics by looking at how they interacted with 
the entrepreneurship intervention. In the final section, I present a 
youth-centred framework for entrepreneurship promotion that puts 
family economic status and youth aspirations at centre stage.
2 Background
I use the notion of  programme-induced entrepreneurship to refer to 
entrepreneurial behaviour that was stimulated by programmes such 
as the ‘training + capital’ intervention that was at the heart of  the 
Mechanics of  Microfinance project. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa 
there are now many programmes funded by government, NGOs and 
others with an explicit objective to induce entrepreneurial behaviour 
among under-resourced, and unemployed youth. The idea that 
entrepreneurial behaviour is or can be induced or stimulated among 
the poor is not new, as indicated by terms such as necessity-induced 
entrepreneurship, recession-induced entrepreneurship, opportunity-
induced entrepreneurship, university-induced entrepreneurship and so 
on. The value of  the concept of  programme-induced entrepreneurship 
is that it brings into focus development interventions that are specifically 
designed to stimulate entrepreneurial behaviour and subjectivity among 
unemployed or disadvantaged young people, regardless of  whether they 
had previously had any interest in entrepreneurship. Again, it is important 
to remember that in this context the key indicator of  entrepreneurial 
behaviour is starting and running a small business in contrast to 
risk-taking or innovation. This means that much of  the literature on 
stimulating entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial behaviour, which puts 
innovation and risk-taking at centre stage, is not particularly relevant.
In the Foucauldian sense of  objectification and subjectification, 
programmes that seek to induce entrepreneurship are governed by 
discourses, i.e. ‘practices that systematically form objects of  which 
they speak’ (Foucault 1972: 49). The process starts with identifying 
the ‘lack of  something’ that is followed by identifying those who lack 
entrepreneurship skills, and culminates in encouraging and empowering 
them to acquire skills and support their entrepreneurial ventures. In 
collaboration with other actors, the Tanzanian government has created 
a framework for promoting entrepreneurship that seeks to produce an 
entrepreneurial subject through training and capital injection. It also 
promotes active research engagement. Although such interventions vary 
across actors and institutions, they all tend to present youth with only 
one possible future career – that of  an entrepreneur. As such, they can 
run roughshod over other youth subjectivities and aspirations.
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For my study, I selected 52 individuals, half  women and half  men, out 
of  the 1,918 youth who participated in a randomised controlled trial to 
be part of  an ethnographic study, using a method I refer to as the Social 
Lab. However, I only selected them from among those who were willing 
to pay for entrepreneurship training. Using a phone survey, I identified 
youth who had limited opportunities to continue with school and had 
shown an interest in starting a business. Individuals were selected to yield 
four equal groups, each having 13 young people: Group 1 had watched 
the entrepreneurship entertainment-education (edutainment) programme 
on TV, i.e. Ruka Juu Training; Group 2 had classroom entrepreneurship 
training, i.e. UDEC Training; Group 3 watched both the TV programme 
and attended the classroom training, i.e. Ruka Juu and UDEC Training; 
and Group 4 received no training. All participants in the study were 
between 18 and 23 years old, and all came from relatively poor families.
The project provided a grant of  US$125 to each of  the 52 youth to 
enable them to start a business in urban Dar es Salaam. I observed 
their businesses from January 2013 to January 2014. Their ventures 
involved selling vegetables, snacks, second-hand clothes, electronics and 
beauty products. Some worked as street vendors, others set up at home 
or by the roadside, while a few managed to rent shops or other business 
premises.
My study used the ethnographic method to observe this economic 
experiment of  how young people utilised a business grant. To do 
this, I set up a Social Lab, a methodological space that combines 
experiment with ethnography to capture how the participants 
interacted with real-life situations. Since one generally needs a lab to 
conduct an experiment and a field situation to do ethnography, I had 
to come up with a space that had some of  the characteristics of  both. 
Ethnographically, I thus used this Social Lab as a way to study the 
everyday lives of  young people, tracking the money they received as it 
entered their businesses and households, as well as observing how these 
young people engaged with the microfinance project.
3 Aspirations and family dynamics
3.1 Setting the scene
In early January 2013 I was in Dar es Salaam to observe the young 
people starting their businesses. Within a period of  two months, more 
than 40 businesses were up and running. The young people spent 
between 40 and 70 hours a week working. The profit they generated 
ranged from US$1 to US$3 per day, which is in line with expected 
earnings of  small businesses in Tanzania (URT 2012). With these 
businesses, they generated pocket money and some financial support for 
their families. Yet when questioned about their employment status more 
than half  of  the youth responded ‘I am just around’, whereas less than 
a quarter said they were doing business. While some continued to run 
their businesses, others soon left them behind for low wage or salaried 
jobs as they promised a regular income, and still others went on to 
explore opportunities for further education.
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It was then that I became curious about how these young people 
interpreted their engagement with entrepreneurship and, more critically, 
why only a few of  them seemed to identify with entrepreneurship. 
How could it be that most of  these participants in an entrepreneurship 
programme wished to stop being entrepreneurs or reduce 
entrepreneurship to a secondary activity?
3.2 Aspirations
Among the youth who participated in my study, I identified three groups 
in terms of  their career aspirations. The first group, which accounted 
for 26 per cent of  the study participants, were entrepreneurial youth 
for whom doing business was the first and perhaps only career choice. 
Although all the youth in my study came from poor families, relatively, 
the individuals in this first group tended to come from lower income 
families and had fewer other opportunities. They were more likely to 
start and run a business venture despite the challenges this entailed. For 
them, the provision of  a business grant was an additional impetus that 
enabled them to realise their dreams. Hence, they were more likely to 
invest their money carefully to create a stable and profitable business. If  
their businesses failed, they tended to start another. One young woman 
who fitted into this group shared her aspirations:
After five years, I expect to have expanded my business by owning a large food 
store and as part of  my plan I am saving for this. And I will buy another 
fishing vessel in the next five years and within the next ten coming years buy a 
boat with an engine.
In regard to the anticipated obstacles, she said:
The main challenge is that my parents might force me to get into marriage before it 
reaches that time, but in six to seven years to come if  someone will be interested in 
marrying me I will accept as long as we both agreed to it. (FD, Dar, S1, 20121)
In fact, this young woman was married in 2014. However, prior to the 
wedding she agreed with her family and the spouse-to-be that she would 
marry only if  she was able to keep her business, and her future husband 
agreed to hire someone to assist her. She was apparently successful in 
negotiating an arrangement that did not constrain her future business 
aspirations.
For three other participants who fitted into the first group, their 
businesses played a central part in their imagined futures:
In ten years, I expect to have more than Tsh30,000,000 and a manufacturing 
company. My income will be Tsh50,000,000 and my plan is to become a 
famous food producer in the world. (MD, Dar, S1, 2012)
In five years to come I believe I will be owning a business with a capital of  
Tsh7 million and in the next ten years I will be owning various business [sic.] 
that will round to a total of  Tsh40 million in terms of  capital. I have chosen to 
do business in my life. (MD, Dar, S1, 2012)
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In five years’ time, I will be having my own skills of  making children’s clothes 
and I think I will be married and with a child in my own house. In ten years’ 
time, I think my business will have made a good capital and I will be running 
my life smoothly. (FD, Dar, S1, 2012)
While their current operations are on a small scale, they all imagine that 
their businesses and their capital will grow. They see the present as a 
time to gain the skills and experiences that will enable them to scale up 
their business and realise their aspirations.
In the second and largest group, 48 per cent of  the participants 
were youth who thought they had multiple career options, with 
entrepreneurship being only one. They were more likely to come from 
households with parents who were employed. It was a sense of  security 
and of  having options that probably explained their willingness to 
abandon their business when another employment opportunity opened 
up, even if  it paid less money. Stability and security of  employment, 
and the assurance of  regular pay, were particularly important for them 
and the risks inherent in running a business were acceptable only if  they 
already had a job to meet basic needs.
One young woman in this group had a strong interest in being 
employed. In the first two months of  running her business she hired 
someone to look after it while she attended nursing school. After six 
months of  training, she started working as a nursing intern. While she 
earned less than what she would have earned from her business, she 
argued it was the beginning of  her career and she hoped to make more 
money later. At the same time, she did not dismiss the possibility of  
running a business in the future ‘… in ten years if  things do not go well 
on the employment side I will then be a big businesswoman in Dar and 
other regions’ (FD, Dar, S1, 2012).
A young man in this group said: ‘I will be a soldier as that is what 
my parents want me to be… but once I get my salary I will start a 
business’ (MD, Dar, S1, 2012). This illustrates how family can shape 
young people’s futures. His father pointed out to me that business was 
not a reliable form of  employment, so he preferred his son to become 
a soldier like him so he can get government benefits. Reluctantly, the 
youth agreed, believing that it would help him get a permanent job 
and later assist him to start a business. Another young man imagined 
that in the future he would also combine employment and business: 
‘In five years to come I will be a procurement officer and will be paid 
Tsh500,000. In ten years, I see myself  as a manager in a certain office. 
Later I will open a business’ (MD, Dar, S1, 2012).
In the third group, 25 per cent of  the participants were young people 
who were already employed and whose interest was to be employed 
in other jobs after attaining further academic credentials. They 
were continuously searching for opportunities or financial resources 
to continue with education. For them, doing business was only a 
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temporary measure or a stepping stone towards their imagined futures 
as salaried employees. Specifically, it might help meet the cost of  further 
education. Because they prioritised education and employment they 
were not likely to invest sufficient time in their businesses, and likely to 
drop out of  business when other options arose.
Young people in this group were categorical about their priority being 
something other than business:
I will have acquired a diploma in five years to come and in the next ten years to 
come I think I will fight to acquire a degree that will help me in future life. To 
me education is the way through a good life for my family and me. (MD, Dar, 
S1, 2012)
My goal is to go back to school. So, I will do business until I get enough money 
to pay for school fees. I will study up to university. (FD, Dar, S1, 2012)
Well, I might have a diploma in the mentioned years to come. My plan is to 
apply for a position in the army and during my service time I can apply for 
studies as other students. (MD, Dar, S1, 2012)
All three of  these young people left their businesses after a couple of  
months and went to school. Today, one of  them is in her second year in 
law college. Another abandoned his business a couple of  times to pursue 
educational opportunities that did not materialise, and the business 
eventually died. The third was finally admitted to the army after three 
years of  applying.
The fact that 73 per cent of  the participants were only interested in 
business as a side activity or as a stepping stone towards employment 
raises serious questions about the appropriateness of  interventions that 
aim to induce entrepreneurial behaviour. In relation to young people in 
groups 2 and 3, are such interventions misdirected?
As indicated in Table 1, young women were more likely to be in groups 
1 and 2, while young men dominated Group 3. Out of  52 youth, only 
14 aspired to be entrepreneurs, nine of  whom were young women. 
However, the imagination of  entrepreneurship among these nine was 
largely confined to small-scale business in the informal sector: only three 
aspired to build a medium-scale, formal business. All the five young 
Table 1 Gendered aspirations of potential young entrepreneurs
Group Young women Young men
1 Aspire to be entrepreneurs 9 5
2 Aspire to be employed 14 11
3 Aspire to first continue with school 3 10
Total 26 26
Source Author’s own.
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men who aspired to be entrepreneurs were thinking of  medium-scale 
businesses. As for the 25 youth who aspired to be in formal employment 
while running a business on the side, 14 were women and 11 were men. 
It is striking that of  the 13 youth who aspired to continue with school 
and later be employed, only three were women. These differences 
underscore well-established gender patterns in relation to education and 
employment opportunities open to young women in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bertrand and Crepon 2014).
Marriage also figured in the imagined futures of  the participants and in 
this case, it was the young women who were more likely to think of  getting 
married and having children within three years, while young men were 
thinking on a timescale of  five to ten years. Over the 12 months of  my 
study, four young women gave birth, four others became pregnant, and five 
got married (making a total of  13 out of  26 young women – 50 per cent). 
All of  these moves had negative impacts on their business. For those who 
were doing well, their business declined and for those who were struggling, 
their business failed. With their new roles of  wife and/or mother, these 
young women had to dedicate most of  their time to domestic duties and 
they consequently had very little time for their businesses.
For young men, marriage aspirations were generally linked to their 
anticipated business success. During the fieldwork, two young men got 
married, two got engaged and two others were planning to have children 
with their girlfriends. Those who got married or engaged were among 
those whose businesses were doing really well. However, their new roles 
as husband or/and father also had negative impacts on their businesses. 
One business failed because the young man used most of  his resources to 
care for his sick wife. Marriage slowed down the growth of  another young 
man’s business because he spent time caring for his wife when she got 
pregnant. Instead of  investing money in his business as he normally did, 
this young man was supporting his expanding household. For the young 
men who were engaged, their businesses also experienced difficulties 
as they had to save money to finish paying bride price and prepare for 
marriage. After weighing the financial demands associated with marriage, 
one of  them decided to postpone it until his business stabilised.
3.3 Family dynamics
The youth who participated in my study were still dependent – they 
lived with parents or guardians and depended on them for support 
(URT 1996; Mlama 1999). The parents and guardians worked in the 
informal sector, were employed in private firms, owned small businesses 
or were unemployed. According to the URT’s (2000) Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PSRP), people who work in the informal sector in urban 
areas tend to be poor. During the initial stages of  my study, most of  the 
youth said their families had limited resources to support their further 
education. So, what does this mean for a microfinance project that 
interfaced with these families by providing young adults with business 
start-up capital? And what factors influence the ways in which those 
youth used the money provided?
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Although it was expected, in line with the Foucauldian notion of  object 
and subject formation, that a person who attained business knowledge 
would apply it in practice, I found that this was not necessarily the 
case. During the early fieldwork, I observed that the youth who were 
participating in the study made no clear demarcation between business 
and private transactions. Some used money from the business grant to 
pay for school fees or health bills, and others used it to cater for basic 
needs such as transportation, communication and food for themselves 
and their families. Operating in the context of  scarcity and extended 
families, youth were faced with the difficult choice between investment 
and spending. I thus argue that, when resources are scarce, capital and 
business knowledge are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
success of  new small business ventures.
Initially, I thought youth had limited knowledge of  business principles. 
To establish the level of  their understanding, I conducted a baseline 
survey. The survey revealed that, of  the 52 participants, 22 had a solid 
theoretical grasp of  business principles as they scored between 90 and 
100 per cent; 8 scored between 70 and 80 per cent; 11 scored between 
50 and 60 per cent and the remaining 11 scored between 40 and 30 per 
cent. However, on the question of  the challenges of  separating business 
transactions from personal transactions, only ten said it was easy. The 
difficulty was not based on a lack of  business knowledge but, rather, on 
the financial constraints of  their families that meant that they had to use 
their business money to meet personal and family needs.
3.3.1 Meeting family needs through business
Most of  the youth in the study were living in under-resourced 
households, which made their businesses a potential source of  family 
income. For instance, when one received a business grant, her mother 
was struggling to pay school fees for a younger son who had just started 
Form 1. With no income herself, his mother relied heavily on her late 
husband’s siblings to raise the funds. The youth and his older brother 
had to survive on the one meal a day that their mother could afford. 
During my preliminary field visit in December 2012, she seemed to be 
relieved by the fact that the programme would provide her son with 
money to start a business. ‘I am so grateful,’ she said, ‘that you have 
decided to assist this young man for I was totally stuck… At least now 
he will be able to sustain himself  and help me here and there.’ Even 
before he had started his business, the young man was aware of  the 
family’s expectations: ‘You see, my mother is not doing well financially,’ 
he stressed, ‘and her health is not good. My brother is struggling with 
school fees just like I did.’ He then shared his aspiration: ‘I hope, when 
I start my business, and make profit, I will be able to help at least with 
transportation money’.
Indeed, only a week after he started his business, this participant took on 
the main responsibility for providing transport, and later, he frequently 
paid for the family’s food as his mother’s income was not stable.
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In the field, I saw participants spending between Tsh1,000 and 
Tsh3,000 per day or even per week to buy food for their families. This 
money was coming from their daily sales. During our evening walks to 
their homes, one of  the young women regularly bought fruits to take 
home and sometimes responded to requests from her mother to bring 
something home to eat. This could be rice, maize flour, beans or oil. 
Another young woman, who was selling fruits in a market space had to 
bring some back to her family every day. Similarly, a young woman who 
had a vegetable stand nearby her house often offered vegetables worth 
Tsh1,000–2,000 to her family at least four times in a week. Moreover, 
there were youth who contributed money to cover siblings’ school fees 
and sometimes even assisted parents in paying rent.
Most of  my participants felt obligated to contribute something because 
they were still dependent. To illustrate this situation, one of  them said: 
‘It might be true that I make money nowadays but I depend on my 
family for most things. Even the shack for my chickens belongs to my 
parents. Now, how do I refuse their request?’ Others said there is no 
assurance in business but relatives tend to help in good and bad times so 
one cannot just ignore them if  they are in need. There were also those 
who argued that since family members help to run the business in their 
absence, contributing money to meet their needs is just a way of  paying 
them back. But most of  all, they did so because everybody felt they had 
also become co-breadwinners.
3.3.2 Costs of transiting to adulthood through business
In the context of  unemployment, having a business is conceived of  
as self-employment and hence a way of  becoming an adult. For my 
research participants, this required them to abruptly transition to 
adulthood. This transition, however, comes with financial costs, not only 
to youths as individuals, but also to their nascent business.
In my analysis of  their financial diaries, it was evident that there had 
been a significant decrease of  the income the participants received from 
parents and relatives since they started their businesses. At the beginning, 
they would contribute between Tsh1,000 and Tsh3,000 per month, but 
from February 2013 their contributions to the basic daily needs of  their 
family decreased to zero and the young people seemed to be financing 
their basic needs themselves. At this point their spending became 
constant, that is, there was a pattern in how much they were spending on 
basic needs and the amount varied little from week to week.
Basic needs included transportation, communication, food and clothing. 
In the field, I observed them financing their lunches at work places, 
paying for their transport and buying vouchers for their phones. 
Trying to understand these spending patterns, I conducted focus group 
discussions on cash flows and personal costs. Keywords coming from 
the discussions included najisimamia meaning ‘I watch over myself ’, 
najikimu (‘I meet my basic needs’), and mambo madogomadogo (‘small basic 
needs’). In using these keywords, my participants were arguing that 
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since they had received the business grant the financial responsibility 
of  meeting their basic needs fell into their own hands, even before 
their business started making a profit. Recalling their financial situation 
before receiving the grant, one of  the young women proudly said: ‘I was 
depending on my mother for everything and when my mother did not 
have resources, I was asking support from relatives or friends’.
Hence once they started a business, things changed as they began 
to cater for their own needs: first, when they asked parents for 
support, they were asked ‘What is the use of  doing business if  one 
cannot support oneself ?’; and second, because they found a sense 
of  self-actualisation by financing their daily needs. In my talks with 
their parents, they argued that cutting child support is not only the 
act of  teaching them about living costs, but it also helps the child to 
learn about taking responsibility for her/his life. For instance, one 
of  the mothers argued: ‘If  you make money without knowing your 
responsibility, you might forget the reason why you are working; but if  
you know you must eat and dress out of  your business, then you take it 
seriously’. Most parents also argued that their economic situation did 
not allow them to continue supporting all their children. So, a young 
person having a business eases the financial responsibility of  parents.
The youth, on the other hand, felt the transition from childhood to 
adulthood was too abrupt. Narrating her experience, one said the 
Table 2 The costs of basic needs that young entrepreneurs incur
Item Description Cost
Food Most youth have their meals while they are running 
their businesses or are out of the house between two 
and seven days a week
Tsh1,000–7,000 per day
Transport Movement in the city is by public transport Participants pay between Tsh1,000 and 
Tsh8,000 per week
Communication Communication with clients, friends and family is mainly 
via family. However, to keep up with youth trends and 
information, one’s mobile phone becomes a connection 
to the world of which they seek to be a part
Tsh500 per day
Health The common diseases are headaches, malaria and 
stomach upset. The common treatment is self-
medication using painkillers and/or antimalarial tablets
This happens at least once a month and the 
cost is between Tsh100 and Tsh2,000
Clothing All youth are responsible for buying their clothes. 
Keeping up with the trend is costly but seems to be 
central to youth’s outlook and self-esteem
Participants purchased at least one of these 
items every month: clothes, shoes, socks, 
vests, t-shirts, etc., spending between 
Tsh2,000 and Tsh15,000. The majority 
spend Tsh8,000–10,000
Beauty and hair All youth use a salon to manage their hair Males spend Tsh2,000 per month for 
a haircut; female costs vary between 
Tsh5,000 and Tsh15,000 per month
Source Author’s own.
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transition was a confusing time: ‘One day I got up sick’, she recalls, ‘and 
told my aunt that I suspected I have malaria’. Her aunt responded: ‘It 
could be, go to the hospital and test’. Knowing that she normally gets 
money to go for check-ups, she prepared herself  and waited for her aunt 
to provide the money. But no money was provided. After a long wait, 
she decided to knock at her aunt’s door to tell her she was ready to leave, 
expecting she would give her money for the check-up. To her surprise, the 
aunt did not provide any money, saying: ‘OK, make sure you came back 
early’. She then asked for money directly: ‘Aunt, what about money?’ Her 
aunt responded with a question: ‘Aren’t you doing business?’
This experience was not unique to this young woman who, by then, 
had been running her business for less than two weeks. Among the 
participants, transition to adulthood was generally marked by an 
income-generating activity that made one capable of  supporting both 
oneself  and one’s family. Table 2 details the costs that the participants 
incurred in catering for family and personal needs.
4 Rethinking youth entrepreneurship
My research points to a disjuncture between (1) young people’s 
aspirations that are rooted in a neoliberal imaginary that education can 
provide the route to a successful career and a good life, and (2) policy 
and programme objectives of  promoting youth entrepreneurship. At 
the centre of  this disjuncture is the fact that for many young people, 
establishing and operating a small business is not recognised as decent 
employment. Rather, it is a signifier of  an inability to continue with 
further education and/or secure formal employment, and of  low status. 
Business is acceptable as a temporary means of  survival, but it is not 
what they imagine themselves doing into the future. Young people in the 
process of  establishing and nurturing their businesses used the phrase 
‘I am just around’, indicating that business was a temporary measure to 
be used to re-join the pathway to a salaried, middle-class future.
These observations are in line with and contribute to literature from 
anthropology and other fields on how the neoliberal economy has 
created uncertainty around youth futures (Honwana 2012; Cole and 
Durham 2008; Guyer 2007; Mains 2007; Hansen 2005; Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999). As a response to social and economic exclusion, young 
people develop strategies to navigate the constraints and uncertainties 
of  a precarious economy (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Cole 2004). 
There is also an emerging literature on the lives of  unemployed youth 
and the strategies they use to deal with time, using various concepts 
such as teatime (Masquelier 2013), waithood (Honwana 2012), timepass 
(Jeffrey 2008, 2010), and killing time (Ralph 2008).
But what does this disjuncture mean for youth employment policy and 
programmes, and specifically for the current emphasis on the promotion 
of  entrepreneurship and self-employment? Over the last decade, there 
has been a mushrooming of  entrepreneurship training, capital schemes 
and policy frameworks meant to build an entrepreneurial culture among 
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young people. However, these initiatives seldom start with, or take any 
account of, young people’s family situations or what they imagine as 
their futures. Rather, they assume those futures can, should and will be 
based on entrepreneurship.
As I found during the course of  my study, for many young people 
this assumption is simply not sustainable. The family demands put on 
youth from poor families are such that it is difficult for them to get a 
business up and running. On the other hand, while youth from relatively 
better-off families do not face the same demands, the work futures that 
the majority of  them and their families imagine are based on salaried 
employment, not entrepreneurship. They are only interested in starting 
and running a small business to the degree that it furthers their progress 
along the pathway to education and salaried employment.
This implies that any programme that seeks to induce entrepreneurship 
among young people should take account of  both their aspirations and 
the economic status of  their families. Such an approach might entail 
providing cash transfers to poor families so that they no longer need to 
depend on the businesses of  their young people. Recent studies indicate 
that poor families are capable of  using cash transfers responsibly 
to cater for their basic needs (Aizer et al. 2016). Similarly, such 
programmes may focus on providing health insurance for poor families 
or scholarships so that the youth who are establishing a business do 
not have to pay school fees and medical bills for their siblings. Further 
research needs to be done to systematically ascertain the social support 
needed to enable youth entrepreneurship.
5 Conclusion
Throughout this article, I have attempted to show how youth who opted 
to be in an entrepreneurship programme did so while attempting to 
realise a range of  aspirations. Their engagement with the programme was 
mediated by their family situations, which affected both their ability to 
manage business capital and how they imagined their future employment. 
In other words, success in inducing entrepreneurial behaviour was 
dependent more on the participants’ family situations than on the finer 
points of  the intervention. To date, however, the links between young 
participants in entrepreneurship programmes and their families have 
not been acknowledged. There is clearly a need for more contextualised 
approaches to entrepreneurship promotion among young people. If  
programmes are to be effective in inducing entrepreneurial behaviour 
among young people, they must start with them and their families.
Note
1 FD = female participant of  the focus group discussion, MD = male 
participant; Dar = Dar es Salaam; S1 = Seminar Room 1, where the 
focus group discussions took place.
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Glossary
ACGS African Centre for Gender and Social  
 Development [US]
ACODE Advocates Coalition for Development and  
 Environment [Uganda]
ACTS African Centre for Technology Studies [Kenya]
AERC African Economic Research Consortium [Kenya]
AfDB African Development Bank [Abidjan]
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
CBN Central Bank of  Nigeria
CBO community-based organisation
CEDLAS  Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y  
 Sociales [Argentina]
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural  
 Research [France]
CHPS Community-Based Health Planning and Services  
 [Ghana]
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIDI Community Integrated Development Initiatives  
 [Uganda]
CIS Commonwealth of  Independent States
CODESRIA Council for the Development of  Social Science  
 Research in Africa [Senegal]
CSO civil society organisations
CYF Canadian Development Foundation
DFCU  Development Finance Company of  Uganda Bank  
 Limited
EACC Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of  Kenya
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERP Economic Recovery Programme [Ghana]
ESL Economics School of  Louvain [Belgium]
ETF European Training Foundation [Italy]
FAC Future Agricultures Consortium [UK]
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization [Italy]
FDI foreign direct investment
GDI Global Development Institute [UK]
GDP gross domestic product
GEM Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
GERA Global Entrepreneurship Research Association
GoK Government of  Kenya
GSS Ghana Statistical Service
GTP Growth and Transformation Plan [Ethiopia]
GVF Graduate Venture Fund
GYEEDA Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial  
 Agency
ICT information and communications technology
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IDRC International Development Research Centre  
 [Canada]
IEA	 Institute	of 	Economic	Affairs	[Kenya]
IEG Independent Evaluation Group [US]
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development  
 [Italy]




IMF International Monetary Fund [US]
JHS junior high school
KYA Kayayei Youth Association [Ghana]
LCCI Lagos Chamber of  Commerce and Industry  
 [Nigeria]
LDC least developed country
LIC low income country
LESDEP Local Enterprises Skills Development Programme  
 [Ghana]
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army [Uganda]
LSP Livelihood Support Programme
masl metres above sea level
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MFI	 microfinance	institution
MIF Multilateral Investment Fund
MoALF Ministry of  Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries  
 [Kenya]
MoFED Ministry of  Finance and Economic Development  
 [Ethiopia]
MoLD Ministry of  Livestock Development [Kenya]
MoYA	 Ministry	of 	Youth	Affairs	[Kenya]
MSE micro and small enterprise
MYSC Ministry of  Youth, Sports and Culture [Ethiopia]
NDPC National Development Planning Commission  
 [Ghana]
NEET  not in education, employment, or training
NGO non-governmental organisation
NHH Norwegian School of  Economics
NYEP National Youth Employment Programme [Ghana]
NYP National Youth Policy [Ethiopia]
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and  
 Development [France]
OER  open educational resources
PASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development  
 to End Poverty [Ethiopia]
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PWP public works programme
RAPID research and policy in development
REP Rural Enterprise Project [Ghana]
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REPOA Research on Poverty Alleviation [Tanzania]
S4YE Solutions for Youth Employment
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SHS senior high school
TDR Special Programme for Research and Training in  
 Tropical Diseases [World Health Organization, US]
TLU tropical livestock unit
UCL Université Catholique de Louvain [Belgium]
UDEC University of  Dar es Salaam Entrepreneurship  
 Centre [Tanzania]
UIA Uganda Investment Authority
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and  
 Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme [US]
UNESCO	 United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	and	 
 Cultural Organisation [US]
URT United Republic of  Tanzania
VCP Vagrancy Control Proclamation [Ethiopia]
VET  vocational education and training
YDP Youth Development Package [Ethiopia]
YEA Youth Employment Agency [Ghana]
YEDF Youth Enterprise Development Fund [Kenya]
YES Youth Entrepreneurial Scheme [Uganda]
YLP Youth Livelihood Programme [Uganda]
YVCF Youth Venture Capital Fund [Uganda]
This page is intentionally left blank
Vol. 48 No. 3 May 2017: ‘Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge: New Perspectives’
174 | Glossary DOI: 10.19088/1968-2017.120
IDS Bulletin The IDS Bulletin is an open access, peer-review journal 
exploring emerging international development challenges. It is 
published bi-monthly and is the flagship publication of the Institute 
of Development Studies, a leading global institution for research, 
teaching and learning, and impact and communications, based at the 
University of Sussex. Progressive economic, social and political change 
for everyone needs new kinds of action and relationships, shaped 
by new kinds of research and engagement. The IDS Bulletin aims to 
transform development knowledge, through its unique thematic 
issues developed by global learning partnerships that bridge academic, 
practice and policy discourse.
Publishing Manager/Bulletin Editorial Coordinator Alison Norwood 
Marketing and Production Officer Gary Edwards 
Publisher The IDS Bulletin is published by the Institute of 
Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK.  
Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261. 
Cover photo Nigeria, Lagos. Fashion designer Ejiro Amos Tafiri, 28, in 
her busy workshop as she and her team produce her latest collection 
for Lagos Fashion and Design Week. In 2014 she opened a flagship 
store in Ikoyi, an upmarket neighbourhood, and her clothes are worn 
by the rich and famous. Nonetheless she still caters for young women 
of more modest means.
Photographer Andrew Esiebo/Panos
Disclaimer The Publisher and Issue Editors cannot be held responsible 
for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information 
contained in this journal; the views and opinions expressed do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Publisher and Issue Editors, neither 
does the publication of advertisements constitute any endorsement 
by the Publisher and Issue Editors of the products advertised. 
Copyright and photocopying IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development 
Studies 
This issue is published under a CC BY-NC licence.
This is an Open Access issue distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 International 
licence, which permits downloading and sharing provided the  
original authors and source are credited – but the work is not used 
for commercial purposes.  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
Online open access This journal is available online at bulletin.ids.ac.uk. 
Visit the site to search for articles and authors and register for table 
of contents email alerts. 
Information for subscribers The IDS Bulletin is published in six issues 
per year. Institutional subscription price for 2017 is £430 (no VAT 
applicable). 
Advertising enquiries Gary Edwards, Marketing and Production Officer, 
IDS Communications and Engagement Unit, idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk 
Volume 48 (2017) 
No. 1 Sex Education in the Digital Era 
No. 2 Interrogating Decentralisation in Africa
Volume 47 (2016) 
No. 1 Opening Governance 
No. 1A Connecting Perspectives on Women’s Empowerment 
No. 2  Development Studies – Past, Present and Future 
No. 3 Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond 
No. 4 Foresight in International Development 
No. 5 Power, Poverty and Inequality 
No. 2A States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New 
  Development Era 
No. 6 Engaged Excellence
Volume 46 (2015) 
No. 1 Towards Systemic Approaches to Evaluation and Impact  
No. 2  Graduating from Social Protection?  
No. 3  Business, State and Society: Changing Perspectives, Roles and 
  Approaches in Development  
No. 4  Beijing+20: Where Now for Gender Equality?  
No. 5  What is the Unique Contribution of Volunteering to  
  International Development?  
No. 6  Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility
Volume 45 (2014) 
No. 1  Undressing Patriarchy: Men and Structural Violence 
No. 2–3 New Perspectives from PhD Field Research 
No. 4  China and International Development: Challenges and  
  Opportunities 
No. 5  Localising Governance 
No. 6  Rethinking Impact Evaluation for Development
Periodical ID statement The IDS Bulletin (ISSN 0265-5012 print) is 
published bi-monthly in January, March, May, July, September and 
November. Mailing agent: Gary Edwards, Institute of Development 
Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK.  
Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261 idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk
Postmaster Send all address changes to IDS Bulletin, Gary Edwards, 
Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. 
Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261 idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk
Journal customer services For ordering information, claims and 
any enquiry concerning your journal subscription please contact 
Gary Edwards, Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, 
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261 idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk 
Print details printed in the UK by Nexus Design & Print Ltd,  
Studio 38, Adur Business Centre, Little High Street,  
Shoreham-by-Sea BN43 5EG, UK.
Delivery terms and legal title Prices include delivery of print journals 
to the recipient’s address. Delivery terms are Delivery Duty Unpaid 
(DDU); the recipient is responsible for paying any import duty or 
taxes. Legal title passes to the customer on despatch. 







































IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies 2017 
www.ids.ac.uk IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and 
registered in England (No. 877338). 
AFRICA’S YOUTH EMPLOYMENT 
CHALLENGE: NEW PERSPECTIVES
Transforming Development Knowledge
Volume 48 | Number 3 | May 2017
‘Youths’ aspirations and imagined potential are  
the most important basis on which young 
people can engage with policy and programmes 
concerning their working futures.’
ISSN 0265-5012 (print), 1759-5436 (online) DOI: 10.19088/1968-2017.121
Volum
e 48 | N
um



























Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge:  
New Perspectives
Editors Seife Ayele, Samir Khan and James Sumberg
Volume 48 | Number 3 | May 2017 
Introduction: New Perspectives on Africa’s Youth Employment Challenge
Seife Ayele, Samir Khan and James Sumberg
Youth Employment in Developing Economies: Evidence on Policies and 
Interventions
Nicholas Kilimani
The Politics of Youth Employment and Policy Processes in Ethiopia
Eyob Balcha Gebremariam
The Side-Hustle: Diversified Livelihoods of Kenyan Educated Young Farmers
Grace Muthoni Mwaura
Gambling, Dancing, Sex Work: Notions of Youth Employment in Uganda
Victoria Flavia Namuggala
Navigating Precarious Employment: Social Networks Among Migrant Youth 
in Ghana
Thomas Yeboah
Youth Participation in Smallholder Livestock Production and Marketing
Edna Mutua, Salome Bukachi, Bernard Bett, Benson Estambale and 
Isaac Nyamongo
Non-Farm Enterprises and the Rural Youth Employment Challenge in Ghana
Monica Lambon-Quayefio
Does Kenya’s Youth Enterprise Development Fund Serve Young People?
Maurice Sikenyi
Promoting Youth Entrepreneurship: The Role of Mentoring
Ayodele Ibrahim Shittu
Programme-Induced Entrepreneurship and Young People’s Aspirations
Jacqueline Halima Mgumia
